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THE CULTURE OF TAX AVOIDANCE 
HENRY ORDOWER* 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TAX PLANNING FOR TAX AVOIDANCE 
When Judge Learned Hand observed: “Any one may so arrange his affairs 
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase 
one’s taxes,”1 he provided the tax planning industry compelling rhetoric to 
legitimize and mainstream its activities.  Identifying a transactional structure 
that is consistent with the client’s business or investment objectives but also 
produces a more favorable tax outcome than other possible structures enables 
tax professionals to serve more than their historical support and reporting roles.  
Tax planners, like deal planners, “add value” as they provide their legal and 
accounting services. 
While I am reluctant to bite the proverbial hand that feeds me both 
intellectually and economically in my tax planner capacity, I always have 
found differing tax outcomes for economically identical transactions 
counterintuitive and counterproductive.  Counterintuitive because if two 
otherwise like taxpayers each receive $100 of income but do not pay the same 
amount of tax on that $100, the outcome defies my sense of order.  A tax 
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 1.  Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d sub nom. Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (deciding a case where taxpayer caused a corporation to engage 
in a divisive reorganization under the statute, spinning off a corporation that held only shares of a 
third corporation; taxpayer liquidated the spun off corporation in order to sell the third 
corporation shares and have capital gain, rather than ordinary dividend income on the 
distribution).  Approval of technical compliance with the tax law to achieve a favorable outcome 
despite possible inconsistency with the intention of the law is older.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Isham, 84 U.S. 496, 506 (1873) (stating “[t]hat if the device is carried out by the means of legal 
forms, it is subject to no legal censure”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
48 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:47 
should impose like burdens on like taxpayers,2 so that the taxpayer engaging 
the tax planner’s services gains no advantage over the taxpayer without a tax 
planner.  Counterproductive in that the possibility of differing tax outcomes 
distracts attention from the activity of producing goods that might benefit 
society and directs that attention to the activity of tax planning.  While I may 
be unwilling to go so far, Professor Weisbach indeed makes this point as he 
argues for elimination of all tax planning.3  Professor Doctor Drüen makes 
similar observations from a German perspective4 but is more tentative about 
restricting tax planning.  Professor Drüen identifies a conflict in applicable 
constitutional principles between the constitutional freedom to structure one’s 
business affairs to one’s advantage5 and the constitutional equality principle as 
it generally applies to taxation.6 
 
 2.  The literature identifies this concept as “horizontal equity.”  See generally Joseph J. 
Cordes, Horizontal Equity, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 164–66 (Joseph 
J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999); Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as 
Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259, 265 
(2006) (exploring United States Supreme Court and German Constitutional Court decisions that 
apply their respective constitutions to taxation controversies, especially controversies in matters 
involving equal protection or due process protection). 
 3.  David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 223–24 
(2002). 
 4. Klaus-Dieter Drüen, Unternehmerfreiheit und Steuerumgehung [Entrepreneurial 
Freedom and Tax Avoidance], 2008 STEUER UND WIRTSCHAFT [STUW] 154, 158 
(“Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet den Wettbewerb und führt zur ineffizienten 
Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in Unternehmen, Steuerberatung und 
Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung gebunden wird.”) [“From an economic 
perspective, tax avoidance disrupts competition and leads to inefficient allocation of resources as 
considerable personnel in business, tax planning industries, and the state remain far from 
economic production maximization activity.”] (author’s translation). 
 5. Id. at 155 (identifying the source of this freedom under the decisions of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] as Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], Article 2, Paragraph 1).  GG 
Article 2, Paragraph 1 reads:  “Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Persönlichkeit, 
soweit er nicht die Rechte anderer verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung oder 
das Sittengesetz verstößt.”  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 
[GRUNDGESTZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 2(1) (Ger.), amended by Gesetz 
zur Änderung des Grundgestzes [Law Amending Basic Law], July 29, 2009, BGBL. I at 2248, 
art. 1 (Ger.), translated in PRESS & INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THE 
BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: PROMULGATED BY THE 
PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL ON 23 MAY 1949 AS AMENDED UP TO 16 JULY 1998 14 (Christian 
Tomuschat & David Curry trans., 1998) (“Every person has the right to free development of his 
personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional 
order or the moral code.”). 
 6. Drüen, supra note 4, at 156–57 (identifying the source of the equality principle as GG, 
art. 3(1)).  “Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich.”  GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESTZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, 
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Despite my reservations about the utility and logic of tax planning, it 
seems likely to remain part of the landscape of the economy not only of the 
United States but also of other modern national economies.  Tax planning often 
enjoys and is likely to continue to enjoy the protection of textualist judicial 
decisions.7  With respect to tax planning, including tax sheltering, a rich 
literature, both in academic and practice circles, addresses the prevalence of 
tax avoidance through planning as well as the administrative, legislative, and 
judicial efforts to contain the planning.8 
 
art. 3(1) (Ger.), translated in PRESS & INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 
supra note 5, at 14 (“All persons shall be equal before the law.”). 
 7. Textualism in the language of interpretative theory refers generally to interpretation of 
the law solely from the words of its statutory text without regard to external sources that might 
provide context or gloss on the statute.  See generally Noël B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, 
Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004) (noting textualism has contributed to the 
rise of tax shelters and arguing for partnership anti-avoidance rules); Steven A. Dean & Lawrence 
M. Solan, Tax Shelters and the Code: Navigating Between Text and Intent, 26 VA. TAX REV. 879 
(2007) (focusing on statutory text to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate application); 
Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 362 (2006) 
(arguing that purposivistic legislation like codification of economic substance will not succeed 
against textualist arguments so that judicial interpretation of the uncodified doctrine may be more 
successful in combating shelters); Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 
TEMP. L. REV. 445 (1993) (viewing textualism under Scalia’s decisions as a form of literalism 
that unnecessarily confines interpretation). 
 8. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 5–
20 (2000) [hereinafter Bankman, Economic Substance Doctrine] (identifying flaws and 
complexities of the dual economic substance test and recommending an ordinary course of 
business exception); Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 
TAX L. REV. 539, 541, 590 (2009) (arguing that shaming  may be counter-productive and 
encourage other managers to be less timid in part because there is no public approbrium); Marvin 
A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Essay, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1952–53 (2005) (proposing broad disallowance of all non-economic 
loss unless Congress specifically sanctions or gives treasury power to disallow losses 
retroactively and to disallow allocation of gain to tax indifferent parties); Michael L. Schler, Ten 
More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor 
Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 371 (2002) (arguing lack of political will to respond to tax 
avoidance and recommending increased disclosure requirements); Weisbach, supra note 3, at 
222–25 (favoring outlawing all tax planning).  See generally Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 
7; Galle, supra note 7, at 362; Jay A. Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and their Implications 
for Tax Compliance, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 328–29 (2008) (arguing that there has been a 
breakdown in ethical standards in practice and their enforcement and seeing malpractice 
jurisprudence as an opportunity to restore standards with penalties and prohibitions on insurance 
for malpractice in tax sheltering). 
  In 2001, Southern Methodist University School of Law held a symposium on tax shelters 
and published the papers in its law journal, including: Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and 
Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2001) (applying FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991) to anti-avoidance rules); Joseph Bankman, 
Commentary, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REV. 149, 
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From the literature, one gets the impression that tax planning and tax 
avoidance is so prevalent in the countries with developed national economies 
that tax avoidance always has been or has become acceptable behavior.  
Judicial sanction of tax planning, however, has not been free from restrictions.  
Courts in the United States, for example, have imposed broad, general 
doctrinal limits on permissible tax planning.  Even in Helvering v. Gregory,9 
Judge Hand quickly added an equally elegant overall limitation on tax planning 
to his elegant endorsement of tax planning.10  Judge Hand rejected a strict 
textualist interpretation of taxing statutes (long before we discussed statutory 
interpretation in those terms)11 and sought to limit tax-reducing arrangements 
to those that are consistent with the intention of the taxing statute.12  Judge 
Hand wrote: “but the meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the 
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no degree of 
particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear, and 
which all collectively create.”13  This limitation on tax planning requires that 
 
150–51 (2001) [hereinafter Bankman, Business Purpose Doctrine] (observing both an age 
difference and practice difference with older practitioners aged 45–65 being more comfortable 
with standards and younger practitionhers being more comfortable with textualism); Peter 
Cannellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in 
Structuring Business Transactions in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 51–57 (2001) (seeing a 
split tax bar between normal and tax shelter bar); Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of 
Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 146–47 (2001) (concluding that efforts to solve the problem 
with anti-abuse rules or other broad rules will not succeed). 
  And there is considerable literature outside the English speaking world as well.  See 
TERESA SIMON ALMENDAL, SKATTEANPASSADE TRANSAKTIONER OCH SKATTEBROTT [TAX-
PLANNED TRANSACTIONS AND TAX CRIME] 268 (2005) (addressing tax planning and tax 
criminality and possible solutions in Sweden); Drüen, supra note 4, at 158; Anders Hultqvist, 
Skatteundvikande förfaranden och skatteflykt [Tax Avoidance Transactions and Tax Flight], 
SVENSK SKATTETIDNINGEN [SVSKT] [SWEDISH TAX JOURNAL], June 2002, at 302 (detailing the 
shortcomings of the Swedish general anti-avoidance rule for lack of consistent application and 
problems of conflict with other statutory interpretation issues, in particular the need to identify 
legislative statutory intent where it is necessary to hypothesize that intent in applying the GAAR); 
Peter Karlsson, Åtgärder mot skatteflykt och en särskild studie av “handelsbolagslösningen” 
[Provisions Against Tax Flight and a Particular Study of the Partnership Solution], (Oct. 2, 
2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs Universitet), available at 
http://www.uppsatser.se/uppsats/93312375a1/ (raising similar concerns and discussing a specific 
type of tax shelter involving sale of corporate interests to an offshore partnership). 
 9. 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 10. Id. at 810–11.  See also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Learned Hand’s Contribution to the Law 
of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 445–46 (1968) (identifying the limited scope of Hand’s 
opinion). 
 11. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 7, at 394, 401 (contrasting Learned Hand’s approach to 
modern textualism); Geier, supra note 7, at 459 (discussing strict adherence to the letter of tax 
law as textualism). 
 12. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810–11. 
 13. Id. at 810–11. 
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the substance of the transaction, rather than its form, control the tax outcome.  
The outcome must match the intention of the taxing statute that otherwise 
applies to the transaction’s form.  Transactions lacking economic and business 
purpose, other than to capture a tax advantage by meeting specific statutory 
requirements, fail this judicial test.14 
Hence the tax collector has not been utterly defenseless in combating tax 
avoidance plans.  Multiple levels of prevention have surfaced and enjoyed 
varying degrees of success.  In the United States, courts have applied 
interpretive glosses like the sham transaction,15 business purpose,16 economic 
substance17 and substance over form18 doctrines to prevent tax reducing 
schemes.19 
In addition to judicial doctrines, legislatures increasingly have enacted 
general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) to shore up weakened statutory supports 
of tax collection.20  Where legislatures perceive a non-compliant use of a 
statute to be common or especially troublesome, subject to the limitations and 
sluggishness of the political process, they modify the statute to correct the 
 
 14. Id. at 811.  For a long line of cases following Gregory, see, for example, Knetsch v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (holding that interest paid on insurance borrowing was a 
sham lacking economic substance); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 
2006) (disallowing interest deductions on borrowings to acquire company owned life insurance 
on employees’ lives as without economic substance); Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 
1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding the taxpayer had no economic interest in property where the 
debt encumbering the property greatly exceeded the property’s value).  For recent discussions of 
the economic substance doctrine, see Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters 
in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 600–04 (Supp. 2010) (examining the Obama 
Administration’s approach to the economic substance doctrine) and Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither 
Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389 (2010) (arguing the modern economic substance 
doctrine should be abandoned and replaced by a “Congressional intent” inquiry). 
 15. Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 366. 
 16. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) (2010) (requiring the taxpayer to demonstrate a business 
purpose for tax-deferred reorganization). 
 17. Estate of Franklin, 544 F.2d at 1048. 
 18. See Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810–11 (noting that when interpreting stautes, “the meaning of a 
sentence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes”). 
 19. I tend to agree generally with Professor Bankman that the economic substance doctrine 
includes the other doctrines in its operation.  See Bankman, Economic Substance Doctrine, supra 
note 8, at 12. 
 20. See generally NABIL OROW, GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES: A COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS (2000) (noting that Parliaments in Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand have enacted GAARs); Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83 (2001) (noting other countries use GAARs as their 
preferred strategy for dealing with corporate tax shelters); Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 
27 VA. TAX REV. 833 (2008) (addressing design, enactment, and function of GAARs in English 
speaking countries).  This Article will use the acronym “GAAR” for general anti-avoidance rule 
consistent with the convention in the literature. 
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statutory flaw and close the possible loophole.21  Also, legislatures have 
introduced penalty regimes to dissuade taxpayers and their advisors from 
engaging in particularly egregious tax planning conduct.22 
Commentators have suggested a broad range of judicial, administrative, 
and legislative corrections, most only partial, to the problem of tax avoidance.  
One commentator views tax malpractice litigation as a growing alliance 
between taxpayers and tax collectors to reign in the excesses of the tax 
planning community and invites the bar to assist.23  Other commentators have 
proposed a prohibition on tax planning generally,24 more disclosure 
requirements for taxpayers,25 a broad disallowance of all non-economic loss,26 
and an ordinary course of business requirement to allow tax benefits incidental 
to ordinary business transactions, but not those emanating from transactions 
planned to capture tax benefits.27  Commentators even have proposed shaming 
of corporate taxpayers that invest in aggressive tax shelters as a method to 
encourage shareholders to pressure managers to comply with the tax laws.28 
If implemented, each recommendation might accomplish a great deal in 
limiting tax avoidance.  Implementation, however, requires that the 
recommendation gain necessary political traction.  That traction has remained 
 
 21. For example, Congress altered the reorganization rules the taxpayer sought to exploit in 
Gregory.  See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810–11 (noting how the defendant created 
a subsidiary corporation to exploit a loophole and avoid taxes).  The statutory change required 
that following the reorganization distribution both the parent and the spun off subsidiary continue 
to actively conduct one or more of the pre-reorganization historical businesses.  I.R.C. § 355(b) 
(1986).  Section 355(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”), as amended, is the 
current form of the active business limitation on divisive, tax-deferred reorganizations.  I.R.C. § 
355(b) (2006). 
 22. See I.R.C. § 6601 (2006) (imposing interest charges on underpayment and nonpayment 
of taxes); Id. §§ 6651–6656 (imposing penalties for negligence and fraud, failure to pay estimated 
income tax, failure to file certain information returns, and failure to pay tax); Id. §§ 6662–6663 
(imposing penalties for accuracy-related underpayments); Id. § 6694 (imposing penalties upon tax 
return preparer for understating taxpayer’s liability).  For a discussion of the penalties see infra, 
notes 139–46, 284 and accompanying text. 
 23. Soled, supra note 8, at 328–29. 
 24. See Weisbach, supra note 3, at 224 (arguing that tax planning imposes costs on those 
who do not plan, and that making the tax planners externalize these costs would eliminate tax 
planning altogether). 
 25. Schler, supra note 8, at 394. 
 26. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1952–53.  Note that in I.R.C. § 469 (2006), the 
passive activity loss limitations applicable primarily to individuals rather than corporations, 
defers the deduction of taxable loss until the taxpayer bears the economic burden of that loss.  
Chirelstein & Zelenak seem to propose an I.R.C. § 469 on steroids that would apply to all non-
economic behavior and to all taxpayers.  Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 8, at 1952–53. 
 27. Bankman, Business Purpose Doctrine, supra note 8, at 151. 
 28. See Blank, supra note 8, at 547–58 (discussing shaming as a possible sanction); but see 
id. at 559 (arguing that shaming may have little effect and even may prove counter-productive). 
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elusive.  Tax planning, tax sheltering, tax avoidance and evasion remain grave 
problems for the integrity of tax systems worldwide. 
In this Article, I argue that over the past half century or longer, multiple 
factors have contributed to and fused into a culture of tax avoidance.  In the 
United States, Congress has fueled and continues to fuel the growth of that tax 
avoidance culture by relying on the taxation system to deliver a variety of 
subsidies and economic stimuli that are unrelated to the administration and 
collection of taxes.  In some cases, Congress has used the Code to drive social 
policy.29  That reliance confuses taxpayers concerning the function of taxation, 
the nature and importance of governmental services, and taxpayers’ own tax 
compliance obligations.  In the presence of that culture, legislatures and 
national executives lack the political will to adopt those proposals that actually 
might minimize or even eliminate the tax avoidance problem.30  Rather, the 
legislatures and executives settle on political compromises that have their own 
flaws and produce only limited corrective results, GAARs being one example.  
I conclude that the cultural change essential to quell tax avoidance requires (i) 
the political resolve to suppress collateral, non-revenue-collection uses of the 
taxation system like delivering subsidies and economic stimuli or driving 
social policy and (ii) dedication of the resources necessary to enforce the tax 
laws and educate the public about the societal role of tax law and taxpayers’ 
responsibilities under the tax laws. 
In Part Two of the Article, I selectively trace the history of tax sheltering in 
the United States and observe how the legislature increasingly relied on the 
taxation system to deliver economic subsidies and direct social policy.  That 
reliance or even dependence on the taxation system caused many industry 
participants to confuse statutorily sanctioned tax planning with securing 
unintended tax benefits.31  In the presence of that confusion, courts became 
unable and unwilling to do the legislature’s work of distinguishing intentional 
from unintentional tax benefits.32  Moreover, confusion of purpose and the mix 
of intended and unintended tax benefits for high income or wealthy taxpayers 
contributed to the growing perception of unfairness in the tax system.33 
Part Three briefly reviews the role of bar and accounting self-regulatory 
organizations in the United States with respect to tax avoidance.  There, I argue 
that both types of self-regulatory organizations failed to set and enforce tax 
practice standards.  As practitioners undermined historical barriers between 
 
 29. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION at xxxvii, xl–xli (5th ed. 2008) 
(noting that using tax law to encourage activity with social benefits and discourage activity with 
social detriments has increased the tax code’s complexity). 
 30. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text (discussing those proposals). 
 31. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra notes 250–52 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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intended and unintended tax subsidies, the self-regulatory organizations 
declined to police their memberships adequately to combat aggressive tax 
planning trends—contributing to the cynicism within the tax professional 
community concerning the tax administrator’s34 ability to do its job.35 
Part Four of the article turns its attention to tax avoidance as a problem 
outside the United States as well.  In discussing GAARs and their underlying 
flaws, I argue that GAARs demonstrate that the governments of many 
countries perceive tax avoidance to have become a national difficulty.  I argue 
further that GAARs reveal legislatures’ and executives’ growing public 
acknowledgement of the inability of tax administrators to combat tax 
avoidance with their existing administrative and statutory tools.  At the same 
time, GAARs demonstrate legislative and executive ambivalence toward 
radical problem solving where the problem is tax collection.36 
Part Five supplements Part Four’s identification of misuse of tax statutes 
outside the United States and provides some examples, as it describes tax 
planning through structured transactions in Sweden37 and the use of foreign 
foundations38 in Germany and other countries to avoid domestic income 
taxation. 
In Part Six, I look more directly to the developing culture of tax avoidance 
as it converges with and legitimizes tax evasion.  I seek to identify how the 
various elements combined to form the tax avoidance culture, and I observe 
that the period of the cultural development was a time of growing wealth 
disparities39 that gave greater economic and political influence to the wealthy 
minority.  That minority seemed ever less willing to share that wealth through 
 
 34. In the United States, the tax administrator is the Internal Revenue Service that this article 
will refer as the “IRS.” 
 35. See infra notes 280–82 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra note 313 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra Part V. 
 38. “Stiftung” (plural “Stiftungen”) is the German term for foundations.  DAS GROSSE 
DEUTSCHES WÖRTERBUCH [GERMAN DICTIONARY] 3427 (Gerhard Wahrig ed., 1967). 
 39. See MICHAEL PARISI & MICHAEL STRUDLER, IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, THE 400 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS REPORTING THE HIGHEST ADJUSTED GROSS INCOMES EACH 
YEAR 1992–2000 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=203102,00.html 
(showing increasing concentration of income in the top 400 group of earners); ARLOC SHERMAN 
& CHAD STONE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INCOME GAPS BETWEEN VERY RICH 
AND EVERYONE ELSE MORE THAN TRIPLED IN LAST THREE DECADES, NEW DATA SHOW 
(2010), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-25-10inc.pdf (noting that the gaps in after-tax 
income between the richest 1% of Americans and the poorest fifth of the country more than 
tripled between 1979 and 2007); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the 
United States 1913–1998, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2003) (finding that top wage shares have increased 
since 1970 and are higher than prior to World War II). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] THE CULTURE OF TAX AVOIDANCE 55 
taxation.  Pseudo-grass roots40 anti-tax movements burgeoned and supported 
the anti-tax goals of the wealthy, the tax planning and sheltering industries 
flourished, and current technologies contributed to and facilitated that cultural 
development.41 
Part seven concludes that it will become necessary to address each element 
that contributed to the creation of the culture of tax avoidance in order to 
engender the cultural change toward tax compliance.  One critical element of 
that change I argue demands that we renew our tax systems as revenue 
collection structures, eliminating the multiplicity of functions they currently 
serve. 
I.  TRACING TAX SHELTERING IN THE UNITED STATES 
Many structured tax avoidance transactions are tax shelters, but not all tax 
shelters are tax avoidance transactions.  While the most visible application of 
the economic substance doctrine42 in the United States in recent years has been 
in relation to a series of aggressive tax shelter products,43 tax sheltering is by 
no means synonymous with tax avoidance in the pejorative usage of that term. 
While this article will argue that the growth of the tax sheltering industry 
contributed significantly to the current prevalence of tax avoidance 
transactions, the “tax shelter” concept encompasses many transactions and tax 
structures that are fully consistent with legislative intent.  In the United States, 
the tax sheltering industry builds products to seize tax saving opportunities 
Congress provided to subsidize specific industries.  For example, Congress 
historically has provided various tax subsidies to industries that explored for 
 
 40. I refer to the low to middle income anti-tax rhetoric as pseudo-grass roots because it 
tends to be against economic interest.  Traditional grass roots organizers, unions, and community 
organizations generally better represent the economic interests of those they organize. 
 41. See Patricia B. Hsue, Comment, Lessons from United States v. Stein: Is the Line 
Between Criminal and Civil Sanctions for Illegal Tax Shelters a Dot?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 903, 
909–11 (2008) (noting that the text shelter industry emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
and that corporate tax shelters flourished in the 1980s). 
 42. The economic substance doctrine served as a U.S. non-statutory GAAR, until its 
codification as I.R.C. § 7701(o) in 2010.  Health Care and Education Reconcilation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (2010).  See also infra note 304 and 
accompanying text.  For a recent general discussion of economic substance and corporate tax 
shelters in the United States, see Kaye, supra note 14, at 600–04 and Lederman, supra note 14, at 
416–41. 
 43. See discussion of the so-called “son of boss” transactions, infra note 232 and 
accompanying text.  See, e.g., Clearmeadow Invs., LLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 509, 528 
(2009) (holding that even if the transaction conforms literally to the Code, it must serve a 
“business or corporate purpose” and perform a function other than reducing taxes; noting the 
purpose is measured by “objective economic reality” as determined by a reasonable possibility of 
yielding a profit and whether “the transaction affected the taxpayer’s financial position in any 
way”). 
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and produced certain natural resources.44  In some instances, the tax-based 
subsidies provide resources to activities that the legislatures deem beneficial to 
the country or community.45  In other instances, the subsidies may be a 
function of successful industry lobbying or a political exchange within 
Congress in order to gain the support of a member of Congress for some 
unrelated legislation.46  This article will refer to investments that seek to obtain 
those subsidies as though the legislature intended them as tax advantaged 
investments rather than tax avoidance transactions. 
Whether the transaction or tax structure is consistent with the legislative 
intention underlying the applicable tax statutes or not, one finds among tax 
shelter products: 1) profitable transactions for which the statutorily intended 
tax benefits materially enhance the return, 2) economically sensible 
transactions that employ unnecessarily complex structures or insert inessential 
structural elements to capture a more favorable tax outcome than economically 
more efficient structures would, and 3) tax driven transactions that, but for tax 
advantages, would be unprofitable or at best minimally profitable.  Early in the 
development of a tax sheltered investment community in the United States, 
shelter promoters designed products for investors whose income otherwise 
 
 44. Percentage depletion, under I.R.C. § 613, allows a deduction for a percentage of the 
gross income from production of natural resources without regard to the cost of the underlying 
production rights or their exhaustion.  I.R.C. § 613 (2006).  Percentage depletion permits a greater 
deduction in conjunction with natural resource production than does cost depletion.  Id. § 611(a).  
Cost depletion allows a deduction only for recovery of the taxpayer’s investment in a natural 
resource deposit in proportion to relationship between the quantity produced and the quantity in 
the deposit.  Id.  This longstanding subsidy, along with current expensing of intangible drilling 
costs for oil and natural gas, encourages exploration and production and lends itself to tax shelter 
construction when accompanied with economic, borrowing leverage.  See id. § 263(c).  
Percentage depletion reduces the taxable income from successful production activities, while 
leaving the economic return undiminished.  Expensing of intangible drilling costs accelerates the 
recovery of investment expenditures to the moment of investment rather than requiring, as with 
most investments, that the taxpayer capitalize the expenditure, add it to the taxpayer’s tax basis in 
the production property, and recover it for tax purposes upon sale of the property or, through cost 
depletion, as the investment produces income and consumes the limited geological resource.  
Economic borrowing leverage magnifies the benefit from tax expensing, that is, current deduction 
of the leveraged intangible drilling costs.  See discussion of borrowing leverage and Crane v. 
Commissioner, infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 45. Low income housing credits (I.R.C. § 42(a) (2006)); research and experimentation 
expensing and credits (Id. § 174); expensing of certain durable, tangible personal property (Id. § 
179); accelerated depreciation (Id. § 168); and investment tax credits to encourage investment in 
durable goods (Id. § 46); rehabilitation credit (Id. § 47); energy credit (Id. § 48); qualifying 
advanced coal project credit (Id. § 48A); qualifying gasification project credit (Id. § 48B); and 
qualifying advanced energy project (I.R.C. § 48C (1986)). 
 46. THOMAS B. CURTIS & DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 87–90 
(1992) (support for one’s present measure in exchange for future support facilitates reaching a 
consensus and is frequently used in Congress). 
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would become subject to a high rate of tax.47  As time passed, investor demand 
and promoters’ eagerness to expand their investor base combined to render tax 
sheltering increasingly an upper-middle-income business.48 
Sheltering embedded itself quickly into the American cultural landscape.  
Non-corporate taxpayer-investors49 adjusted their investment portfolios from 
traditional investments, such as stocks and bonds, to tax advantaged products, 
including municipal bonds50 and a variety of syndicated, tax sheltered 
investment products,51 sometimes even when it was not clearly economically 
 
 47. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) (denying claimed interest 
deductions from the interest the taxpayer paid on borrowing involving a scheme to purchase a life 
insurance product and borrow its cash value as a sham designed to generate interest deductions 
without any real economic interest cost to the taxpayer).  During much of the period from the end 
of World War II until 1981, individuals were subject to progressive marginal federal income tax 
rates with a maximum marginal federal income tax rate for individuals reaching 70% or more.  
I.R.C. § 1 (1954).  The taxpayer in Knetsch v. United States was subject to a marginal federal 
income tax rate in excess of 90%.  Knetsch, 364 U.S. at 366. 
 48. See STEPHEN E. ROULAC, TAX SHELTER SALE-LEASEBACK FINANCING: THE ECONOMIC 
REALITIES 55 (1976). 
 49. Corporations during the post-war period were subject to progressive rates as well but the 
highest rate remained in the 50% range.  See I.R.C. § 11 (1954) (providing for a normal corporate 
income tax of 30% and an additional surtax of 22% for high income corporations). 
 50. I.R.C. § 103 (2006) generally excludes the interest a taxpayer earns on funds the 
taxpayer lends to a state or local government. 
 51. Tax shelter syndications predominantly were private placements of limited partnership 
interests.  See generally JACK H. HALPERIN, PRIVATE PLACEMENT OF SECURITIES (1984) 
(detailing numerous types of tax-sheltered arrangements attorneys could help their clients use).  
The limited partnership interests were securities under Sections 2(2) and 2(3) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, as amended, but the offering of the interests was exempt from the registration 
requirements of Section 5 of the Securities Act as the offering did not involve the public offering 
of securities, thereby qualifying for the registration exemption under Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(2)–(3), 77d, 77e (2006).  Generally, the promoter would seek to 
fit the offering into one or more of the various safe harbor, private placement rules under that 
section, especially Securities Act Regulation D consisting of Rules 501 through 508.  17 C.F.R. 
§§ 230.502–230.508 (2010); see also Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for 
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 33-6389 
[1982–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982); HALPERIN, 
supra, at 162–66. 
  While the offering was exempt from registration, the interests remained subject to the 
general disclosure requirements and anti-fraud rules of the securities laws, so that legal counsel 
recommended that promoters provide full disclosure to prospective investors in the form of an 
offering document, generally called a private placement offering memorandum (PPM).  The PPM 
resembled the prospectus that the partnership and promoter would have provided if the offering 
had been a public offering.  The PPM included disclosures of information concerning the 
prospective investment that the promoter and the promoter’s financial, tax and legal advisors 
thought that a reasonable investor would deem to be material to his or her investment decision, as 
Securities Act Rule 502(a)(2) requires.  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(2) (2010). 
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beneficial to the investors to do so.52  Loss of money in bad shelters seemed 
more desirable than payment of like or lesser sums in tax.  Moderate income 
individuals actively sought strategies to limit their income tax liability.53  The 
shelter industry survived tax rate reductions and introduction of requirements 
that taxpayers assume personal liability for partnership debt in order to capture 
tax benefits.54  The industry evolved when the passive activity loss limitations 
of I.R.C. § 469 made sheltering unavailable to the industry’s traditional 
investing community of highly compensated taxpayers.55  Shelter promoters 
increasingly developed products for corporations and for individuals and 
corporations that had large capital gains.56 
A. Development and Structure of Syndicated Deferral/Conversion Tax 
Shelters for Income Tax; Tax Exempt Earnings; Estate Tax Sheltering 
Techniques 
Traditionally, syndicated tax sheltered investments in the United States 
afforded taxpayers the opportunity to secure current deductions that they could 
use to offset income from other sources—including income from the 
performance of services.57  The deductions enabled taxpayers to defer taxation 
 
  State and local bonds on which the interest was exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 103 
(1986) were also exempt from registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act but not because 
of a transaction exemption as applied to private placements but rather because they were 
themselves exempt securities under Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act.  15 U.S.C. § 77c (2006).  
Despite the exemption, issuers invariably produced a prospectus-like disclosure document in 
conjunction with the bond offering. 
 52. Syndicated tax shelter products customarily included financial projections as part of their 
PPMs.  Since most shelters depended upon deductions to deliver their tax benefits, the projections 
illustrated the anticipated tax impact of the investment under the assumption that the investor 
would shelter only the highest marginal bracket income.  Lower bracket investors and investors 
who, because of the effect of the shelter, would become subject to a lower bracket on part of their 
income did not capture the full anticipated tax benefit.  In some cases, constant time analysis, 
present value for example, of investment return for such investors would fall short of similarly 
analyzed non-shelter investments.  See HALPERIN, supra note 51, at 162–66. 
 53. Investing in tax shelters even became a measure of one’s success, as it showed that one 
was sufficiently successful to need to shelter income.  See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax 
Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 464 (1988) (discussing how tax 
benefits meant to benefit certain individuals were sought after by individuals not meant to benefit 
from them). 
 54. The so-called “at risk” rule required the taxpayer to have economic risk of loss of 
borrowed funds in order to claim deductions attributable to the additional tax basis from 
borrowing.  I.R.C. § 465 (2006).  See discussion of the “at risk” rule infra note 163 and 
accompanying text. 
 55. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 57. Currently, I.R.C. § 469 (2006) prevents taxpayers from deducting losses from so-called 
“passive activities” from the taxpayer’s active income from the performance of services.  See 
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of the income, but generally not permanently free the income from federal 
income tax.  When the deferral ended, and the taxpayer would take the income 
from the investment into account, that income occasionally would be long term 
capital gain rather than the ordinary income that the deductions offset.  Thus, 
one observes that the taxpayer converted ordinary deductions into long term 
capital gain.  Sheltering consisted of deferral and conversion.  The following 
example illustrates a fairly traditional deferral/conversion tax shelter 
structure.58 
The shelter promoter formed a limited partnership to acquire rental real 
estate.  The promoter, or an entity the promoter controlled, served as the 
general partner of the partnership, while the investors seeking tax shelter 
entered the partnership as limited partners.  The partnership acquired the rental 
property with as small a cash investment and as large an amount of borrowed 
funds as possible.  Borrowing enabled the partnership to leverage both its 
investment return59 and the tax benefits from depreciation allowances,60 while 
 
infra note 191 and accompanying text.  Passive activities generally are active businesses in which 
the taxpayer does not participate materially in the sense of providing significant services as was 
the case with most deferral type tax shelters.  I.R.C. § 469(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
 58. This format was frequent and customary, so that most tax practitioners probably are very 
familiar with its use.  Since 1986, however, such shelters have become less common, so this 
example may be a helpful reminder.  See infra note 191 and accompanying text; see generally 
PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1191–96 (6th 
ed. 2008) (discussing three common elements of tax shelters). 
 59. For example, if the interest rate on the borrowed funds was less than the rate of return 
from the rental of the property, the excess return on the borrowed funds over the interest payable 
belonged to the partnership and increased its overall return.  As a simple illustration, assume the 
partnership invests $100 and borrows $100 at 8% but receives a 10% return.  It receives $20 on 
the total $200 investment, pays $8 in interest, leaving the partnership with $12, a $2 enhancement 
to the partnership’s return, boosting its overall return to 12%.  Of course, leverage often works 
negatively when the rate of return is not as expected.  Consider what would happen if the 
partnership’s investment yields only 6%.  The partnership receives $12, pays $8 interest, leaving 
the partnership with only $4 net for a return of 4%. 
 60. See discussion supra note 60.  I.R.C. § 167 (2006) provides an allowance for 
depreciation of durable property having a limited useful life and used either in the taxpayer’s 
trade or business or for the production of income.  Current depreciation rules for tangible property 
appear in I.R.C. § 168 (2006).  Consider the example in the previous footnote.  If each limited 
partner were taxable at a 70% marginal rate of income tax, and the property were depreciable on a 
straight line over ten years, the $100 cash investment in the first year yields a tax deferral of $7.  
In addition, the borrowed funds yield a tax deferral of $7, so that the doubling of the investment 
with borrowed funds doubles the current tax savings from deferral.  The overall return on the 
investment and borrowing in the first year is $12 net cash plus $14 tax savings.  The tax savings 
is only temporary.  As the partnership pays the debt from its investment income, the amortization 
of principal is not deductible even though amortization reduces cash.  Accordingly, the $14 tax 
savings considerably overstates the value of the enhanced depreciation allowance.  The temporary 
use of the tax benefit represents the enhanced return, that is, the return the limited partners receive 
on the temporary use of the money from the tax savings.  Ideally, investors would use only the 
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also receiving a deduction for the interest it paid or accrued on the 
indebtedness.61  Once the non-deductible amortization of principal on the 
indebtedness began to exceed the deduction from depreciation allowances, the 
partnership would sell the property and repay the debt.  Depreciation 
allowances from the borrowed funds as well as the partnership’s cash 
investment had diminished the partnership’s adjusted basis in the property.62  
On sale, the partnership’s amount realized included proceeds used to repay 
debt, as well as proceeds distributed to the partners.63  The gain was often 
much greater than the amount of cash available to investors.64  Since the rental 
property was property used in the partnership’s trade or business, the gain 
generally was long term capital gain.65  Long term capital gain was taxable to 
the investors at a much lower rate of tax than that at which they claimed the 
 
return on the tax savings while setting the savings amount aside in order to pay the taxes when 
they came due.  Often investors failed to understand this concept or received inadequate tax 
counseling and did not prepare for the taxes that would become payable in the later years of the 
investment. 
 61. I.R.C. § 163 (2006).  Since interest often was payable currently, the tax benefit of the 
interest deduction reduced the interest cost but was far less significant than the deduction for 
depreciation allowances that carried no accompanying cash outlay.  As the shelter industry 
became more competitive and aggressive, promoters began to manipulate the interest deduction 
as well.  The partnership might accrue interest but defer payment if the lender was willing (or the 
promoter were the lender).  A cash basis lender might be willing to add interest to principal in the 
years before Congress added the original issue discount accrual rules to the Code.  See id. §§ 
1271–1275.  Other schemes included such accrual methods as the so-called “Rule of 78s,” which 
the IRS succeeded in discouraging with Rev. Rul. 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97 (limiting interest 
deduction to economic accrual even if the contract required accrual under the Rule of 78s). 
 62. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (2006). 
 63. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1947) (holding that the taxpayer’s amount realized 
on disposition of property included the non-recourse indebtedness, subject to which the buyer 
took the property). 
 64. Under I.R.C. § 1001 (2006), gain from the sale or exchange of property is the excess of 
the amount realized, including both cash the seller uses to repay debt and debt that the buyer 
assumes or subject to which the buyer takes property, over the seller’s adjusted basis in the 
property. 
 65. As property used in the partnership’s trade or business and subject to an allowance for 
depreciation, I.R.C. § 1231 (2006) governed gains (or losses) on the sale of the property.  Section 
1231 classifies the gain from such property as long term capital if § 1231 gains in the year exceed 
§ 1231 losses in the year.  If losses exceed gains in the year, both gains and losses are ordinary.  
Section 1231 classification of the gain as ordinary or long term capital occurs at partner, not 
partnership level, because the partnership separately states § 1231 gain under I.R.C. § 702(a)(6) 
(2006). 
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deductions for depreciation allowances.66  Hence the investors converted their 
ordinary 70% deductions into 35% (or 28%) long term capital gain.67 
The promoter would price the tax shelter investment to provide the 
investors a return on their cash investment that combined some cash return, 
permanent tax savings through conversion of ordinary deductions into long 
term capital gain, and estimated earnings on deferred tax amounts.  Projections 
usually showed the computation of the value of deferral at the highest marginal 
income tax rates, so that an investor in a lower than maximum income tax 
bracket would receive a lower return on invested cash.  Generally, the 
projections would estimate the value of the investment’s cash flow that 
consisted of distributed cash, if any, and tax savings over time.  The promoter 
would fix the cash investment based upon that cash flow in order to provide a 
sufficient return on investment to facilitate sale of the investment units. 
Cash investment in excess of the amount that the partnership required to 
acquire its property went to the promoter as one fee or another.  The promoter 
characterized those fees to make them deductible by the partnership and the 
limited partner investors in order to increase the return from the tax benefits.  
Acceleration of depreciation allowances, through short useful lives and 
accelerated methods of depreciation, further improved the return from tax 
benefits.  For real property, double declining balance depreciation tended to be 
available, but short useful lives were characteristic of personal rather than real 
property.68 
Many shelters offered interests in partnerships that leased equipment 
having a short economic useful life.69  Tax shelter partnerships often also 
invested in motion pictures, video tapes, and sound recordings that qualified 
 
 66. I.R.C. § 1202 (1954) allowed a deduction equal to 50–60%, depending on the tax year, 
of non-corporate taxpayers’ net capital gains in the year.  Net capital gain is the excess of net long 
term capital gain over net short term capital loss.  I.R.C. § 1222 (2006). 
 67. At a 50% capital gain deduction, the rate of tax on each dollar of gain would be a 
maximum of 35%, and at a 60% deduction, 28%. 
 68. Component depreciation became popular in the 1950s and 1960s to shorten the 
aggregate useful life of buildings.  Component depreciation enabled taxpayers to depreciation 
elements of a structure separately from the building as a whole; for example, wiring and 
plumbing might have a shorter useful life than the structural components of the building.  See 
Shainberg v. Comm’r, 33 T.C. 241 (1959), acq. in result, 1960-1 C.B. 5 (allowing component 
depreciation of new buildings); Rev. Rul. 73-410, 1973-2 C.B. 53 (extending component 
depreciation to used building where the taxpayer allocated the purchase price among the 
components at purchase).  When Section 201(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
(ERTA), Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 204 added I.R.C. § 168 (2006), the accelerated 
cost recovery system, it shortened and standardized recovery periods for all tangible depreciable 
property and eliminated the use of component depreciation. 
 69. Under I.R.C. § 168, most tangible personal property became depreciable over not more 
than five years. 
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for the income forecast method of depreciation.70  The income forecast method 
concentrated depreciation deductions in the first year or two when a motion 
picture, video tape, or sound recording generated the bulk of its income.71  
Other shelters developed around industries that Congress subsidized through 
the tax system in order to encourage capital investment.  Those industries 
sometimes received tax credits or current expensing.  Oil and gas exploration is 
an example of such an industry in which current expensing was available for 
intangible drilling costs72 and percentage depletion for production.73  Other 
industries, including rehabilitation of real property (especially historic 
structures), enjoyed a generous subsidy of as much as twenty-five percent 
through tax credits.74  More generally, investment in new equipment received a 
ten percent subsidy through the investment credit.75 
Critical to the success of the tax sheltered investment were 1) classification 
of the limited partnership as a partnership for tax purposes, rather than as an 
association taxable as a corporation,76 and 2) classification of the partnership’s 
indebtedness as without recourse to the partnership or any partner.77  
Partnership, rather than corporate, tax classification provided the tax 
transparency that enabled limited partners to use their shares of partnership tax 
items.78  Since shelters depended upon borrowing leverage to magnify tax 
benefits and defer taxes, the borrowing had to be non-recourse in order for the 
 
 70. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68 (allowing depreciation under the income 
forecast method). 
 71. Id. 
 72. I.R.C. § 263(c) (2006); see also discussion supra note 44. 
 73. I.R.C. § 613; see also discussion supra note 44. 
 74. I.R.C. §§ 38, 46 (1954). The 25% credit was only for rehabilitation of historic structures, 
while a 15% or 20% credit applied to other real property rehabilitation.  Id. § 46. 
 75. Id. §§ 38, 46. 
 76. Jeffrey D. Sperling & Lawrence Lokken, The Limited Partnership Tax Shelter: An 
Investment Vehicle Under Attack, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 1–10 (1976) (explaining the major 
differences between the two entities and that partnerships are preferred over corporations for tax 
shelters largely because of flow-through income and deductions). 
 77. Non-recourse indebtedness is an obligation with respect to which the lender has no 
recourse to the borrower assets other than the property that secures the debt.  Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 462–63 
(1997).  Promissory notes evidencing non-recourse debt either 1) have specific exculpatory 
language limiting the lender’s recourse, or 2) historically, had a corporation sign as debtor and 
then liquidate, distributing the property subject to the debt to its shareholders without the 
shareholders assuming the debt.  See id. at 460–65 (explaining when non-recourse debt could be 
advantageous in the corporation context). 
 78. Under Subchapter K of the Code, tax transparency is the fundamental characteristic of 
partnership taxation.  See I.R.C. § 701 (2006) (providing that partners, not partnerships, are 
subject to tax on the partnership’s income); Id. § 702(a) (requiring partners to include their shares 
of the partnership’s income, loss, and separately stated items in their own tax computations). 
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limited partners to include their shares of the partnership’s borrowing in their 
adjusted bases in their partnership interests.79 
With respect to partnership classification, the Treasury regulations 
identified four features of a corporation that distinguished corporations from 
partnerships: continuity of life; limited liability; free transferability of interests; 
and centralized management.80  If the partnership had more than two of these 
features, the IRS would reclassify it as a corporation.81  As an association 
taxable as a corporation, the limited partnership would be taxable on its income 
and would take its deductions into account at the entity level.82  Income and 
deductions would not pass through to the limited partners to take into account 
in computing their individual tax liability.83  While tax opinions devoted many 
pages of text to discussing classification, classification as a practical matter 
was rarely, if ever, a real issue.84  Years later, the government ceded the 
classification territory by promulgating the so-called “check-the-box” rules for 
classification that allowed taxpayers to elect classification relatively freely.85 
A partner, whether limited or general, may deduct the partnership losses so 
fundamental to the operation of a tax shelter only to the extent of the partner’s 
adjusted basis in his or her partnership interest.86  Limited partners, however, 
 
 79. Id. §§ 752(a), 704(d); see also infra text accompanying note 86. 
 80. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1995) (superseded by Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1997)). 
 81. Id. § 301.7701-2(g). 
 82. Subchapter C of the Code, I.R.C. §§ 301–385 (2006), prescribes the computation method 
for the taxable income of a corporation at entity level, and I.R.C. § 11 imposes the tax, if any, at 
that level.  The corporation generally may carry forward and carry back deductions that exceed a 
corporation’s income in a taxable year to take them into account in computing or re-computing 
the entity’s taxable income in another year.  See I.R.C. § 172 (permitting loss carrybacks for the 
two previous tax years); Id. § 1212 (permitting loss carrybacks for the previous three to ten years, 
depending on the circumstances).  Under Subchapter K of the Code, partnerships compute their 
incomes, losses, and various separately stated items and allocate that income, loss, and separately 
stated item among their partners.  Id. § 702(b).  The partners take the allocated items into account 
in computing their own separate tax liability. 
 83. Id. § 703(a)(2). 
 84. E.g., Larson v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) (applying the four factor test to syndicated 
real estate limited partnerships and finding for the taxpayer because the partnership lacked only 
two of the four partnership features, limited liability and centralized management).  A much later 
decision, ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 512–13, 516 (2000), held that an 
arrangement between an offshore bank and a partnership was not a partnership for tax purposes, 
but did not hold that the partners had formed an entity taxable as a corporation. 
 85. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2009) (showing an effective date of January 1, 1997). 
 86. I.R.C. § 704(d) (2006) limits current deductibility to the partner’s adjusted basis in the 
partnership interest.  Losses in excess of that adjusted basis belong to the partner to whom the 
partnership allocated them under the partnership agreement, and that partner will be able to 
deduct them when his or her adjusted basis in the partnership interest increases, either as a result 
of a contribution to the partnership, or the allocation of income from the partnership to the 
partner.  Id. §§ 722, 705. 
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do not share in a partnership’s recourse indebtedness, and do not increase their 
bases in their partnership interests,87 because only the general partners are 
obligated to pay that indebtedness if the partnership cannot.88  Shelter 
structures depended upon the partnership’s ability to include the partners’ 
shares of the partnership’s non-recourse indebtedness in the partners’ adjusted 
bases in their partnership interests,89 so that limited partners would have 
adequate basis to deduct their shares of the partnership’s losses.90 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crane v. Commissioner 
established that the purchaser or seller of property subject to non-recourse 
indebtedness encumbering that property includes the encumbrance in the 
amount of the purchase and sale proceeds.91  The Court equated recourse and 
non-recourse indebtedness for tax purposes to the extent of the value of the 
property.92  In the Court’s view, as long as the value of the underlying property 
was at least equal to the amount of the debt, the owner of the property would 
treat a non-recourse debt as a genuine obligation and repay it in order to 
protect the investment in the property.93  Accordingly, even if the partnership 
financed its acquisition of property with non-recourse debt, its basis in the 
property was, as always, the full purchase price.94  And if the partnership 
acquired property subject to, but without assuming, existing indebtedness 
encumbering the property, the partnership’s cost included the amount of the 
debt subject to which it took the property.95 
 
 87. I.R.C. § 752(a) (2006) treats a partner’s share of an increase in the partnership’s 
indebtedness as a contribution of cash by that partner to the partnership under I.R.C. § 721(a) and 
§ 722 (2006). 
 88. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(e) (1990) (superseded by Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1–3 in 
T.D. 8380, 1992-1 C.B. 218) (allocating recourse liabilities according to the partners’ loss sharing 
ratios, but only to the extent the partners bear the risk of the losses), with Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) 
(2010) (substantially having the same effect). 
 89. Treasury Regulation Section 1.752-1T(e) (1990) allocated non-recourse liabilities among 
all partners relative to their profit ratios, because payment of the indebtedness would follow only 
if the partnership were profitable.  At present, Treasury Regulation Section 1.752-3 (2010) 
allocates non-recourse indebtedness among limited and general partners, but is far more complex.  
The regulation has a tiered allocation of the partnership’s non-recourse liabilities that follows the 
partnership’s allocations of non-recourse deductions under Treasury Regulation Section 1.704-
2(b) (2010), and only allocates residual debt according to profit-sharing ratios. 
 90. I.R.C. § 704(d) (2006). 
 91. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); see also supra note 64. 
 92. Crane, 331 U.S. at 6. 
 93. Id. at 14. 
 94. I.R.C. §§ 1011, 1012 (2006). 
 95. Id. §§ 752(c), 1011, 1012. 
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That adjusted basis, including the financed portion of the purchase, formed 
the partnership’s basis for determining its depreciation allowances,96 and 
limited partners shared in that debt.97  By design, in the early years of a tax 
shelter partnership, depreciation allowances and other deductible expenses of 
the partnership significantly exceeded operating income, so that each limited 
partner’s loss allocations quickly exceeded the amount of cash the limited 
partner contributed to the partnership. 98 
As shelter demand increased and reached taxpayers with smaller incomes 
subject to lower rates of tax, promoters became increasingly aggressive in 
seeking tax-based return enhancements.  Techniques included removing non-
depreciable, non-deductible assets from the syndicated partnerships.  In real 
estate, that meant the partnership would lease the land rather than own it.99  
Debt instruments, often in the form of wrap-around mortgages that a party 
related to the promoter provided, would overlay the underlying third party 
financing, accruing interest in amounts far greater than what was payable 
currently.100  Fees structured for deductibility proliferated.101 
In addition, investors entered cash basis partnerships at the end of the year.  
The partnership then paid its accrued expenses for the entire year, and 
sometimes expenses for subsequent years in advance.  Since the partnership 
paid the expenses after it admitted the limited partners as members, it could 
allocate a full share of all expenses paid to the limited partners in order to 
 
 96. I.R.C. § 167(c)(1) (2006) controlled the determination of depreciation.  Land is not a 
wasting asset and is not depreciable.  EARL A. SALIERS, PRINCIPLES OF DEPRECIATION 112 
(Ronald Accounting Ser., 2d prtg. 1916). 
 97. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(e) (1990) (superseded by Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1–3 in T.D. 8380, 
1992-1 C.B. 218 and current Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (2010)). 
 98. I.R.C. § 722 (2006).  The partner’s basis in his or her partnership interest is equal to the 
amount of cash and the adjusted basis of property the partner contributed to the partnership, less 
losses and distributions that the partnership previously made to the partner.  Id. § 705(a). 
 99. Rental payments on the leased land were deductible under I.R.C. § 162 (2006), but 
owned land yielded no deduction since it was not depreciable. 
 100. A wrap-around mortgage resembles a second mortgage.  The wrap-around lender lends 
funds in addition to the original debt but does not discharge the original debt.  Rather the wrap-
around lender takes a note from the property owner in the amount of the original debt and the 
additional funds and agrees to make the payments on the original debt when they are due.  The 
original mortgage and note retain priority and their payment schedule.  The wrap-around might 
have a higher interest rate or accrue interest more rapidly than the wrapped debt and might even 
be non-recourse while the original debt is recourse.  See generally R. Kymn Harp, When Wrap-
Around Mortgages Return—The Time to Plan is NOW, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2004, at 42 
(explaining how wrap-around mortgages can be used to preserve the benefits of a long-term, low-
interest loan). 
 101. See I.R.C. § 162 (2006) (allowing as a deduction from a business’s taxable income all 
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid during the taxable year). 
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cause the expense deduction to match the timing of the investment.102  
Promoters also arranged for investors to pay for their partnership interests over 
several years to match the tax benefit returns with the investment more closely 
and increase the investment return relative to the invested funds.  At the same 
time, Congress continued to fuel the growth of the shelter industry by 
eschewing direct subsidies in favor of providing subsidies through tax 
benefits.103 
Syndicators marketed deferral/conversion type tax shelters largely to self-
employed professionals, such as medical doctors, dentists, architects, lawyers 
and others who had substantial income from their professional services.  To a 
lesser extent, highly compensated employees, such as corporate executives, 
were also a market for these products, but those individuals frequently had a 
broader range of tax deferral opportunities available to them than did the self-
employed.104  Keogh and individual retirement account-qualified retirement 
arrangements had significantly lower contribution limits for self-employed 
individuals than employer plans had for employed individuals.105  Similarly, 
corporate stock based compensation plans facilitated long term deferrals.  Over 
the years, a variety of plans used incentive options,106 restricted stock,107 and 
non-qualified stock options to accomplish that objective for key corporate 
employees.108  Life insurance products in the form of split-dollar arrangements 
rapidly grew in popularity.109  And for those with substantial bargaining power, 
the emergence of “rabbi” trusts enabled long term elective deferrals.110 
 
 102. See id.  Congress prohibited that practice in 1984.  Section 72(a) of the Deficit Reduction 
Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 589, added I.R.C. § 706(d)(2) (2006) 
(compelling matching expenses and allocations of the deductions attributable to those expenses). 
 103. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 104. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, 
ANALYSIS, AND LEGAL PROPOSALS 3–5 (1999). 
 105. Section 238 of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 512, eliminated the distinctions in maximum contributions for 
employed versus self-employed individuals. 
 106. I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) (2006) provides for incentive stock options that result in no income at 
the time of transfer of the incentive stock upon option exercise, but the employer corporation does 
not receive a deduction under I.R.C. § 162 when I.R.C. § 424(a) is applied.  Only the purchase 
price paid under the option will be considered received by any corporation for the transferred 
share. 
 107. Id. § 83 (deferring the employee’s inclusion of the excess of the value of the stock over 
the amount of the employee’s purchase price until the employee’s right to the stock no longer is 
subject to a risk of forfeiture). 
 108.  Under I.R.C. § 83(e) (2006), non-traded stock options an employee might receive as 
compensation do not have an ascertainable fair market value and are not includable in the 
employee’s income until the employee exercises the options. 
 109. Id. § 101. 
 110. Rabbi trusts are trusts an employer establishes for the benefit of the employee.  The 
assets of the trust remain subject to the claims of the employer’s creditors.  The IRS concluded in 
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Investors garnered tax advantages not only through deferral and 
deferral/conversion arrangements, but also by way of non-taxable investment 
products.  As the shelter industry grew, so did the market for tax exempt 
municipal bonds.111  Interest on state and local obligations is exempt from 
federal income tax.112  The interest exemption provides a federal tax subsidy to 
the states by enabling them to borrow at a lower interest cost than the market 
demands for taxable obligations.  In an efficient market, lenders should be 
indifferent as to the identity of the borrower, as long as bond ratings reflect 
comparable risk profiles for all borrowers the lender is considering, so that net 
after tax return to the lender should be the same for exempt and non-exempt 
bond issues.  To illustrate: Assume that the market interest rate for obligations 
with risk profiles identical to the municipal bonds is 10%.  Since the interest on 
the municipal bond is exempt from federal income tax, it should pay interest at 
3% to a taxpayer whose income is subject to a 70% marginal rate of tax in 
order to yield for the taxpayer identical returns from investments in taxable and 
tax exempt debt. 
But while not traditionally categorized as tax shelters, state and local 
obligations offered and continue to offer high marginal bracket taxpayers a 
significant tax advantage through inefficient tax subsidy allocation.  The 
deeper the market for exempt indebtedness became, the higher the interest rate 
the issuer had to offer to sell all its bonds.  Since the issuer could not 
discriminate among bond purchasers to sell lower rate bonds to higher bracket 
taxpayers, higher bracket taxpayers than the target group would buy some 
portion of the issue and get part of the state subsidy.  For example, if, in the 
example in the preceding paragraph, the state had to price the obligations 
competitively with the taxable market for a 50% marginal bracket taxpayer in 
order to find sufficient buyers for its bonds, a 70% marginal bracket bond 
 
private letter rulings that the employer does not transfer the trust assets to the employee for 
purposes of inclusion in the employee’s income under I.R.C. § 83 until the trust ceases to be 
subject to those claims.  In the interim, the employee may direct the investment of the trust’s 
assets.  See Henry Ordower, A Theorem for Compensation Deferral: Doubling Your Blessings by 
Taking Your Rabbi Abroad, 47 TAX LAW. 301, 313–16 (1994) (tax-based economic analysis of 
rabbi trusts and analysis of structure). 
 111. See I.R.C. § 103 (2006) (excluding interest on any state or local bond from income). 
 112. Id.  Until 1988, many in the tax community believed that Congress did not have the 
power to tax the interest a state or local government paid on its obligations.  The underlying 
theory was expressed in the maxim that the “power to tax is the power to destroy.”  In South 
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 524 (1988), the United States Supreme Court overruled 
precedents that held that Congress was powerless to tax the interest.  Since 1969, interest on state 
obligations has been taxable if the state arbitraged its yield by using the bond proceeds to invest 
in higher yielding taxable obligations.  Section 601(a) the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 656, added § 103(c) to the 1954 Code, listing arbitrage bonds as exemptions 
from the tax-exempt bonds list. 
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buyer would receive the equivalent of a 16-2/3% return on a market rate 
instrument in a 10% return market.113 
Moreover, local governments began to exploit their exempt borrowing 
power to compete for business investment.  The governments provided their 
exempt borrowing authority for financing private facilities.114  Since increasing 
numbers of private projects relied on tax exempt financing, interest rates on 
exempt debt rose.115  In order to find sufficient buyers for all the debt, state and 
local governments had to reach deeper into the taxpayer marginal bracket pool.  
Since exempt interest rates must advance in inverse proportion to the targeted 
marginal tax rate of the buyers, tax-exempt rates began to converge on taxable 
rates.  And higher bracket taxpayers gained greater tax avoidance benefit from 
the purchase of higher rate tax-exempt debt. 
On the exempt earnings side of tax avoidance is also the increase in the 
value of life insurance attributable to earnings on the invested cash value of the 
policy.  Inside build-up in the value of life insurance is not taxable so long as 
the policy remains in force.116  Only if the policy owner withdraws the cash 
value of the policy while the insured individual is alive does the inside value 
increase become subject to income tax.117  If, however, the policy pays by 
reason of the death of the insured, the inside income build-up is permanently 
excludable from the gross income of the beneficiary.118 
Historically, such whole life insurance policies imputed a very low interest 
rate to the cash value of the policy, so that the policies were not particularly 
attractive investments.  In the 1970s, the life insurance industry sought to 
become more competitive as market interest rates advanced rapidly, rendering 
 
 113. In a 10% taxable interest market, the state would pay 5% on tax exempt bonds if the all 
the bonds would sell to a class consisting of taxpayers in a 50% marginal bracket or higher.  A 
5% after tax return to a 70% bracket taxpayer yields the equivalent of a 16-2/3% rate on a taxable 
investment.  That is 5% = (1-.7) X, and solving for X, .05/.3 = .167. 
 114. While documentation was complex, industrial revenue bonds followed one of two 
models.  Either the local government authority would borrow and re-lend to the private user, or 
own the financed facility during the period during which the exempt bonds were outstanding and 
lease the facility to the private activity user.  See generally Daniel H. Skerritt, Industrial Revenue 
Bonds, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 517, 517–26 (1967) (discussing the use of and legal challenges to 
using industrial revenue bonds for non-direct municipal purposes). 
 115. ROBERT S. MCINTYRE, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, TAX EXPENDITURES—THE HIDDEN 
ENTITLEMENTS 26–27 (2d ed. 1996), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/hident.pdf. 
 116. The owner of the life insurance may designate the beneficiary, often borrow against the 
policy or withdraw funds from the policy.  Nevertheless, the tax law does not treat ownership of 
the policy to be ownership of the interest earnings that the policy issuer credits to the policy.  
Hence the inside build-up in value is not currently includable in the policy owner’s gross income.  
See BORIS I. BITTIKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 6-1 (2d ed. 2002). 
 117. I.R.C. § 72(e) (2006). 
 118. Id. § 101. 
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life insurance products less competitive with other investment products.119  
Universal life insurance policies began to appear.120  Those policies allowed 
the insured to select among investment options to enhance the inside policy 
value while shifting some value risk to the policy owner.121  The increase in 
policy value mimicked mutual funds or other investment returns, as universal 
life policies wrapped mutual funds and invested in parallel portfolios to mutual 
funds and other investment products.122  Aggressive insurance marketers for a 
time even marketed life insurance products which the policy owner could 
trade, and alter periodically the policies’ underlying investment portfolio.123 
The tax shelter movement did not reach just the income tax.  Life 
insurance products became basic tools of the estate planning industry.  The 
case of Crummey v. Commissioner established that an expiring power of 
appointment qualified for the annual gift tax exclusion.124  These “Crummey” 
withdrawal powers facilitated the funding of life insurance premiums through 
annual gifts from the insured without inclusion of the policy proceeds in the 
insured’s estate at death.125  “Crummey” trusts that owned insurance on the life 
of wealthy and moderately wealthy individuals became commonplace as 
individuals sought to enhance their estates with insurance proceeds that were 
not subject to estate tax.126 
Probably as important to the tax side of estate planning as Crane v. 
Commissioner127 was to income tax sheltering was the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Estate of Bright v. United States.128  In Estate of Bright, the court 
determined that decedents’ estates may claim substantial discounts on their 
 
 119. Zvi Bodie, Managing Pension and Retirement Assets: An International Perspective, in 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: A SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE JOURNAL 
OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH 162, 188 (Marvin H. Kosters & Allan H. Meltzer eds., reprt. 
1991) (1990) (noting that in response to a sharp decline consumer demand for long-term fixed-
income because of inflation and subsequent high interest rates, insurance companies introduced 
universal and variable life insurance policies with higher and more adjustable interest rates). 
 120. Id. 
 121. William C. Scheel, The Effects of Risk Reduction Inherent in Universal Life Insurance, J. 
RISK & INS., June 1979, at 45, 46, 56 (noting universal life insurance policies enabled lower risk 
premiums because they contain risk reduction properties of a mortality cost guarantee and 
investment yield guarantee were combined into a single product). 
 122. HAROLD D. SKIPPER & W. JEAN KWON, RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE: 
PERSPECTIVES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 534 (2007). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968); see also I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) 
(2006) (outlining powers of appointment); Id. § 2503 (describing the gift tax). 
 125. I.R.C. § 2042. 
 126. See 1 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Federal Tax Guide § 1:86 (2004). 
 127. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 128. Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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minority shareholdings in closely held corporations.129  Majority ownership by 
closely related family members of the decedent did not alter the ability to claim 
the discounts, even if the decedent’s shareholdings would pass to those other 
family members.130  Planners soon built extensive estate tax shelters based 
upon minority discounting.131  Older generation individuals transferred both 
operating businesses and portfolio assets to family limited partnerships (and 
later family limited liability companies).132  Then, over time they would give 
minority interests to family members, claiming on each occasion appropriate 
minority discounts for the interests, gradually diminishing their own interest to 
a minority interest.133  Ultimately, the interests that the older generation donors 
held at the time of their death would be a minority interests for which their 
estates could claim substantial discounts that often, when combined with 
marketability and other discounts, could be as much as or more than fifty 
percent.134  Tax shelter would emanate from the sum of the values of all the 
interests in the family limited partnership or closely held business being far 
less than the value of the business’s underlying assets.135  The IRS continues to 
litigate to prevent discounting in the family limited partnership area but has 
enjoyed only very limited success.136 
Demand for tax advantaged investment structures grew rapidly through the 
1970s and 1980s as tax avoidance began to displace investment quality as a 
primary investment goal.  Even as Congress sought to limit such activities by 
imposing risk costs on investors as a price for tax benefits,137 investors’ 
appetites for such investments did not seem to shrink.  Tax avoidance had 
become a deeply embedded and durable cultural feature of the United States.  
Tax shelter investing became a measure of one’s success and intelligence—one 
 
 129. See id. at 1002–03, 1006–07. 
 130. Id. at 1005–07.  On the income tax side, those family members may have been 
constructive owners of the shares under I.R.C. § 318, but the constructive ownership rules do not 
apply to the estate tax.  I.R.C. § 318(a)(1) (2006). 
 131. Carter G. Bishop, The Ebb and Flow of the Federal Tax Role of Fiduciary Duties in 
Family Limited Partnerships: From Byrum to Bongard, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 61, 63 (2006). 
 132. Id. at 63 n.19, 67. 
 133. Ronald H. Jensen, The Magic of Disappearing Wealth Revisited: Using Family Limited 
Partnerships To Reduce Estate and Gift Tax, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 155, 156–57 (2004). 
 134. See id. at 155. 
 135. Id. at 172.  This is a remarkable form of tax magic.  For more on discounting through 
family limited partnerships, see generally Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Family 
Limited Partnership Formation: Dueling Dicta, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 136. See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, Kelley: A Green Light for FLPs, 109 TAX NOTES 1467, 
1468–69 (2005); Wendy C. Gerzog, Return to Senda: Order Determinative for FLP Discounts, 
110 TAX NOTES 791, 791–92 (2006). 
 137. See, e.g., infra notes 155, 163 and accompanying text discussing the separation of rates 
for service income and investment income through the maximum tax on earned income and the 
more immediate economic risk that accompanies the “at risk” rules. 
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who invested in tax shelters and legally avoided taxes was doing well and was 
investing wisely—even if the investments were otherwise not economically 
compelling.  Almost unsurprising was the statement attributed to Leona 
Helmsley a couple of years before she went to jail for tax evasion: “We don’t 
pay taxes.  Only the little people pay taxes.”138 
Neither penalties nor substantive changes in the tax law staunched the 
revenue leakage from tax shelters.  With respect to penalties, beginning in 
1976 and continuing regularly, Congress added penalty provisions to the Code 
to address tax sheltering and other practices.  Taxpayers became subject to 
accuracy-related penalties of 20% of the amount underpaid139 and a special 
20% accuracy related penalty on understatements for transactions the IRS had 
designated as reportable transactions.140  Taxpayers could avoid the accuracy-
related penalty by demonstrating the existence of substantial authority for the 
position taken or by disclosing the transaction adequately on the return.141  
Failure to disclose in the case of listed or reportable transactions might 
increase the penalty.142  For tax practitioners and promoters, Congress added 
return preparer penalties,143 promotion of abusive shelter penalties,144 penalties 
for aiding and abetting understatement of tax,145 list maintenance penalties,146 
and reporting requirements for reportable transactions like tax shelters.147  
These penalties caused practitioners to modify their practices148 but did not 
stop tax shelters. 
Several substantive tax law changes should have slowed the shelter 
industry’s growth but did not.  For example, early on, depreciation recapture 
rules eliminated the conversion opportunity for personal property depreciation 
shelters.149  The combination of short useful lives and investment credits150 for 
property partnerships used in equipment leasing generated significant short 
term tax benefits and provided a solid shelter foundation.  Unlike real property, 
 
 138. Robert Johnson, Little Dogs Don’t Pay Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at A2. 
 139. I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2006). 
 140. Id. § 6662A(a). 
 141. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B). 
 142. Id. § 6662A(c). 
 143. I.R.C. § 6694(a)–(b) (1976); I.R.C. § 6694(a)–(b) (1994) (reflecting the 1989 
amendments to the tax preparer liability provision). 
 144. I.R.C. § 6700(a) (2006). 
 145. Id. § 6701(a). 
 146. Id. § 6708(a). 
 147. Id. § 6111(a) (imposing a filing requirement); Id. §§ 6707(a), 6707A(a) (imposing 
penalties for failure to report). 
 148. See discussion infra note 266 and accompanying text. 
 149. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(a), 76 Stat. 960, 1032 (adding I.R.C. § 
1245 to the Code to recapture depreciation allowances on personal property as ordinary income). 
 150. Id. § 2, 76 Stat. at 962 (adding new I.R.C. § 38 to the Code concerning investment in 
depreciable property). 
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the value of personal property declined with use, so that depreciation recapture 
generally was not a barrier to investment in personal property.151  Loans 
secured by personal property most often required that the partnership repay the 
debt as the property declined in value.  When it came time to dispose of the 
personal property, only marginal value and nominal tax gain would have 
remained to generate depreciation recapture income.  However, when the 
promoter (or another party related to or involved in the deal) was the lender, 
non-recourse debt may have remained outstanding at the end of the property’s 
real useful life.  In those instances where the lender had an intimate connection 
to the deal, third party financing often was unavailable because the promoter 
pushed the value of the underlying depreciable property to its limit or beyond 
in order to enhance the aggregate amount of the depreciation allowances and 
investment credits.152  Despite substantial recapture of depreciation, the 
deferral benefit from the inflated value made the investment sufficiently 
attractive to tax shelter seeking investors.  Also, as a practical matter, investors 
often may not have included their share of the partnership’s income from that 
recapture in their individual returns.153 
Congress did not target tax shelters with the depreciation recapture rules, 
but rather Congress targeted the more general growing disparity between the 
rate of economic depreciation and the rate of artificially accelerated tax 
depreciation.154  In 1969, however, Congress focused on tax shelters and 
enacted both the minimum tax on tax preference items and the maximum tax 
on earned income to limit benefits from tax sheltering.155  The maximum tax 
on earned income created a schedular-type rate structure separating personal 
 
 151. See I.R.C. § 1245(e) (1982) (describing when depreciation would be recaptured on 
certain types of real property). 
 152. The government occasionally denied depreciation allowances and credits on the basis of 
overstated value that had no economic substance.  Only in fairly egregious cases did the 
government win value overstatement cases.  See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 
1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that non-recourse, seller-financed real estate transaction with 
inflated value did not transfer an equity interest so as to entitle a depreciation deduction); United 
States v. Philatelic Leasing, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1554, 1554  (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (upholding an 
injunction against tax shelter promotion involving gross overvaluation of printing plates). 
 153. Information-matching capability at the time of the change was not equal to the task of 
matching partnership and individual returns. 
 154. See Cordes et al., supra note 2, at 82.  Accelerated methods of depreciation created 
incentives for capital investment but also increased the level of artificiality in the depreciation 
allowances.  Id.  Accordingly, Congress considered it necessary to prevent the conversion of 
those artificially rapid deductions into long term capital gain by recapturing the excess deductions 
as ordinary income.  Id. 
 155. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 301, 804, 83 Stat. 487, 580, 685 (1969) 
(adding I.R.C. § 56 (minimum tax on tax preferences) and § 1348 (maximum tax on earned 
income)). 
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service income from investment income.156  The maximum rate of tax on 
personal service income became 50% under the statute, while the maximum 
rate on investment income remained at 70%.157  Many high-income, self-
employed, and highly-compensated employed individuals nevertheless 
invested in tax advantaged products to shelter income from services that 
otherwise would have been subject to the maximum tax.158  When the deferral 
reversed so that the investment generated more taxable income than cash flow, 
the cost of sheltering 50% of earned income might be as high as 70% of 
investment income.  The first tax reductions during the Reagan administration 
eliminated that schedular-type rate split by decreasing the maximum marginal 
rate on all income to 50%.159 
The minimum tax on tax preference items similarly had little if any effect 
on tax sheltering except that it forced promoters to restructure some products 
to produce the desired return on invested funds.  The minimum tax initially 
was a 10% add-on tax that imposed a surcharge on certain tax benefits 
common to many syndicated tax shelters.160  In 1976, the rate increased to 
15%, and the categories of tax preferences expanded.161  Congress later 
restructured the minimum tax to the alternative minimum tax, which provides a 
parallel tax computation to the regular income tax and now reaches far beyond 
its original tax sheltering targets.162 
 
 156. I.R.C. § 1348(a) (1970).  This is not to say that the United States federal income tax was 
not somewhat schedular earlier.  See SYLVAIN R.F. PLASSCHAERT, SCHEDULAR, GLOBAL AND 
DUALISTIC PATTERNS OF INCOME TAXATION 17–24 (1988) (discussing schedular tax systems); 
Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 49–50 (1996).  The 
Code isolated income and loss from the sale or exchange of capital assets from other income long 
before the maximum tax.  Capital losses were deductible only against capital gains (plus, for 
individuals, up to an additional $1,000 per year) under I.R.C. § 1211, and 50% or 60% of net 
capital gain was deductible under I.R.C. § 1201.  I.R.C. §§ 1201(b)(1), 1211(b)(1) (1970). 
 157. I.R.C. § 1348(a); see supra note 47 and accompanying text.  Earned income for purposes 
of the statute was the income that was the type of income subject to the Social Security and Self-
Employment Tax.  See I.R.C. § 1348(b)(1). 
 158. See Garrison Grawoig DeLee, Note, Abusive Tax Shelters: Will the Latest Tools Really 
Help?, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 435 n.23 (1984) (noting that high-income individuals were still 
sheltering income). 
 159. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101(c)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 178–
79. 
 160. I.R.C. § 56; see also DeLee, supra note 158, at 435 n.23. 
 161. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1549 (amending 
I.R.C. § 56). 
 162. I.R.C. § 55 (1982).  For a discussion of how the AMT has expanded beyond the original 
tax-sheltering target, see, for example, Alan J. Auerbach et al., Budget Blues: The Fiscal Outlook 
and Options for Reform, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 109, 120 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2003) 
(discussing that presently less than 10% of Alternative Minimum Tax revenue is due to original 
anti-sheltering provisions); Leonard E. Burman et al., Policy Watch: The Expanding Reach of the 
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Next Congress added the “at risk” rules to the Code.163  The “at risk” rules 
seemed a certain bet to stop many of the personal property based abusive tax 
shelters.164  Sponsors of the legislation predicted that prospective investors for 
such shelters would abandon the investment plan rather than exposing 
themselves to personal liability in order to capture a tax advantage.165  But the 
sponsors were wrong.  With hardly a moment’s hesitation, syndications began 
to appear that required investors to assume some portion of the partnership’s 
indebtedness in order to claim the tax benefits of the deal.166  Perhaps because 
the promoters persuaded investors that the deal had sufficient economic 
solidity or because promoters reassured investors that they never would have to 
pay more than their investment capital, tax shelters with limited partner 
liability for the partnership’s indebtedness remained marketable.167 
But if Congress really sought to limit the incidence of tax sheltering with 
its changes to the tax law, it did not speak with a clear and consistent voice.  
 
Individual Alternative Minimum Tax, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2003, at 173–74 (discussing the 
growth of Alternative Minimum Tax on originally unintended taxpayers). 
 163. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 204(a), 90 Stat. at 1531 (adding I.R.C. § 465 for amount “at 
risk” deductions); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 201(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2814 (1978) 
(extending the § 465(c) “at risk” rules to income-producing activities other than the holding or 
operation of real estate). 
 164. Because non-recourse financing was customary in the real estate industry, the “at risk” 
rules did not apply to real estate originally.  I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982).  Later, Section 503(a) 
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 extended the “at risk” rules to real estate.  Tax Reform Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 503(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2243 (1986) (striking I.R.C. § 463(c)(3)(D)).  
However, even after extension to real estate, the “at risk” rules treated commercially reasonable 
non-recourse financing of real property as an amount at risk so that the change in the law targeted 
only artificial lending arrangements that facilitated inflating the value of the underlying property.  
Id. § 503(b), 90 Stat. at 2243.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was the first re-codification of the 
Internal Revenue Code since 1954, but unlike the 1954 Code, this re-codification preserved the 
structure and numbering of its predecessor. 
 165. Olivia S. Byrne, The At-Risk Rules Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Door Closes 
on Tax-Motivated Investments, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 364, 366 (1988). 
 166. Partnerships generally solved the problem of making limited partners—who by 
classification enjoyed limited liability for partnership debt—liable for part of their debt by having 
them enter into a separate assumption agreement with the lender.  The assumption agreement 
relieved the partnership from personal liability and the investor assumed personal liability.  See 
Michael H. Hoeflich, Tax Shelter Partnerships and the Proposed At-Risk Regulations:  Deferred 
Payment Financing, 58 TAXES 475, 479 (1980) (discussing implications of the new law and 
proposed regulations); Philip F. Postlewaite & Tammy Jo Bialosky, Liabilities in the Partnership 
Context—Policy Concerns and the Forthcoming Regulations, 33 UCLA L. REV. 733, 753–54 
(1986) (arguing that guarantees would not work because they were secondary in nature and the 
limited partners would have recourse on the guarantee to the partnership and thus to the general 
partner). 
 167. Any agreement by promoters to protect investors against loss, however, would have 
prevented those investors from being at risk, so the reassurance would have had to be non-
specific and non-binding.  See I.R.C. § 465(b)(4) (2006). 
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New or improved opportunities to shelter emerged from Congress itself as it 
continued to use the taxation system to deliver economic stimuli and industry 
subsidies.  The line between Congressional intent in providing tax-based 
incentives and abusive tax sheltering remained blurry.  For example, along 
with eliminating the maximum tax on earned income, Congress also shortened 
the useful lives of all tangible property, eliminated the concept of salvage value 
as a limitation on depreciable basis, and simplified and standardized 
depreciation rules.168  The standard for personal property became the five-year-
life,169 half-year convention,170 and double declining balance method,171 so that 
the taxpayer generally recovered twenty percent of the cost of personal 
property the first year placed into service and an additional 32% the second 
year.172  As originally enacted, real property had a fifteen-year-life,173 a mid-
month convention174 and double declining balance depreciation was 
available175 at a cost of recapture as ordinary income on exit.176  A straight line 
election under the fifteen-year-life would prevent recapture.177  
Deferral/conversion shelters had to make the fifteen-year straight-line election 
in order to secure the conversion part of the formula.  In addition, historic and 
rehabilitation tax credits178 to preserve existing commercial and residential 
property, as well as low income housing credits,179 that Congress made 
 
 168. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201(a), 95 Stat. 172, 203–13 
(adding I.R.C. § 168, which laid out an accelerated cost recovery system). 
 169. I.R.C. § 168(c) (2006); see also id. § 168(e)(1)(3) (describing what is to be classified as 
five-year property with a five-year recovery period). 
 170. Id. § 168(d)(1). 
 171. Id. § 168(b)(1). 
 172. Taxpayers who placed more than 40% of their property into service in the last quarter of 
the year, however, had to use a mid-quarter convention, thereby limiting the first-year allowance 
to 5%.  Id. § 168(d)(3). 
 173. I.R.C. § 168(b)(2) (1982) (superseded by I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(E) (2006)). 
 174. I.R.C. § 168(d)(2) (2006). 
 175. I.R.C. § 168(b)(2) (1982) (superseded by I.R.C. § 168(b)(1) (2006)). 
 176. I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) (1982).  For real property, other than residential real property, that a 
taxpayer placed in service between 1981 and 1987, I.R.C. § 1245(a)(1) recaptured the 
depreciation allowances on the disposition of the property as ordinary income unless the taxpayer 
elected straight line recovery for the property under I.R.C. § 168.   Later, I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1) 
taxed gain on the disposition of real property as ordinary income to the extent of additional 
depreciation.  I.R.C. § 1250(a)(1) (2006).  Under I.R.C. § 1250(b)(1) additional depreciation 
means depreciation adjustments exceeding those that would have resulted from straight line 
depreciation.  I.R.C. § 1250(b)(1) (2006). 
 177. I.R.C. § 1245 (a)(5)(C) (1982) (exempting real property from recapture of a straight line 
election is in effect under I.R.C. § 168 (b)(3) (1982)). 
 178. Id. § 46(b).  The credits ranged from 15% to 25%.  Id. 
 179. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2189–90 (1986) 
(adding I.R.C. § 42 which provided for a 4% or 9% credit on buildings placed into service in 
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available at the same time as it enacted the passive activity loss limitations,180 
substituted for direct subsidies and lent themselves to tax shelter syndications. 
These accelerated recovery periods for durable property succeeded in 
encouraging capital investment but not necessarily in an economically efficient 
manner.  Responding to ever-increasing demand for tax shelter, the provisions 
served to promote tax shelter products.  Broad availability of investment 
credits181 that partnerships could overlay with rapid depreciation made tax 
shelters based on personal property extremely attractive.  For several years, 
investment in new depreciable property yielded a 10% tax credit without any 
reduction in the depreciable basis of the property.182  Hence, the present value 
signature of the tax shelter for the first year for a 50% marginal bracket 
taxpayer was a net outlay in the first year of only 80% of the cash 
investment.183  The investment tax credits rendered the shelters attractive to 
even lower bracket taxpayers.184 
Moreover, for a short time safe harbor leasing enabled corporations to shift 
their tax benefits freely to other corporations that could utilize them better.  
Under a safe harbor lease, the user of the property shifts both investment 
credits and depreciation allowances from its investment in new tangible 
personal property by means of a simple election that mimics a sale and 
leaseback transaction.185  The structure did not have to meet general economic 
substance principles.186  Promoters quickly facilitated safe harbor leases by 
offering interests in investment partnerships that bought the corporate tax 
 
1987 or laterwith the amount of the credit depending upon whether the building was federally 
subsidized). 
 180. For a discussion on passive activity loss limitations, see infra notes 191–93 and 
accompanying text. 
 181. I.R.C. § 38(a) (1982). 
 182. See id. §§ 38, 46. 
 183. The computation combining the impact of the depreciation allowance and the investment 
credit is as follows:  I – (0.1 x I) – (I x 0.2 x (1 – t)), where “I” is the investment amount and “t” 
is the investors marginal tax rate. 
 184. Credits, unlike deductions, do not vary in value depending on the taxpayer-recipient’s 
marginal tax rate.  Accordingly, all taxpayers who otherwise would have tax liability would get 
equal tax savings from a credit, as long as allowance of the credit did not depend on the taxpayer 
having a certain level of income.  One dollar of credit meant one dollar of tax savings to all 
taxpayers.  On the other hand, one dollar of deduction to a 25% bracket taxpayer equals twenty-
five cents of tax savings, while the same deduction to a 50% bracket taxpayer is worth fifty cents.  
DOUGLAS A. KAHN & JEFFREY H. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 555 (5th ed. 2005). 
 185. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr. & Alan J. Auerbach, Transferability of Tax Incentives and the 
Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752, 1762 (1982). 
 186. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201(a), 95 Stat. 172, 214–
216 (adding I.R.C. § 168(f)(8), laying out special depreciation deduction rules for leased 
property).  Section 168(f)(8) was later repealed, subject to various transition rules, by the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 209(a), 96 Stat 324, 442. 
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benefits to corporate investors that had an appetite for those benefits.  While 
safe harbor leasing was not available for individual investment, it helped to 
legitimize tax sheltering for corporations as well as individuals and made tax 
shelters more of a cultural mainstay. 
B. Shutting Down the Deferral/Conversion Shelters—the Industry Shift to 
Custom Products 
The 1986 tax changes reflected the view that base-broadening along with 
rate reduction would prevent loss of revenue from rate reductions.187  
Discussion in the contemporaneous literature and in government assumed that 
high marginal tax rates were responsible for tax sheltering.188  One hypothesis 
was that absent high tax rates, incentives to shelter income would disappear, or 
at least diminish sufficiently to become an insubstantial tax concern.189  
Reliance on that hypothesis proved misplaced.190 
More important to suppressing taxpayers’ appetite for tax shelter products 
in 1986 was the robust schedular feature that the passive activity loss limitation 
introduced to the Code.191  That feature divides individual income and loss into 
two discrete categories: income and loss from conduct of trades or businesses 
in which the taxpayer does not participate materially—the taxpayer’s passive 
 
 187. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2096 (reducing 
the maximum rate of tax on individuals to 28%).  I.R.C. § 1(c) phased out the 15% marginal rate 
and the personal exemption for taxpayers with incomes in excess of $43,150 ($71,900 on joint 
returns), thereby creating a bubble rate of 31% within a specific income range.  See I.R.C. § 1(c) 
(2006).  At the same time, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 increased the maximum effective rate on 
net capital gain from 20% to 28% by repealing the 60% net capital gain deduction under I.R.C. § 
1202(a).  Tax Reform Act of 1986 §§ 301–302, 100 Stat. at 2216–19.  Net capital gain under 
I.R.C. § 1222(11) is the excess of net long term capital gain under I.R.C. § 1222(7) over net short 
term capital loss under I.R.C. § 1222(6).  I.R.C. § 1222 (2006). 
 188. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A 
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1940–41 (1987) (arguing that high 
marginal tax rates encourage tax shelter investments and broadening the tax base would “directly 
reduce the number of tax shelters by eliminating the deductions and credits that make such 
shelters possible”); Jane Seaberry, Simplification Doesn’t Faze Tax Industry, WASH. POST, Dec. 
10, 1984, at Bus. 1 (discussing issues related to proposed tax law changes, including the fact that 
lowering the tax rate decreases the incentive to shelter income and would be one of “[t]he biggest 
blows to the tax shelter business”). 
 189. Tom Petska, Partnerships, Partners, and Tax Shelters after Tax Reform, 1987–1989, 
STAT. INCOME (SOI) BULL., Summer 1992, at 8, 10, 17 (discussing the decrease in the number of 
partnerships after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the increase in profit shown by partnerships). 
 190. See discussion infra notes 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 191. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 501(a), 100 Stat. at 2243 (adding I.R.C. § 469 to the Code 
which placed limits on passive activity losses and credits).  For a discussion on other schedular 
features, see supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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activities192—and all other income and loss.193  Generally, taxpayers could 
deduct expenses and losses from passive activities only to the extent of their 
income from passive activities.194  The statute defines excess expense and loss 
from passive activities as “passive activity loss.”195  While the statute disallows 
passive activity loss,196 the disallowance is not permanent.  Rather, the passive 
activity loss suspends and carries forward to the succeeding tax years197 until 
the taxpayer has sufficient income from passive activities to absorb the loss198 
or the taxpayer disposes of his or her interest in the passive activity in a taxable 
transaction.199  Allowing the deferred passive activity loss upon disposition 
matches loss allowance with the taxpayer’s underlying economic loss from the 
activity.200  Losses from traditional passive investments such as securities201 
and losses from business activities in which the taxpayer participates 
materially remain deductible from both passive activity income and non-
passive activity income.202  The asymmetry in loss deductibility allowing non-
passive activity loss to offset passive activity income, but not allowing passive 
activity loss to offset non-passive activity income, was intentional and made 
passive activity losses less usable. 
While the passive activity loss limitation rendered deferral/conversion 
shelters impractical for the traditional shelter market of taxpayers whose 
income came primarily from personal services, a smaller market remained for 
those who had sheltered in the past.  If those taxpayers’ old shelter investments 
were generating income without cash flow because the investment partnership 
used the income to repay debt,203 for example, that phantom income was often 
 
 192. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1) (2006).  Traditional tax shelters were syndicated interests in limited 
partnerships that engaged in the conduct of a trade or business. 
 193. Id. § 469(e)(1) (classifying traditional passive income like dividends and interest as not 
passive activity income). 
 194. Id. §§ 469(a)(1), (d)(1). 
 195. Id. § 469(d)(1). 
 196. Id. § 469(a). 
 197. I.R.C. § 469(b) (2006). 
 198. Id. § 469(d)(1). 
 199. Id. § 469(g). 
 200. Id.  The passive activity loss limitations resemble rules of capitalization requiring 
taxpayers to capitalize, rather than deduct, net passive activity losses.  The capitalization analogy 
does not describe the concept fully except on a rather macroscopic level, as I.R.C. § 469 
combines a broad range of passive activities as a single capital category since taxpayers may 
deduct passive activity loss from one activity against passive activity gain from another unrelated 
activity.  See id. § 469(c) (providing a laundry list definition of what constitutes “passive 
activity”). 
 201. Id. § 469(c)(1)(A) defines a passive activity as the conduct of a trade or business.  
Passive activity income and loss does not include passive investment income under I.R.C. § 
469(e)(1). 
 202. I.R.C. §§ 469(c)(1)(A), (e)(1) (2006). 
 203. See supra text accompanying note 152 (discussing burnt-out shelters). 
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passive activity income.  The taxpayers might shelter that income with a new 
passive-activity-loss-generating investment.204 
Despite tax rate reductions and passive activity loss limitations, the tax 
sheltering industry adapted and survived—in many respects becoming more 
robust.  Promoters shifted their attention from generic shelter products for 
highly compensated individuals to custom shelters for corporate taxpayers not 
subject to the passive activity loss limitations.205  Corporate managers had 
come to view the historical support functions of tax planning and reporting as 
active profit centers.206  Tax sheltering contributed to the corporation’s profit 
and loss statement by reducing the amount of taxes payable.207  Even though 
the government might challenge the corporations’ shelter-based tax positions, 
auditors provided clean certifications of corporate financial statements even if 
the statements did not disclose and reserve potential tax risk.208 
Rather than deferral, the promoters of these new corporate products sought 
permanent elimination of tax liability, and frequently, duplication of losses.  
Several variations of these structured transactions depended at least in part 
upon the involvement of partners or other participants that were not subject to 
 
 204. This is assuming the taxpayers reported the income at all.  See supra note 153 and 
accompanying text. 
 205. I.R.C. § 469(a)(2) does not limit the deductibility of passive activity losses for corporate 
taxpayers except S corporations that are tax transparent to their individual shareholders and to 
closely held regular taxpaying corporations if they are personal service corporations.  See I.R.C. 
§§ 469(a)(2), (e)(2). 
 206. Compare Donald L. Korb, What is the Role of a U.S. Tax Advisor in a Changed Law 
Enforcement Environment, in 28 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 
DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & 
RESTRUCTURINGS 1175, 1176 (Practising Law Instit., Tax Law & Practice Course Handbook Ser. 
No. J-852, 2008) (arguing that corporate desire to reduce and control costs coupled with the 
realization that taxes were one of the largest expenses led to viewing the tax department as a 
possible profit center via tax shelters), with Blank, supra note 8, at 544 (offering examples of 
“clever” corporations engaging in transactions that complied with the letter of the law that could 
make large tax liabilities disappear). 
 207. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Corporate Tax 
Shelters, and Book-Tax Alignment, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 169, 175 (2009) (finding that an increase in 
incentive, stock-based compensation may have encouraged managers to actively use tax planning 
to enhance profitability in the short term and, concomitantly, their own incentive compensation). 
 208. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., FASB 
INTERPRETATION NO. 48, ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF FSAB STATEMENT NO. 109 1, 2 (Fin. Accounting Ser. No. 281-B, 2006) 
(interpreting FASB Statement Number 109 as prohibiting a reporting entity from claiming a tax 
benefit on its financial statements unless the position that gives rise to the benefit is more likely 
than not to withstand government challenge).  This may diminish the use of tax shelter structures 
by corporations because, in many instances, the interpretation will prevent the corporation from 
capturing an immediate financial statement benefit. 
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U.S. taxation.209  Although the tax products had some commonalities, 
promoters tended to tailor the products to the needs of the specific corporate 
taxpayer. 
In one variant, a corporate taxpayer sought to exploit the ratable basis 
recovery rule applicable to contingent payments on installment sales.210  By 
creating a partnership with a foreign partner initially owning the bulk of the 
partnership interests, the partnership sold heavily leveraged, high tax basis 
notes in exchange for contingent payments.  The first payment was 
disproportionately large relative to succeeding payments.  The partnership had 
to take the initial payment into account as soon as it received the payment.211  
Under the ratable basis recovery rule, the payment generated a large gain 
because the allocation of basis to that payment relative to the ratio of the 
payment to all other reasonably anticipated payments was a disproportionally 
small portion of the total basis.  The partnership allocated the bulk of the gain 
to the foreign partner under the terms of the partnership agreement because 
that partner owned most of the partnership interests.  The foreign partner was 
indifferent to the allocation of gain because the gain was capital from the sale 
of personal property that was not connected to the foreign partner’s conduct of 
a trade or business in the United States and, accordingly, not taxable in the 
United States.212  The foreign partner then withdrew or reduced its interest.  
The remaining small payments generated capital loss because the bulk of the 
partnership’s basis remained to be recovered.  The partnership allocated those 
capital losses to its U.S. corporate partner that then owned substantially all 
partnership interests.  The U.S. corporate taxpayer had a large capital gain 
from other sources and intended to deduct the capital loss from that gain.  In 
several cases, the government successfully argued that the transaction was for 
tax avoidance purposes only because it lacked economic substance and 
business purpose.  The court held that the government could disregard the 
application of the treasury regulation to the transaction.213  In another case, the 
 
 209. Non-United States corporations that are not engaged in a trade or business in the United 
States are only taxable in the United States on income deriving from United States sources.  
I.R.C. §§ 881(a), 882(a)(1) (2006).  United States tax exempt organizations are not taxable on 
investment income but are taxable on income from a trade or business that is unrelated to their 
exempt functions.  Id. § 511(b). 
 210. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(3)(i) (2010) (requiring ratable recovery of basis in 
installment sales with contingent payments). 
 211. Am. Auto. Ass’n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 689 (1961) (holding prepaid income 
includable for current tax year even if burdened by performance obligation and costs in the 
future). 
 212. I.R.C. § 865 (a) (sourcing income from the sale of personal property of a non-resident 
outside the United States; I.R.C. § 881(a) (imposing a withholding tax at the source only on 
certain periodical payments of interest, dividends, and royalties). 
 213. Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2003); ACM 
P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 260 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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court disregarded the partnership as a separate taxable entity because it had no 
business purpose other than the transaction involving the contingent 
installment sale regulation.214 
In another common shelter variant, promoters built upon the longstanding 
financing tradition of the sale-leaseback.215  United States corporate taxpayers 
acquired property offshore and leased it back to the seller.  Frequently the 
seller was a governmental or quasi-governmental body operating a critical, 
infrastructure facility such as the mass transit system in a foreign city.  The 
buyer/lessor borrowed the purchase price for the facility from a non-U.S. 
lender.  Under the terms of the sale and leaseback (or lease and leaseback), 216 
the seller/lessee deposited most of the sale proceeds with a financial institution 
related to the buyer’s offshore lender under documentation that protected the 
lender from possible default.217  The payment from the buyer/lessor exceeded 
the payment deposited by the seller/lessee to provide a “fee” to the seller for 
facilitating the transaction.  The seller/lessee had an option to repurchase the 
facility at the end of the lease term so that it would not have to relinquish 
ownership and control of the facility.  The option terms economically 
compelled the seller/lessee to exercise the option.  If respected for U.S. tax 
purposes, the transaction would generate substantial deductions for the U.S. 
corporate buyer/lessor in the form of interest deductions and depreciation even 
though the transaction was substantially risk free to the U.S. corporate 
participant.  Longstanding economic substance precedents on sale-leasebacks 
made these transactions seem likely to withstand challenge even though the 
U.S. corporate partner had little opportunity for economic profit from the 
transaction.218  Nevertheless, the IRS designated the transactions under its 
coordinated issues program219 and has successfully litigated several 
transactions.220  Despite the settlement initiative that the IRS offered following 
 
 214. ASA Investerings P’ship. v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 215. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 569–70, 582–83 (1978) (finding a sale-
leaseback of building had sufficient economic substance even though the likelihood of profit for 
the purchaser/lessor in excess of what a lender would receive was remote).  For a short period, 
safe harbor leasing permitted U.S. corporations unable to effectively use their depreciation 
allowances and investment credits to sell those tax benefits to other corporations through a safe 
harbor lease.  See supra text accompanying note 185. 
 216. The literature and the IRS refer to the transaction by the acronym “SILO” which stands 
for Sale In/Lease Out. 
 217. The arrangement substantially had the effect of defeasing the loan.  See Coordinated 
Issue—Losses Claimed and Income to be Reported from Sale In/Lease Out (SILO), IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=140247,00.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter Coordinated Issue—Losses Claimed]. 
 218. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 569–70. 
 219. Coordinated Issue—Losses Claimed, supra note 217. 
 220. The IRS has sought, with some success, to challenge both types of shelters.  See BB&T 
Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 2008) (successfully challenging a LILO 
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those successful cases,221 the IRS’s success in challenging LILO/SILOs has not 
been complete.222 
In another structured pattern, a corporation having or anticipating a large 
capital gain from the sale of a subsidiary (or other capital asset) would create a 
new subsidiary and capitalize it with an amount of cash approximately equal to 
the parent corporation’s estimated exposure from specific contingent liabilities, 
such as medical reimbursement claims or unfunded environmental cleanup 
expenses.  The new subsidiary assumed those liabilities so that its net value 
approached zero.  Either because the payment of the liabilities would be 
deductible when paid223 or, based upon existing precedents, contingent 
liabilities were not debt for purposes of the corporate tax rules,224 the parent 
corporation’s adjusted basis in its subsidiary was the amount of cash the parent 
contributed, undiminished by the amount of the liability.225  The parent could 
 
transaction); Altria Grp., Inc. v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(concluding that the SILO and LILO transactions lacked economic substance); AWG Leasing 
Trust v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953, 960, 998 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (successfully challenging 
a SILO transaction); Fifth Third Bancorp v. United States, No. 1:05-cv-350, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 108241 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2008) (reporting jury finding that LILO transaction lacked 
any economic substance). 
 221. LILO/SILO Initiative Frequently Asked Questions, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/busi 
nesses/article/0,,id=186294,00.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
 222. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228, 340 (2009) 
(holding a LILO transaction to have economic substance). 
 223. I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) (2006). 
 224. See Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 489, 502 (1940) (holding payments for use of 
borrowed stock pending return of the stock—as in the case of a short sale—not to bear interest on 
indebtedness because the borrowing of shares is not an obligation to make a payment); Helmer v. 
Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727, 731 (1975) (holding that the delivery obligation where 
partnership granted option, received premium, and distributed proceeds was not a debt and did 
not increase the partners bases in their partnership interests under IRC § 752). 
 225. Under I.R.C. § 358(a), a shareholder’s basis (in these cases, the parent corporation was 
the shareholder) in the shares of a controlled corporation (the new subsidiary) is equal to the 
amount of cash plus the fair market value of the property the shareholder contributed to the 
corporation less the amount of debt that the controlled corporation assumed or subject to which 
the controlled corporation received the contributed property because I.R.C. § 358(d) treated that 
debt as cash that the controlled corporation distributed to its shareholder.  I.R.C. § 358(a) (2006).  
Under I.R.C. § 358(d)(2), however, I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) liabilities were not treated as cash that the 
controlled corporation distributed to the contributing shareholder because the shareholder had not 
taken those liabilities into account for tax purposes, as the liabilities would become deductible 
when they ceased to be contingent or when a cash basis taxpayer paid them.  Id. §§ 358(d)(2), 
357(c)(3).  New I.R.C. § 358(h) changed this result as it required a reduction of basis for both 
contingent and deductible liabilities under I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) where the stock basis exceeded the 
fair market value of the contributed cash and property.  Id. § 358(h)(1).  Section 309 of the 
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 added I.R.C. § 358(h), retroactive to assumptions of 
liability after October 18, 1999.  Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
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sell the subsidiary for a nominal amount and claim a loss equal to the cash it 
contributed to the subsidiary.  Although the loss was capital,226 a corporation 
that recently had a large capital gain from the sale of a subsidiary, as were the 
facts in the decided cases, could use the capital loss the tax play generated.  
The new subsidiary, in turn, had the funds available to pay the liabilities and 
often could claim a deduction for the payments.227 
While emphasis shifted to corporate shelters for a few years, the passive 
activity loss limitations did not alter the culture.  Individuals continued to seek 
shelter from taxes, preferring to pay fees to shelter promoters rather than 
paying taxes.  In the estate tax area, family limited partnerships with value 
discounting228 and Crummey trusts for life insurance229 remained powerful 
estate planning tools.  For income taxes, demand for tax exempt bonds 
increased,230 the underground economy grew,231 and foreign financial 
institutions with bank secrecy protection made increasing inroads into the U.S. 
investment market.232  The tax shelter paradigm itself shifted for individuals 
 
app. G § 309, 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (2000).  The change also may have affected “son 
of boss” transactions.  See infra text accompanying note 235. 
 226. I.R.C. § 1211(a) limits the deductibility of capital losses in the case of a corporate 
taxpayer to the amount of the taxpayer’s capital gain with excess losses available for temporary 
carryback and carryforward under I.R.C. § 1212(a).  I.R.C. §§ 1211(a), 1212(a)(1) (2006). 
 227. But see Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the transaction where asbestos liability was transferred to new subsidiary was for tax 
avoidance purposes and lacked economic substance even though consistent with IRC § 358 
basis); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 436 F.3d 431, 433, 443 (4th Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment for taxpayer 
and remanding where medical and dental plan liabilities and cash were transferred to new 
subsidiary). 
 228. See supra note 135. 
 229. Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1968). 
 230. R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, BOND EVALUATION, SELECTION, AND MANAGEMENT 152 
(2004) (discussing how the demand for tax-exempt bonds increases when tax rates also increase, 
as happened when the tax rates increased in 1993, but demand decreased when tax rates declined 
as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986). 
 231. The underground or shadow economy refers to payments that do not use the national or 
international banking system in order to avoid detection and taxation.  FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER & 
DOMINIK ENSTE, HIDING IN THE SHADOWS: THE GROWTH OF THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 1–
5 (2002) (explaining the concept of the shadow economy, estimating the underground economy 
around the world, estimating the underground economy at 10% of gross domestic product in the 
United States during the 1999–2001 period, and identifying steep growth from 1970–2000). 
 232. In February 2009, Union Bank Suisse agreed to both pay $780 million in fines, penalties, 
restitution, and interest to settle Securities Exchange Commission and Department of Justice 
criminal and civil charges and to provide the United States with identities and information 
pertaining to clients who may have been using these banks to avoid the IRS (breaking the long-
standing secrecy of Swiss bank accounts).  Swiss Bank Settles U.S. Tax Charges, Mounting U.S. 
Pressure on Swiss Bank Secrecy, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 338, 338–40 (John R. Crook ed., 2009).  
Shortly thereafter, IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman announced that the IRS generally would 
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from deferral shelters for personal service income to sheltering of large capital 
gains from sales of businesses.  A leading structure to shelter those gains was 
the “son of boss” shelter233 that recently forced the dissolution of at least one 
major law firm, and materially injured several others.234 
Rather than the old deferral-based shelters, newer products purportedly 
enabled individuals to eliminate long-term capital gain permanently.  In one 
variant, taxpayers who anticipated a large long-term capital gain might buy and 
sell call options equal in amount but with minimally different strike prices and 
expirations.  The option premiums paid and received were substantially equal 
in amount, so the taxpayers had no net cash outlay.  The options offered the 
taxpayers little or no opportunity for profit since advance in the value of the 
underlying security would also increase the value of the purchased options, but 
the taxpayers’ obligation under the sold options would increase in a like 
amount. 
Under the tax shelter plan, the taxpayers would contribute the purchased 
call options to a partnership or new corporation.  At the same time, that entity 
assumed the obligation on the sold call options.  The contributing taxpayers 
claimed a tax basis in the partnership interest or stock equal to the purchase 
price of the call options.235  Since the obligation under the sold call options was 
not a fixed obligation to make a payment, it arguably was not a liability that 
would reduce that basis under applicable corporate or partnership rules.236  The 
 
not prosecute taxpayers that voluntarily came forward with information about their sheltering 
overseas and would reduce the applicable punishment from a penalty of 50% of the highest 
annual balance for each account for each of the last three years to a penalty of between 5% and 
20% applied only once to the highest balance in the accounts over the past six years, paying all 
applicable taxes and interest.  Lynnley Browning, The I.R.S. Will Lower Penalties for Some 
Offshore Tax Evaders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at B3; I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-84 (Sept. 
21, 2009) (stating that although the original deadline for voluntary disclosures on foreign 
accounts was Septempber 23, 2009, the IRS was extending the deadline to October 15, 2009).  
See also infra note 490 and accompanying text. 
 233. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255.  The IRS referred to the shelter product as “son 
of boss.”  BOSS was an acronym for an earlier shelter product marketed by a major investment 
banking firm as the “Bond Option Sales Strategy.”  While the “son of boss” strategy was 
unrelated to the BOSS product, the name caught on without the acronym. 
 234. Both the IRS and clients proceeded against the Dallas-based firm of Jenkens & Gilchrist 
on account of the active tax shelter opinion business that tax partners in the Chicago office 
conducted.  See Katie Fairbank & Terry Maxon, How Jenkens Lost Its Way, DALL. MORNING 
NEWS, Apr. 1, 2007, at 1A. 
 235. For basis in corporate shares, see supra text accompanying note 225 (discussing I.R.C. § 
358(a)).  For basis with regard to partnership interests, see I.R.C. § 722 (2006). 
 236. See supra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.  I.R.C. § 752(b) governs partnerships 
and treats a taxpayer who contributes property to a partnership—subject to the partnership 
assuming a liability that encumbers the property—as receiving a cash distribution under I.R.C. § 
731(a) equal to the resulting reduction of the taxpayer’s separate liabilities.  I.R.C. § 752(b) 
(2006). 
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contributing taxpayers then would sell their interests in the partnership or 
corporation to a third party and recognize a capital loss.237  Taxpayers could 
use that non-economic capital loss to offset the capital gain they recognized—
or soon would recognize—from sale of their business.  The loss is non-
economic insofar as the net value of the taxpayer’s interest in the new 
corporation or partnership was zero at the moment of acquisition because the 
economic value would take the sold call options into account.  Following the 
sale of the business and the new entity, the taxpayers had no further interest in 
that entity, so the transactions and recognitions of gain and loss were complete.  
The offsetting capital gain from the sale of the business would never become 
subject to tax. 
In 2000, the IRS notified taxpayers of its intention to challenge those and 
similar transactions on a variety of grounds.238  Then in 2004, the IRS offered a 
settlement initiative on “son of boss” type tax products.239  Taxpayers who 
conceded all tax liability would be subject to no more than a ten percent 
penalty—no penalties if they disclosed their transaction on their return—and 
would be allowed a capital loss for their out of pocket costs (or an ordinary 
loss for half those costs).240  Many taxpayers settled, and many of those have 
sued their professional advisors for malpractice and other related claims.241  
However, the settlement initiative also denied taxpayers who did not settle 
access to the Appeals Division of the IRS, making litigation their only 
opportunity to resist or compromise the government’s assessment of a 
deficiency and its penalties.242 
 
 237. A variant on this structure exploited the partnership termination rules under I.R.C. § 708 
that enabled a shift of the artificial basis to other assets, and enabled taxpayers to increase their 
shares of closely held businesses or, in other instances, corporations that had acquired their 
closely held shares for shares of the acquiring corporation in tax deferred reorganizations.  Other 
variants used short sale strategies under which the obligation to return borrowed securities that 
were used to establish a short sale were not identified as liabilities that reduced share or 
partnership interest basis. 
 238. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, supra note 233.  The example in the preceding paragraph is from 
the Notice. 
 239. I.R.S. Announcement 2004-46, 2004-21 I.R.B. 964. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See Soled, supra note 8, at 268–69, 268 n.1. 
 242.  Denying taxpayers access to Appeals was unprecedented and controversial.  Then 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson publicly stated that the settlement initiative did 
not set any precedent for denial of access to appeals in the future: “We viewed Son of Boss 
transactions as clearly abusive and, for sound administrative reasons, concluded that the 
resolution terms should be set with bright-line clarity to facilitate a quick resolution.”  I.R.S. Fact 
Sheet FS-2004-13 (May 2004).  Potential related criminal investigations of Son of Boss 
transactions also made conventional Appeals case review problematic.  Everson also noted that, 
“The approach that we followed here should in no way be viewed as having set a precedent for 
subsequent resolution strategies.”  Id.  See also Vincent S. Canciello, Tax Shelter Resolution 
Initiatives and the Independence of Appeals, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Apr./May 2003, at 15, 18 
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Cases arising from the settlement initiative currently are working their way 
through the courts.  In those cases, the government relies on two theories: 1) 
that the transactions lack economic substance243 and 2) that under recently 
promulgated and retroactive regulations, the contingent or non-cash liabilities 
are liabilities for purposes of the partnership and corporate rules.244  A 
statutory change to Subchapter C of the Code in late 2000,245 retroactive to 
1999, reduced the adjusted basis of property in some instances by the amount 
of contingent liabilities that encumbered the property.246  The legislation 
authorized the Department of the Treasury to promulgate regulations to 
prevent taxpayers from the “acceleration or duplication of losses” through the 
use of partnerships in a similar manner.247  The Treasury promulgated a 
temporary regulation in 2003, finalized in 2005,248 that the government has 
sought to apply to “son of boss” cases.249 
Whether those cases will have a meaningful and long-term impact on 
aggressive planning is doubtful.  Textualist judicial decision-making that 
interprets statutes narrowly and technically empowers the aggressive tax 
planners.  That empowerment exerts negative influences on the tax community 
 
(presenting warning from a past National Director of Appeals that prohibiting taxpayers from 
using Appeals directly conflicts with Congressional orders and is a deterioration of Appeals 
independence); David B. Robinson, Appeals’ Role in Tax Shelter Settlement: Independence 
Affirmed, 58 TAX EXECUTIVE 94, 94 (2006) (interviewing David B. Robison, former National 
Director of Appeals, stating that he did not anticipate denying access to appeals in similar 
settlements again). 
 243. Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 11, 14 (2007) (disallowing the losses 
that the taxpayer claimed from trading Euro options, and holding that the objective economic 
substance test required that the economic profit/loss potential bear a reasonable relationship to the 
loss the taxpayer claims).  However, while the Federal Circuit on affirmed the Claims Court on 
March 23, 2010 on the economic substance issue, it vacated and remanded with respect to 
penalties arising from the overstatement of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis under I.R.C. § 1011.  
Jade Trading, LLC v. United States, 598 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (following 
Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Comm’r, 591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 244. Taxpayers relied on longstanding precedents that treated contingent and non-cash 
obligations as something other than indebtedness to which I.R.C. § 752(b), for example, would 
apply.  See Helmer v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727, 731 (1975). 
 245. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 246. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. G § 309(a), 114 
Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (2000) (adding I.R.C. § 358(h)(1) which reduced basis by the 
amount of any determined liability). 
 247. Id. § 309(c)(1). 
 248. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6T (2003) (superseded by Treas. Reg. § 1.752-7 (2005), a 
permanent regulation concerning liabilities assumed after June 24, 2003). 
 249. Compare Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608, 622–
23 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that the retroactive regulation under I.R.C. § 752 was interpretive 
rather than legislative and invalid as applied to the taxpayers), with Cemco Investors, LLC v. 
United States, 515 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding the regulations to be valid as applied in 
the case and criticizing Klamath). 
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and the legislative process.  Legislators and taxing agencies find the courts 
unreliable in combating all but the most egregious tax schemes.  While the 
courts have remained solid against active tax protest,250 they are far less 
predictable as stalwarts against tax planning devices that lack all but the most 
minimal economic substance,251 or they utilize a statute in a manner 
inconsistent with its obvious legislative purpose.252  Accordingly, legislatures 
seek greater precision and narrower application in taxing statutes to eliminate 
statutory uncertainty and ambiguity that tax planners might exploit.  Given 
drawn out legislative processes, tightening of statutory language tends to lag 
planning.  Tax planners already have moved on to the next statute’s flaws 
before the legislature has corrected the previous statute’s flaws.253  Moreover, 
tighter legislation is more complex and intricate and often has its own 
unanticipated gaps in application because it is precise and narrow.  I anticipate 
that tax sheltering and aggressive tax planning will continue with an ever-
renewing variety of products. 
II.  THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL ADVISORS—ADDING VALUE 
Until the last few decades of the twentieth century, major law and public 
accounting firms did not actively market tax shelter products.  Rather, the 
firms served primarily in their traditional advisory roles to their clients.254  
 
 250. See Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that all 
individuals must pay taxes on their income whether they are natural citizens or not and regardless 
of whether they take advantage of government services); United States v. Beale, 574 F.3d 512, 
519 (8th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming that disagreement about what tax law should be, when knowing 
tax-paying obligations, yet failing to follow them, does not remove liability for willful tax 
evasion). 
 251. See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) (holding that 
for there to be economic substance, the transaction must have a legitimate business purpose, must 
have been considered independently of tax benefits, and must not be shaped only by tax-
avoidance purposes with meaningless labels). 
 252. See Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 13 F.3d 355, 357 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that using 
animal bones for gelatin after processing meat could be considered recycling (if they had not been 
stipulated to be animal waste), and could entitle the plaintiff to energy property investment tax 
credit, even though the examples of recycling given by Congress when enacting the statute 
involved creating an end-product similar to the initial product being recycled, such as making 
paper from recycled newspapers).  This is an example of what I would call “off label” statutory 
use. 
 253. The average time to pass a bill is six to seven years.  155 CONG. REC. S9216 (daily ed. 
Sept. 10, 2009) (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi) (“The average bill takes about six years to pass.”); 
Kristen Bell DeTienne & Richard D. Flint, The Boss’s Eyes and Ears: A Case Study of Electronic 
Employee Monitoring and the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, 12 LAB. LAW. 93, 97 
(1996). 
 254. See generally DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 
710–11 (Am. Casebook Ser., 2d ed. 2008) (explaining that tax advice is a common area of advice 
for many business lawyers); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS 
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Firms developed long-term relationships with their clients and billed for their 
time without negotiating their fees.255  If some of their clients marketed tax 
shelters, the professional advisors sought to maintain an aesthetic distance 
from the products and their marketing.  Many tax practices were conservative 
in their tax recommendations.256  Although tax practitioners assisted in 
structuring business transactions for tax efficiency, many tax practitioners 
considered the aggressive exploitation of tax opportunities in conjunction with 
syndicated products as an undignified practice.257 
However, as the twentieth century drew to a close, ever more emphasis fell 
on business development.  Firms had less room for outstanding legal 
technicians who developed only minimal business.  Capturing and retaining 
clients became ever more important and competitive.  Even in the elite practice 
areas like securities offerings, clients shopped for lawyers and negotiated fees.  
Clients sought lawyers who would “add value” to the business rather than 
simply passively evaluating the legality of business structures.  In order to add 
value, tax lawyers became more creative and assertive in tax planning. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, and possibly earlier, high-income individuals 
started to bring marketed tax shelter offerings to their legal and accounting 
representatives for review.  In order to service their regular clients, even the 
prestigious firms found themselves peripherally engaged with tax shelters in 
reviewing those offerings.  As demand for tax shelters increased, the rapidly 
growing tax shelter industry provided a steady source of securities and tax 
 
FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS & APPLICATIONS 116, 209–11 (4th ed. 2006) 
(describing the rise of tax planning and the tax advisor); Henry Ordower, Toward a Multiple 
Party Representation Model: Moderating Power Disparity, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1274–75 
(2003) (discussing the role of the lawyer with regard to multiple clients as advisory rather than 
adversarial). 
 255. Corporate clients historically did not change their legal representation or demand bids 
before committing for legal services.  During and after the late 1970s, the nature of legal practice 
and practice relationships began to change.  Competitive bidding for legal work became 
increasingly common, lawyers no longer routinely spent their whole careers with a single firm, 
and long-lasting relationships between corporate management and outside legal counsel became 
less common.  Pricing for legal services became increasingly important, as corporate clients 
shifted ever greater portions of legal work to in-house counsel whenever management thought it 
economically worthwhile to do so.  Referrals from outside vendors like tax product and insurance 
sales representatives became an important source of legal business. 
 256. Anecdotally, tax lawyers gained a reputation for squelching deals rather than facilitating 
them when they could not find a structure that worked for the deal or did not agree with the 
promoter on how the tax characteristics of the deal should play out. 
 257. One nonagenarian New York practitioner who began practicing in New York City in the 
early 1940s relates that the “silk stocking” firms then eschewed even residential real estate 
practice and much commercial real estate.  Those firms ceded the practice to smaller, often 
Jewish practitioners whom the elite firms did not often hire.  When I began practicing in the 
1970s, the elite firms that employed the top graduates from major law schools similarly eschewed 
tax shelter practice and looked askance at aggressive tax planners. 
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work that tempted even the most traditional firms.258  Legal memoranda and 
opinions that accompanied PPMs were consistent with traditional legal practice 
as a support function to business.259  Accounting firms prepared projections 
that anticipated favorable tax outcomes and included detailed tax savings-
based rate of return computations.260  Law firms provided memoranda and, less 
frequently, opinions that described the anticipated tax effects of the proposed, 
syndicated offering.261  Memoranda and opinions tended to be generic and, 
early in the development of the tax shelter industry, frequently discussed 
hypothetical facts rather than the specific features of the deal involved in the 
current offering.262  Firms addressed those memoranda or opinions to their 
promoter clients rather than to the investors who relied on the opinions in 
evaluating the investment.  Under that procedure, the investors did not have 
privity of contract with the firms and might have no recourse against them if 
the IRS challenged the investor’s tax reporting positions from the 
investment.263  But later, privity of contract as a limitation on claims fell aside 
as firms had to address and deliver their opinions to the investor directly.  
Promoters referred prospective investors to lawyers for opinions on the 
 
 258. Syndicated limited partnership tax shelter investments were securities.  Although the 
offerings were private placements and exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 
a PPM accompanied most offerings to provide necessary disclosure to the investors.  See supra 
text accompanying note 51. 
 259. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (describing how legal opinions were common in financial transactions). 
 260. Susan Cleary Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter 
Compliance Norm, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 965 (2006) (explaining how accounting firms are 
consulted regarding the benefits of tax planning proposals). 
 261. Id. at 966. 
 262. Both the American Bar Association and the IRS later barred this practice.  See ABA 
Comm. Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982) (stating that a lawyer could not 
disclaim responsibility for accuracy of facts in tax shelter opinion); I.R.S. Requirements for 
Covered Opinions (Treas. Circular No. 230), 31 C.F.R § 10.35 (2007) (asserting that a lawyer 
must make reasonable efforts to learn the facts of the investment). 
 263. To successfully sue for malpractice, one must show: 1) the professional owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiff (generally shown by an attorney-client or accountant-client relationship 
between the professional and the plaintiff); 2) the professional breached that duty; 3) the 
professional’s negligence was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff; and 4) there are 
actual damages resulting from the professional’s negligence.  Bradley E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. 
Client—Privity, Malpractice, and the Lack of Respect for the Primacy of the Attorney-Client 
Relationship in Estate Planning, 68 TENN. L. REV. 261, 267 (2001); see also Sorenson v. 
Pavlikowski, 581 P.2d 851, 853 (Nev. 1978).  Without the privity of contract required under the 
first element of the test, the plaintiff’s case would fall apart.  See Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 
195, 205–06 (1880) (holding that the party that causes an injury to plaintiff will not be held liable 
in a transaction where there is neither fraud, nor collusion, nor privity of contract). 
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specific investments in the customized tax shelters that followed enactment of 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.264 
But even elite firms seeking to maintain distance from tax shelter 
promoters and the marketing of the tax products sometimes referred clients 
who asked for recommendations on tax shelters to the promoters for whom the 
firms prepared PPMs.  A few aggressive tax firms actively developed and 
marketed their own tax advantaged investment programs.265 
As the tax sheltering industry developed, both the American Bar 
Association,266 controlled by the prestigious firms,267 and the IRS268 developed 
practice standards that prohibited practitioners from rendering opinions on 
hypothetical facts.  Accordingly, practitioners needed to complete due 
diligence so that their opinions would be based on the facts of the deal.  Later, 
the standards tightened and forced practitioners to form a closer relationship 
with promoters so that they could render the necessary opinion based on all the 
details of the deal.269  Circular 230 requires that a tax shelter opinion conclude 
 
 264. See supra note 209 and accompanying text; Soled, supra note 8, at 271–72. 
 265. With just a hint of envy, tax professionals from the traditional elite firms regarded those 
aggressive but very successful firms as a little seedy.  Kanter & Eisenberg, based in Chicago, was 
among the most innovative and aggressive of those firms.  Inv. Research Assocs. v. Comm’r, 78 
T.C.M. (CCH) 951, 969 (1999).  For decades, Burton Kanter was considered one of the most 
creative tax lawyers in the United States, and he helped several high-profile clients evade taxes, 
all the while taking sizeable kick-backs for himself.  David Cay Johnston, Tax Lawyer Called 
Architect of a Tax-Evasion Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2000 at C2.  Kanter also evaded taxes 
himself, claiming negative income for twelve straight years from 1978 to 1989.  Id.  Kanter was 
audited by the IRS in every year except one since 1961, and the audits from tax years 1973 to 
1994 were still in dispute when the Tax Court reached its decision in 1999.  Id.  Following the 
fraud ruling in 1999, Kanter’s estate appealed the decision all the way to the Supreme Court 
where the Court reversed and remanded, stating that it was improper for the trial judge to affirm 
tax liability without considering a special trial judge’s opinion.  See Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 
40, 72 (2005).  The Tax Court recently ruled as Kanter’s estate wished, adopting the findings 
from the special trial judge’s opinion.  Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, No. 712-86 (T.C. Nov. 26, 
2010); Sam Young, Kanter Plaintiffs Appealing Unpublished Final Tax Court Order, 130 TAX 
NOTES 996, 996 (2011) (disussing the Tax Court’s unpublished order adopting the special trial 
judge’s findings and finding a deficiency and failure to pay penalty). 
 266. See ABA Comm. Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982); BERNARD 
WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 267 (4th ed. 2008); Charles 
E. McCallum & Bruce C. Young, Ethics Issues in Opinion Practice, 62 BUS. LAW. 417, 422 
(2007). 
 267. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter 
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 94–95 (2006) (arguing that, for the period after 1990, the elite 
bar sought to combat the tax shelter industry in order to reassert its authority in the tax arena). 
 268. See I.R.S. Requirements for Covered Opinions (Treas. Circular No. 230), 31 C.F.R § 
10.35 (2007) (establishing best practices for attorneys rendering tax shelter opinions). 
 269. Id.  It is possible that the decline of Jenkens & Gilchrist may have been because their tax 
opinions were generic and lacking a careful review of the suitability of the offering for the 
specific taxpayer and the details of the offering. 
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that the tax position that the opinion advances “more likely than not” would 
prevail if litigated.270  Demands of clients and the growth of tax shelter 
representation as a significant revenue source motivated lawyers to render 
“more likely than not” opinions when earlier they might have shied from that 
high standard of certainty.271  Rather than improving the quality of the tax 
deals, the opinion standard seems to have made lawyers and accountants more 
like the promoters of the shelters.  Even the most reputable law firms that 
might have eschewed tax shelter promoters as clients early in the tax shelter 
days became engaged in the shelter practice, as that practice itself became 
increasingly lucrative.272  Whatever qualms about shelters such firms 
historically may have had yielded to the ever more prevalent cultural norm that 
favored tax sheltering and tax avoidance.  Self-regulatory organizations like 
the American Bar Association did not prevent the development of the tax bar’s 
role in the tax shelter industry.273 
Providing advice collateral to economically driven transactions and 
recommending transactional adjustments that might diminish the client’s tax 
liability decreased in importance to tax practice.  The historical, key role of 
direct client servicing yielded its importance to the development and sale of tax 
products.  Gradually, tax professionals brought tax products they and others 
had developed to existing clients.274  Tax professionals also began to team with 
aggressive tax product marketers to sell products to clients with whom the tax 
professional had no existing relationship.275  Many of the products were 
unrelated to the client’s economic activities.276  If the client deployed these 
unrelated products successfully, the products would reduce the client’s tax 
exposure from economic activity more efficiently than targeted, transaction 
related planning could.  Initially, product design involved the efficient and 
possibly creative capture of intended tax subsidies, but tax professionals soon 
turned their attention to ferreting out statutory flaws and indeterminacies 
around which they might build the products.  That the advisors knew the 
statutory flaws and indeterminacies they discovered were unintentional and 
 
 270. Id. § 10.35(b)(4). 
 271. Lily Henning, Tax Shelter Letters: Proposed IRS Regulations Take Aim at Lawyers, 
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 8, 2004, at 5. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Compare this with the inability of the self-regulatory organizations within the financial 
services industries to prevent the market failures in those industries in 2008.  Henry Ordower, The 
Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State Funds, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 310–21 
(Supp. 2010). 
 274. Interview by Frontline with Michael Hamersley, Former Senior Tax Manager, KPMG 
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2004) (discussing the shift at KPMG from individualized 
client service to wholesale marketing of general tax shelter products). 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. (discussing selling tax products rather than tailored tax planning to clients). 
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that their recommended applications of the statute were inappropriate277 did 
not deter the advisors from recommending that their clients aggressively 
exploit the opportunities the statutory weaknesses offered. 
Cynicism developed among tax professionals and contributed to a 
perception that the IRS was helpless to combat tax avoidance.  That cynicism 
encompassed both the so-called audit lottery278 and the use of very complex, 
nearly impenetrable transactions.  Both the audit lottery and transactional 
complexity whetted the appetites of tax professionals and their clients for 
marginal, but lucrative, aggressive tax planning techniques.  The tax 
administrator’s limited auditing resources spared many schemes from detection 
while other unacceptable tax-driven transactions would escape challenge 
because their intricate structures cloaked their substance.  Even where the tax 
administrator devoted considerable resources to analyzing and challenging 
those complex structures, courts became unreliable allies in combating them.  
Courts increasingly deployed textualist statutory analysis and refused the 
administrator’s invitation to read statutes according to their probable intent.279 
At the same time, successful aggressive tax planning raised clients’ 
expectations that tax advisors always could find devices to diminish the 
clients’ tax obligations.  Clients began to view tax advisors who were 
unwilling to plan aggressively as simply too timid.280  Client expectations 
exerted pressure on the planning limits that many practitioners historically 
respected and caused practitioners to push the limits in order to protect their 
practices.281  Successful aggressive tax planning contributed to the cultural 
 
 277. See Henry M. Ordower, Trusting our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate 
Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 313, 354 (1996) (arguing 
that estate planning practitioners drive the excessive and inappropriate use of estate planning 
structures that disempower surviving spouses). 
 278. The audit lottery refers to the fairly remote risk that the IRS will audit one’s federal 
income tax return since the IRS does not have a sufficiently large staff to audit more than 2% of 
returns.   Rather than reporting one’s income accurately, one might underreport and play the 
lottery that the IRS will not audit the return.  See Joel S. Newman, The Audit Lottery: Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell?, 86 TAX NOTES 1438, 1438 (2000).  Electronic filing and information matching 
allows automatic checking of more than 2% of returns.  The IRS lost some ability to select returns 
for audit efficiently when it suspended its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (referred 
to customarily as the TCMP audit) in the mid-1990s.  See George Gutman, Citing Budget, IRS 
Announces Indefinite Suspension of TCMP, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 212–25 (1995), available at 
95 TNT 212-25 (LEXIS). 
 279. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 7, at 2. 
 280. See WOLFGANG SCHÖN, TAX AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 222 (2008) (noting that 
many clients pressured their tax advisors and that advisors were paid based on the amount of 
taxes saved). 
 281. Id. 
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shift in the community at large.  As a community standard, tax compliance was 
“out” and tax avoidance was “in.”282 
The elite bar continues to support more stringent disclosure requirements 
and standards impacting the professionals who support the tax product 
industries.283  Yet, the elite bar was far less supportive of amendments to tax 
return preparer penalties that required the preparer to apply a “more likely than 
not to be sustained on its merits” standard for positions the preparer reports or 
recommends.284  The tax professional community argued against the enhanced 
standard ostensibly because of the concern that the standard applicable to 
preparers was higher than that applicable to taxpayers, thereby creating a 
potential conflict between the interests of the preparers and their clients.285  
Preparers would wish to enforce a “more likely than not” standard or require 
disclosure on the return to protect themselves from penalties, while their 
clients would be safe from penalties as long as there was “substantial 
authority” for a position even if not disclosed on the return.286  Outcry 
concerning the standard resulted in the softening of the standard to “substantial 
authority” conforming to the taxpayer standard the following year.287  The elite 
bar was as concerned about the standard as the accountants who prepared the 
returns because the Treasury promulgated regulations at the same time that 
brought many attorneys who rendered advice on a transaction under the tax 
return preparer definition288 and subjected them to the tax return preparer 
penalties.289  Under those regulations, attorneys who advised on transactions 
became “non-signing tax return preparers.”290 
 
 282. See infra note 440 and accompanying text. 
 283. See Rostain, supra note 267, at 98–99 (discussing that investors would not want to 
participate in tax shelter arrangements that involved significant risk). 
 284. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2) (2006), as amended by the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, 
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 
8246(b), 121 Stat. 112, 203 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6694), imposes a penalty on a tax return 
preparer whose client reports an unreasonable tax position based on the preparer’s advice without 
full disclosure of the position.  A position is unreasonable if the preparer “knew (or reasonably 
should have known) of the position,” and “there was not a reasonable belief that the position 
would more likely than not be sustained on its merits.”  U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterens’ Care, 
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 § 8246(b), 121 Stat. at 203. 
 285. Jeremiah Coder, Final Preparer Penalty Regs Adopt Some Changes, New Guidance, 121 
TAX NOTES 1351, 1351 (2008). 
 286. Id. 
 287. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 506(a), 122 
Stat. 3765, 3880 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6694). 
 288. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15 (2009). 
 289. I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695. 
 290. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(2). 
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Perhaps recent developments with KPMG,291 Jenkens & Gilchrist, and 
others will make professionals somewhat more reserved.  Whether the adverse 
publicity again will change the culture and render tax shelters and the support 
functions that legal and accounting professionals provide unacceptable remains 
doubtful.  While professional advisors are likely to become more cautious, 
client demand for shelter products is a compelling motivation to continue to 
design new tax products. 
III.  GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES 
Tax avoidance and tax planning, complex transactions exploiting 
weaknesses in taxing statutes with the assistance of tax professionals, are not, 
however, uniquely American problems.  Outside the United States, legislatures 
have felt the need to rein in unintended tax minimization strategies by turning 
to GAARs.292  Among other countries, New Zealand,293 Australia,294 
Canada,295 Germany,296 Sweden,297 and, recently, China298 have statutory 
GAARs.299  Some of those jurisdictions have employed GAARs for several 
decades.300  The Canadian statute is fairly typical of GAAR structures.  It 
defines an “avoidance transaction” as one: 
(a) that, but for this section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax 
benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to have been 
undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain 
the tax benefit; or 
(b) that is part of a series of transactions, which series, but for this section, 
would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may 
 
 291. Rostain, supra note 267, at 99. 
 292. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 293. Section 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976 (N.Z.); Section BG 1 of the Income Tax Act of 
2007 (N.Z.) (incorporating GB 1 and certain definitions in YA 1). 
 294. Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth.) s 177D(b) (Austl.). 
 295. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 245 (Can.). 
 296. ABGABENORDNUNG [AO] [GENERAL TAX CODE], Mar. 16, 1976, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 26, § 42 (Ger.). 
 297. 15 ch. 2, 3 §§ LAGEN OM SKATTEFLYKT [TAX AVOIDANCE (FLIGHT) LAW] (Svensk 
författningssamling [SFS] 1995:575) (Swed.), available at http://www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/lag/ 
19950575.htm. 
 298. Lee A. Sheppard, China Tries a GAAR, 123 TAX NOTES 523, 524 (2009); Jinyan Li, Tax 
Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the Chinese and Canadian GAAR, 11 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 655, 657 (2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/til/ 
default/vol11/iss2/art8. 
 299. See generally OROW, supra note 20; Cooper, supra note 20 (describing the proliferation 
of statutory GAARs). 
 300. Canada, Australia, and Sweden each have had a GAAR for twenty years or more.  See 
supra notes 293–97. 
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reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for 
bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit. 301 
When a tax avoidance transaction is present, the statute permits the revenue 
authority to deny the tax benefit the taxpayer seeks.302  Unlike many other 
GAARs that integrate benefit denial and reallocation according to economic 
reality, the Canadian statute includes a separate provision that permits re-
characterization of amounts and reallocation of income and expense.303 
Although the United States has had a statutory GAAR for only a very brief 
time,304 judicial decisions305 applied an economic substance doctrine in various 
 
 301. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, § 245(3) (Can.).  The Supreme Court of Canada has 
had a difficult time breaking its old habits of approaching tax avoidance cases with a mind to 
interpret tax statutes based on strict construction, leaving Parliament to clear up any ambiguities 
in the statutes.  As a result, the GAAR has been largely unenforced in its twenty-two-year 
existence.  Lisa Philipps, The Supreme Court of Canada’s Tax Jurisprudence: What’s Wrong 
with the Rule of Law, 79 CAN. BAR REV. 120, 138 (2000). 
 302. Income Tax Act, § 245(2) (Can.). 
 303. Id. § 245(5). 
 304. Section 1409(a) of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, added 
Subsection (o) to IRC § 7701 to read in part as follows: 
(o) CLARIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE. — 
(1) APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE.—In the case of any transaction to which the 
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as 
having economic substance only if — 
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income 
tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and 
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax 
effects) for entering into such transaction. 
(2) SPECIAL RULE WHERE TAXPAYER RELIES ON PROFIT POTENTIAL.— 
(A) IN GENERAL.—The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into 
account in determining whether the requirements of subparagraphs (A) 
and (B) of paragraph (1) are met with respect to the transaction only if the 
present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the 
transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected 
net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected. 
. . . 
(5) DEFINITIONS AND SPECIAL RULES.—For purposes of this subsection— 
(A) ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE.—The term ‘economic substance 
doctrine’ means the common law doctrine under which tax benefits under 
subtitle A with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the transaction 
does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose. 
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 
1029, 1067 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7701). 
  Thus, if the transaction lacks economic substance, the taxpayer may not claim the tax 
benefits of the transaction.  In addition, the statute would impose a general 20% penalty under 
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formulations at least since the decision in Helvering v. Gregory.306  In addition, 
various provisions of the Code reallocate income among taxpayers or re-
characterize specific transactions according to their economic substance rather 
than the form taxpayers have chosen.307 
Enactment of the statutory economic substance rule followed several years 
of frequent and intensive discussion of economic substance codification both 
in Congress and in the professional tax community.  Some participants in the 
planning community who supported a statutory rule envisioned an opportunity 
to make more outcomes predictable than under a non-specific judicial doctrine.  
While the discussion of codifying the economic substance doctrine indicated 
that participants in the tax community perceived that the judiciary had not used 
existing anti-avoidance doctrines adequately or appropriately,308 that 
perception was not universal.  IRS representatives questioned whether or not a 
statutory economic substance provision would improve the ability of the IRS to 
disregard the taxpayer’s chosen transactional structure in favor of one that 
better comports to economic reality.309  Debate concerning the benefit of a 
 
I.R.C. § 6662 (the accuracy related penalty) for underpayments of tax attributable to transactions 
lacking economic substance under the statute and would double the penalty to 40% if the taxpayer 
did not disclose the transaction on the taxpayer’s return.  Id. § 1409(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 1069 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6662) (adding I.R.C. § 6662(i)). 
 305. On the application of the economic substance doctrine, see Knetsch v. United States, 364 
U.S. 361, 366 (1960); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 2006); Estate 
of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 306. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d sub nom. Gregory v. 
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 307. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(b) (2006) (requiring reallocation of partnership items if the 
partnership’s allocation lacks substantial economic effect); Id. § 482 (permitting the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to reallocate income and expense among related taxpayers 
according to economic substance); Id. § 7872 (imputing interest income and expense to 
transactions with understated interest). 
 308. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 7, at 4–5 (suggesting that the United States 
Department of the Treasury should instruct the courts in how to interpret the Code using 
legislative intent to combat tax shelters that may appear to be legal under a textualist reading of 
the Code); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering 
Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 118 (2004) (blaming the adherence to strict 
statutory construction and textualism by some justices of the United States Supreme Court, 
notably Justice Scalia, for the loosening of morals in accounting and tax law practices, and stating 
textualism does not allow legal constraints to draw strength from moral constraints).  Canada’s 
courts have also had problems enforcing its GAAR, which has been in statutory form since 1988.  
Philipps, supra note 301, at 132.  The Supreme Court of Canada still relies on its strict 
construction interpretation of tax statutes and often finds in favor of taxpayers in legal disputes 
with the Canada Revenue Agency.  Id. 
 309. Donald Korb, the predecessor to the current chief counsel for the IRS, strongly opposed 
codification of the economic substance doctrine.  Korb was concerned that a statutory provision 
would restrict the range of arguments that the IRS might make rather than improving the 
frequency of IRS’ success in application of economic substance to abusive tax structures.  Crystal 
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statutory economic substance doctrine continued through 2009.310  The 
statutory economic substance provision is equivalent, if not identical, to a 
GAAR.  Like a GAAR, the provision seeks to re-characterize transactions 
according to their economic substance rather than according to the tax outcome 
of the form that the taxpayer has given the transactions.311  Congress also 
views the statutory rule as a revenue raiser.312 
GAARs are not a panacea for tax administrators.  One recurring 
enforcement concern in countries that have GAARs is that the GAAR violates 
rule of law principles.313  The GAAR’s very lack of precision that is essential 
to its flexibility as an anti-avoidance tool renders it vulnerable to rule of law 
arguments.  Rule of law principles require that law be understandable and 
predictable, so that the person whom the law affects reasonably may conform 
her behavior so as not to violate the law inadvertently.314  Law must not be 
secret.315  Commentary in both Germany316 and Sweden,317 for example, 
questions whether statutory GAARs fail rule of law analysis.  The 
commentators argue that when transactions comply with the specific 
 
Tandon, Economic Substance Codification Would Create More Problems Than It Solves, Says 
Korb, 118 TAX NOTES 777, 777 (2008). 
 310. Amy S. Elliott, Alexander Downplays Effect of Economic Substance Codification, 126 
TAX NOTES 1309, 1309 (2010); Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Criticize Economic Substance 
Codification, 126 TAX NOTES 589, 589 (2010). 
 311. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 
124 Stat. 1029, 1067–68 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7701). 
 312. Jeremiah Coder, News Analysis: Corporate Penalties in House Healthcare Bill Cause 
Concerns, 125 TAX NOTES 729, 730 (2009).  “A November [2009] Joint Committee on Taxation 
revenue estimate peg[ged] the total revenue to be raised from codifying economic substance and 
imposing new penalties for underpayments at $5.7 billion from 2010 to 2019.  That figure isn’t 
further broken down between the two provisions.”  Id. 
 313. See generally Rebecca Prebble & John Prebble, Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance 
Rules to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law? A Comparative Study, 55 
SAINT LOUIS U. L.J. 21 (2010) (addressing that issue in detail in a paper presented at the Sanford 
E. Sarasohn Memorial Conference on Critical Issues in International and Comparative Taxation, 
where this paper was also presented). 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See generally Drüen, supra note 4 (addressing the German rule and questioning whether 
the generality of the anti-avoidance rule causes the rule to conflict with the constitutional rule of 
law by preventing taxpayers from being able to predict the tax outcome of their transactions). 
 317. Motion 2009/2010:Sk387 Avskaffande av skatteflyktslagen [Motion to Repeal Tax 
Flight Law] (introduced before the Swedish Parliament in October 2009), available at 
http://www.riksdagen.se/Webbnav/index.aspx?nid=410&typ=mot&rm=2009/10&bet=Sk387.  
Some legislators introduce this or a similar motion annually on the ground that the existing law 
violates the rule of law principle.  The legislature has rejected these motions each time they come 
before the Parliament.  For a more detailed discussion of the conflict between the rule of law and 
the tax avoidance law in Sweden, see Hultqvist, supra note 8, at 302.  See also ALMENDAL, supra 
note 8, at 56–72; Karlsson, supra note 8. 
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requirements of the governing substantive law and nevertheless violate the 
GAAR, the GAAR prevents taxpayers from being able to predict the tax 
outcome of their transactions—disqualifying the transactions through law 
unknown to and unknowable by the public.318 
GAARs require that in order to generate a specific tax outcome, 
transactions must conform to the statutory intent, in addition to meeting the 
transparent technical requirements of the statute.  Swedish commentary 
observes also that application of the GAAR conflicts with rule of law 
principles in part because it requires analysis and argumentation by analogy.319  
Swedish basic law probably prohibits argumentation by analogy.320  Hence, 
operation of a GAAR suggests that taxing statutes have controlling legislative 
intent that taxpayers, or rather their advisors, know or reasonably may 
discover.  The GAAR denies taxpayers a desired tax characterization when the 
taxpayers—or rather the taxpayers’ tax advisors—seek to exploit statutory 
language, its generality, or flaws to enable the taxpayers to capture tax benefits 
for transactions under statutes that the legislature did not intend to apply to 
those transactions. 
Against the possible conflict between the GAAR and the rule of law stands 
the rule of equal treatment under the law.  Modern constitutions universally 
guarantee equal treatment under the law.321  Successful tax avoidance enables 
 
 318. Prebble & Prebble, supra note 313, at 28–29. 
 319. Hultqvist, supra note 8, at 308. 
 320. Id. at 321. 
 321. Compare Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the longstanding United States Constitution, 
with the more general equality guarantee that Article 3 of das Grundgesetz [The German Basic 
Law]  provides without regard to sex, race, language, disability, etc.  The German Basic Law, 
which some literature refers to as the German constitution, serves the function in Germany of the 
Constitution in the United States, with the material difference being that the procedure for 
amending the Basic Law is simpler than the emendation procedure for the United States 
Constitution.  Compare Article 79 of the Basic Law, requiring a two-thirds majority in each house 
of parliament to change the Basic Law, with the United States procedure under Article V of the 
United States Constitution, requiring ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures or the 
electorates of three-fourths of the states.  The Swedish Grundlagen [Basic Laws], like the United 
States Constitution, prohibit laws or regulations that discriminate on the basis of race, religion, 
national origin, etc., but also sex, subject to a limitation to eliminate historical discrimination 
except for military service.  2 ch. 12, 13 §§ SKYDD MOT DISKRIMINERING [PROTECTION FROM 
DISCRIMINATION] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 2010:1408) (Swed.), available at 
http://www.riksdagen.se/webbnav/index.aspx?nid=3925#K2 (“12 § Lag eller annan föreskrift får 
inte innebära att någon missgynnas därför att han eller hon tillhör en minoritet med hänsyn till 
etniskt ursprung, hudfärg eller annat liknande förhållande eller med hänsyn till sexuell läggning.  
Lag (2010:1408).”  [“No law or regulation may result in disadvantaging any person because he or 
she belongs to a minority with respect to ethnic origin, skin color or other similar characteristic or 
because of sexual orientation”].  “13 § Lag eller annan föreskrift får inte innebära att någon 
missgynnas på grund av sitt kön, om inte föreskriften utgör ett led i strävanden att åstadkomma 
jämställdhet mellan män och kvinnor eller avser värnplikt eller motsvarande tjänsteplikt.  Lag 
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some taxpayers to pay smaller amounts of tax than other similarly situated 
taxpayers who are not avoiding tax.  The equality principle that such disparate 
tax treatment violates is just as fundamental to the law as the rule of law itself. 
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court322 repeatedly has confirmed 
that the German Basic Law requires that similarly situated taxpayers receive 
like tax treatment under some, but not all, German taxes.  For example, the 
court ruled that the wealth tax and the inheritance tax both were 
unconstitutional because imprecision in valuation of property caused disparate 
treatment of like taxpayers.323  More recently, the Constitutional Court held 
that a two-year limitation on deductibility of the expenses for a second 
residence for a married taxpayer who worked in a different city from his 
spouse was unconstitutional.324  The law treated taxpayers whose employers 
assigned them to a series of away-from-home assignments more favorably than 
it treated taxpayers who had single long term away-from-home assignments.325  
And the Court even has held that inadequate means for enforcing the law and 
collecting the tax in the cases of interest income326 and capital gains327 violates 
the equality principle by favoring dishonest over honest taxpayers. 
 
(2010:1408).”  [“A law or other regulation may not disadvantage any citizen on account of sex, 
unless the regulation is part of the effort to establish equality between men and women or affects 
mandatory military service or other mandatory service.”]. 
 322. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESTZ] [GG] [BASIC 
LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBL. I, art. 93 (Ger.) (establishing jurisdiction of the Federal 
Constitutional Court).  Das Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Constitutional Court] has 
jurisdiction over any constitutional issue critical to the outcome of a controversy.  Other courts 
must suspend their proceedings once they identify the constitutional issue and refer that issue to 
the Constitutional Court for resolution. 
 323. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] (Federal Constitutional Court), June 22, 1995, 93 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDERVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 121 (Ger.) (holding the 
wealth tax, as applied, to be in violation ofthe equality principle); Bundesverfassungsgericht 
[BVerfGE] (Federal Constitutional Court), June 22, 1995, 93 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDERVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 165 (Ger.) (similarly holding the inheritance tax to 
be in violation of the equality principle).  See also Ordower, supra note 2, at 327. 
 324. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] (Federal Constitutional Court), Dec. 4, 2002, 107 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDERVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 27 (Ger.). 
 325. Id. 
 326. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] (Federal Constitutional Court), June 27, 1991, 84 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDERVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 239 (Ger.) (holding that in 
the absence of withholding or another mechanism to collect tax on interest income, taxation of 
interest income was unconstitutional, but delaying application of the decision to give the tax 
authorities time to equalize collection of the tax).  See also Lily Kahng, Investment Income 
Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 316 (2010). 
 327. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] (Federal Constitutional Court), Mar. 9, 2004, 110 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDERVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 94 (Ger.) (holding taxation 
of gain from speculation in securities unconstitutional because of lack of an adequate 
identification and collection mechanism). 
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The Constitutional Court, however, has observed that overall progressivity 
in taxation is less important to the equality principle—and its parallel ability to 
pay principle— than is equal treatment of like taxpayers: 
In the interests of constitutionally mandated equality of tax burden . . . , as a 
goal, taxpayers who have the same ability to pay328 should be taxed equally 
(horizontal tax equity), while (in the vertical direction) taxation of higher 
incomes should be measured against the taxation of lower incomes.329 
Accordingly, the court has never held the German turnover tax330 
unconstitutional even though it generally taxes lower income taxpayers on a 
greater percentage of their income or wealth than it does higher income 
taxpayers.331 
One commentator explains how the equality principle in taxation validates 
a GAAR.332  Despite the GAAR’s conflict with the principles of 
entrepreneurial freedom that emanate from the rule of law, equality in taxation 
is critical.  As the state takes through taxation without giving specific quid pro 
quo, inequality undermines the state’s authority to tax.  Tax avoidance itself is 
inefficient.  It draws human resources to unproductive tax planning on the 
taxpayer’s side and combating tax planning on the government’s side, rather 
than deploying those resources to economic production that contributes to 
public welfare.333 
 
 328. A concept identified in German as “Leistungsfähigkeit.” 
 329. 107 BVERFGE at 27 (46–47) (Ger.) (emphasis added) (author’s translation).  The 
German text reads: 
Danach muss im Interesse verfassungsrechtlich gebotener steuerlicher Lastengleichheit 
(citation omitted) darauf abgezielt werden, Steuerpflichtige bei gleicher 
Leistungsfähigkeit auch gleich hoch zu besteuern (horizontale Steuergerechtigkeit), 
während (in vertikaler Richtung) die Besteuerung höherer Einkommen im Vergleich mit 
der Steuerbelastung niedriger Einkommen angemessen sein muss. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 330. This is the German version of a value added tax.  Umsatzsteuergesetz [UStG] [German 
turnover tax], Feb. 21, 2005, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 386, last amended by 
Gesetz [G], Apr. 5, 2011, BGBL. I at 554, art. 2 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/ustg_1980/gesamt.pdf. 
 331. Ordower, supra note 2, at 276–78. 
 332. Drüen, supra note 4, at 158. 
 333. Id.  In referring to the decisions of the German Constitutional Court requiring the state to 
enact legislation to fulfill its duty to protect the constitutional rights of its citizens, Drüen writes: 
Bei dieser Fundierung entpuppen sich § 42 AO und andere Vorschriften zur Abwehr von 
Steuerumgehung als ein Instrument zur Wahrung der Gleichheitsrechte der anderen 
Steuerbürger.  Denn Steuerumgehung revidiert die gesetzliche Belastungsentscheidung . . 
. .  Die Gleichheit ist aber für den Steuerstaat, der nimmt, ohne zu geben, essentiell.  Denn 
die Ungleichheit delegitimiert die Steuer als Gemeinlast.  Überdies verzerrt 
Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet den Wett bewerb und führt zur 
ineffizienten Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in Unternehmen, 
Steuerberatung und Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung gebunden wird. 
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Dr. Drüen is not alone in worrying about inefficient and unproductive tax 
planning activities.334  One sees like arguments from commentators in the 
United States.335  Generating wealth, while providing neither goods nor 
services for consumption, does indeed seem an artificial and an inefficient 
allocation of creative human capital.  The resource allocation is artificial in that 
historically, wealth was a function of ownership of land and agricultural 
production, while later one derived wealth from active involvement in 
manufacturing, processing, and distributing goods and agricultural products.  
Only recently have more ephemeral pursuits like development of and 
investment in financial and tax avoidance products generated large amounts of 
wealth for both the product developers and their clients.336  The resource 
allocation is inefficient in that it concentrates wealth without providing any 
tangible benefit except concentration of wealth.  This issue affects not only the 
tax planning industry but also the markets for complex financial products to 
which governments have shifted their regulatory attention as a result of the 
widespread economic failures in 2008.337  While it is possible that the creative 
individuals who engage in tax planning are suited to that intellectual activity 
only, that creativity certainly may be transferable to other public welfare 
producing pursuits were those pursuits equally remunerative.  On the other 
hand, participants in the financial product planning or tax planning industries 
might argue that their activities make capital available for production by 
freeing it from taxation or through financial products, thereby releasing capital 
otherwise locked into less productive activities for more efficient uses. 
Whether tax planning is inefficient, and whether GAARs conflict with rule 
of law principles or buttress distributional equality in taxation, enactment of 
 
Id. (citations omitted) [“To this contemplation (of the court), § 42 AO (the GAAR) and other 
regulations to combat tax avoidance emerge as an instrument to protect the equality rights of 
other tax citizens.  Tax avoidance revises the legislative decision on distribution of the tax burden. 
. . .  Equality is critical to the state which taxes without giving back.  For inequality delegitimizes 
taxes as a common burden.  More important, from an economic perspective, tax avoidance 
disrupts competition and leads to inefficient allocation of resources as considerable personnel in 
business, tax planning industries, and the state is remains far from economic production 
maximization activity.”]. 
 334. Id.  Professor Drüen distinguishes tax avoidance activity from “wirtschaftliche 
Nutzenmaximierung” (other activities that maximize economic welfare). 
 335. Weisbach, supra note 3, at 216. 
 336. See supra Part II. 
 337. U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 43 (2009), available at www.financial 
stability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (discussing financial failures and reforms in the 
United States); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC, at 
12, COM (2009) 207 final (Apr. 30, 2009) (discussing financial failures and new regulations in 
the European Union). 
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GAARs evidences a common perception among legislatures that tax collectors 
need additional enforcement tools.  Underlying that perception is the 
observation that taxpayers capture tax advantages through technically correct, 
but inappropriate or unintended, applications of the tax law.  Tax advisors 
design transactions and recommend structural alternatives for transactions to 
produce favorable tax outcomes that are inconsistent with the legislative intent 
underlying the tax law.  Those technically compliant transactional designs 
either 1) lack good economic or business reasons for their use or 2) employ 
unnecessary or inefficient economic steps toward an objective that becomes 
economically sound because of the tax advantage those steps may generate.  
The value of the tax advantage tends to exceed the cost of the unnecessary or 
inefficient economic steps or the unnecessary transaction as a whole.  A 
GAAR or similar regulation is critical to displace the taxpayer favorable tax 
outcome, for, if the transactions failed to comply with the technical 
requirements of the law, the tax collector could prevent an outcome 
inconsistent with that law.  Technical compliance with the law leaves the 
government either to accept the unanticipated taxpayer favorable outcome or 
find another means (like a GAAR) of preventing the outcome. 
While possibly sound on a theoretical level, I find the secret and uncertain 
law argument against GAARs338 to be disingenuous on a practical level.  Tax 
advisors who design tax minimization structures for their clients generally 
know the purpose of taxing statutes or, at least, know when the legislature did 
not intend the statute to apply to the structure they proffer.  Professional 
advisors nevertheless exploit statutory weakness and ambiguity to their clients’ 
benefit, thereby serving their clients’ economic interests while creating 
distributional inequalities.339  In many instances, creative tax planners seek to 
identify statutory uncertainty where most advisors and their clients would find 
none.340  Not infrequently, those difficult to discover statutory flaws mean 
financial success for the planners as they market tax planning techniques.341  
 
 338. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
 339. See supra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 340. One well-known example of such creativity was the “rabbi” trust for deferral of 
compensation.  I.R.C. § 83 (2006) specifically defined the moment of inclusion in income of 
property transfers and enabled employees to defer inclusion in income as long as there was a risk 
that the employee might forfeit the compensation.  Rabbi trusts go one step beyond the statute by 
leaving the compensation that the employer paid into a trust for the employee’s benefit subject to 
the claims of the employer’s creditors.  The I.R.S. ruled that no transfer had taken place until the 
property in the trust became free from the creditors’ claims.  IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107 (Dec. 
31, 1980) (giving the “rabbi trust” its name); Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (providing 
model trust provisions for rabbi trusts).  For fiscally solid employers, the risk to the employee of 
deferring compensation in that manner was slight.  See Ordower, supra note 110, at 316. 
 341. Over the last decade or so in the United States, tax professionals have applied for and 
obtained patents on tax strategies.  Tax patents would protect the revenue of the patent holder by 
giving the patent holder control over the use of the strategy to keep it from being deployed 
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As the techniques find their way into the public domain, however, less 
meticulous practitioners often use the techniques sloppily or recommend them 
to inappropriate clients.  The techniques lose their value because they become 
readily visible to the tax administrator who may issue a public statement of 
intention to challenge the tax characterization and impose penalties,342 
promulgate appropriate regulations, turn to the legislature for statutory change, 
or use or threaten to use the GAAR. 
That a court examining the transaction might not find in favor of the tax 
collector challenging the advisor’s tax characterization does not necessarily 
mean that the tax structure properly applied the statute.  Lack of a clear, 
unambiguous statutory statement may suffice to secure a taxpayer favorable 
outcome even where the court doubts that outcome to be correct.343  In the 
United States, a statutory GAAR might move the courts away from textualism 
by giving them a foundation upon which to base a decision unfavorable to the 
taxpayer despite compliance with the terms of the substantive statute.344 
IV.  TAX PLANNING AND TAX AVOIDANCE: EXAMPLES FROM SWEDEN AND 
GERMANY 
I have not found discussion of a retail tax shelter industry resembling what 
I describe in Part 2 of this Article in the German or the Swedish literature.  
Syndicated tax shelter products seem to be a phenomenon of the common law 
world.345 
 
inappropriately and in a manner easy for the tax administrator to challenge.  After the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos, the door is open for business method patents 
generally, but because the Court did not establish any guidelines for what is and is not a 
patentable process, the United States Patent Office and future court decisions on the subject may 
restrict the patentability of tax planning techniques in the future.  130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); see also  
D.C. Denison, Relief as Patent Process Left in Tact: High Court Ruling Could Have Altered 
Software Firms’ Rights, BOS. GLOBE, June 29, 2010, at B5. 
 342. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (notifying the public that the IRS 
would challenge Son of Boss type structures). 
 343. See generally Galle, supra note 7 (observing the textualist strict interpretation but 
arguing that an uncodified doctrine may be superior to a statute). 
 344. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 7, at 38–55 (seeing the partnership anti-avoidance 
regulation as helping to overcome strict application of the text). 
 345. See Philipps, supra note 301, at 138 (noting Canada’s courts have struggled with 
enforcing anti-abuse rules against taxpayers who have structured business deals within the textual 
letter of the law, but outside of the legislative intent); Wolfgang Schön, The David R. Tillinghast 
Lecture, The Odd Couple: A Common Future for Financial and Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. 
REV. 111, 118–19 (2005) (referencing the United Kingdom’s attempt to crack down on tax 
accounting discrepancies in corporations). 
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Nevertheless, tax avoidance (and evasion)346 and aggressive tax planning 
certainly are as common in civil law as they are in common law jurisdictions.  
In Europe, however, tax avoidance often follows rules of income sourcing 
because, unlike the United States (which taxes its citizens and permanent 
residents347 on their worldwide incomes without regard to the source of the 
income or the taxpayer’s residence),348 European countries do not necessarily 
tax their citizens on worldwide income.  For example, Germany349 and 
Sweden350 tax their residents on their income from all worldwide sources, but 
tax non-residents, whether or not citizens, generally only on their incomes 
from German or Swedish sources respectively,351 including income from 
services performed or passive income from domestic investment sources.352 
In order to escape high marginal income tax rates in their home country, 
individuals who have sufficient resources and a willingness to relinquish their 
residence in their home country may—and do—relocate themselves and their 
 
 346. Tax evasion involves tax planning conduct that is illegal.  Tax avoidance, on the other 
hand, is minimization of taxes through legal means.  An often cited quotation from Judge Learned 
Hand: 
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, 
because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to evade, taxation.  Any one 
may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to 
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to 
increase one’s taxes. 
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d sub nom. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 
U.S. 465 (1935) (setting the standard for distinguishing tax avoidance from tax evasion even 
though it utilizes the term “evasion”). 
 347. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1) (2006) includes alien individuals who are lawful permanent residents 
of the United States as residents even if they are living outside the United States. 
 348. I.R.C. § 61 (2006) includes in the gross income of a United States citizen or resident “all 
income from whatever source derived.”  Under I.R.C. §§ 871 and 872 (2006), non-resident aliens 
are taxable on their income from United States sources and income that is effectively connected 
with the conduct of a United States trade or business. 
 349. Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Law], Oct. 16, 1934, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 3366, 3862 (recodified Oct. 8, 2009) (amended Dec. 
22, 2009) (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/estg/gesamt.pdf.  
The German tax law distinguishes between “unbeschränkte Steuerpflicht” [unlimited tax 
liability], that is, tax liability from worldwide sources and “beschränkte Steuerpflicht” [limited 
tax liability]. 
 350. 3 § INKOMSTSKATTELAG [INCOME TAX LAW] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
1999:1229) (Swed.), available at http://62.95.69.15/cgibin/thw?%24{HTML}=sfst_lst&%24 
{OOHTML}=sfst_dok&%24{SNHTML}=sfst_err&%24{BASE}=SFST&%24{TRIPSHOW}= 
format%3DTHW&BET=1999%3A1229%24.  Like Germany, Sweden distinguishes between 
“obegränsad skattskyldighet” (unlimited tax liability) and “begränsad skattskyldighet” (limited 
tax liability). 
 351. Income Tax Law § 2(1) (Ger.); 3 ch. 7 § Income Tax Law (Swed.). 
 352. Income Tax Law § 2(1) (Ger.); 3 ch. 18 § Income Tax Law (Swed.).  This statement 
oversimplifies the point.  The rules are more complex but generally follow that pattern. 
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primary service performance location to low tax jurisdictions to avoid home 
country taxes.353  Germany adopted legislation to discourage expatriation to 
avoid taxes.354  Under that legislation, individuals who were subject to 
unlimited German income tax liability for five of the prior ten years before 
they leave Germany for a low tax jurisdiction such as Switzerland, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, or an island nation, and who retain significant 
economic connection with Germany, remain liable for German income tax on 
most of their worldwide income.355  With the exception of income from 
services they perform outside Germany, the liability continues for ten years 
following their exit from Germany.356  Similarly, Swedish tax law continues to 
tax both Swedish citizens and non-citizens who were resident in Sweden for 
ten years or more and retain significant connections with Sweden on their 
income from all sources during the five year period following their exit from 
Sweden.357  In order to claim exemption from continuing taxation, the taxpayer 
has to establish the lack of continuing connection with Sweden.358  Even the 
United States, which requires relinquishment of citizenship in order to escape 
worldwide taxation, has had to backstop expatriation with special continuing 
taxation rules359 and an exit tax.360 
Others arrange the business affairs of entities they control to shift their 
income source to entities located outside the home, high tax rate country.361  
Much of such income-shifting is a function of the planning of transfer pricing 
between related entities.  Transfer pricing remains a broad and general 
international tax concern.  The fundamental issue is the ownership of 
intellectual property by entities that have their base in low tax jurisdictions.  
The end user based in a high tax jurisdiction must pay a royalty for use of the 
intellectual property to the low tax jurisdiction owner.  Tax administrators seek 
to prevent such income shifts but find it difficult to use available statutory tools 
to reallocate income to the home country.362 
 
 353. Income Tax Law § 2(1) (Ger.); 3 ch. 18 § Income Tax Law (Swed.). 
 354. Außensteuergesetz [AStG] [Foreign Tax Law], Sept. 8, 1972, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, 
Teil I [BGBL. I] at 1713, § 2 (amended 2010) (Ger.). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. 
 357. 3 c. 7 § INKOMSTSKATTELAG [INCOME TAX LAW] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
2007:1419) (Swed.). 
 358. Id. 
 359. I.R.C. § 877 (2006) (continuing to tax in the United States individuals who expatriate for 
tax avoidance purposes). 
 360. Id. § 877A (imposing a market to market exit tax on expatriation). 
 361. For some recent estimates on loss of tax revenue in the United States from shifting of 
income offshore, see Martin A. Sullivan, Transfer Pricing Costs U.S. at Least $28 Billion, 126 
TAX NOTES 1439 (2010). 
 362. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (2006) (giving the IRS authority to reallocate excess royalties to 
the United States user where the user and the intellectual property owner are related). 
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Such practices of shifting residence and income source have become part 
of the cultural landscape.  A substantial segment of the public at large in many 
countries views tax evasion and, presumably, avoidance within the law as 
acceptable conduct.363  Those without the resources to avoid tax sometimes 
look upon others’ avoidance with envy and occasionally emulate the practice 
with their own small-scale, but meaningful tax evasion.364 
While neither Sweden nor Germany may have a marketed tax shelter 
industry, there is tax planning that includes artificial or unnecessary 
transactions to achieve favorable tax outcomes.  Taxpayers rely on their tax 
advisors to structure transactions for maximal tax efficiency. 
In Sweden, for example, one transaction model enabled a Swedish 
corporation to sell substantially appreciated property without recognizing gain 
on the sale.365  The same structure afforded the buyer an opportunity to recover 
almost its entire acquisition cost for tax purposes immediately rather than 
through long term depreciation allowances.366  In the transaction, the seller 
formed a foreign entity in which it owned one hundred percent of the 
ownership interests.367  Next the seller entered into a tax transparent Swedish 
“handelsbolag”368 with its controlled foreign entity, retaining only a small 
interest in the handelsbolag.369  The seller contributed the appreciated property 
to the handelsbolag at the tax basis of the property rather than its current 
value.370  This opportunity arose if the property constituted its own trade or 
business separable from the remainder of the seller’s businesses, and the 
 
 363. See Robert W. McGee & Michael Tyler, Tax Evasion and Ethics: A Demographic Study 
of 33 Countries 2 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished working paper, Barry University), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=940505 (statistical analysis of attitudes 
toward tax evasion with a sizable percentage in most demographic groups considering evasion 
justifiable under some circumstances).  I extrapolate that a greater percentage would find 
avoidance within the law acceptable. 
 364. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing the underground, largely cash or 
barter, economy); see infra note 470 and accompanying text. 
 365. Karlsson, supra note 8, at 23.  The Swedish Tax Authority announced its intention to 
litigate based upon multiple arguments including the Swedish GAAR.  It also promulgated 
regulations to reduce tax basis for these transactions prospectively and proposed a statutory 
change.  See Handelbolaglösningen [Partnership solution], SKATTEVERKET [TAX AUTHORITY], 
http://www.skatteverket.se/rattsinformation/skatteupplagg/handelsbolagslosningen.4.3dfca4f410f
4fc63c8680009678.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
 366. See Karlsson, supra note 8, at 23. 
 367. Id. 
 368. The Swedish handelsbolag is an unincorporated tax-transparent entity and may have a 
single owner.  In the transaction, the Swedish corporation must own a nominal interest in the 
entity in order to transfer property to it without recognizing gain. 
 369. Id. at 24. 
 370. Id. 
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transfer facilitated a necessary business restructuring that taxation might 
impede.371 
Next the controlled foreign entity and its Swedish parent sell their interests 
in the handelsbolag at the fair market value of the underlying property to a 
Swedish buyer.372  Assuming the transaction meets various conditions on 
income source and treaty rules, the gain is taxable primarily to the controlled 
foreign entity outside Sweden according to its interest in the handelsbolag and 
is not subject to Swedish taxation.373  Moreover, the foreign controlled entity 
may distribute the proceeds to its Swedish parent tax free.374  As to the buyer, 
on liquidation of the handelsbolag, the buyer recognizes a tax loss equal to the 
difference between the purchase price for the interests in the handelsbolag and 
the tax basis of the underlying property.  That loss is currently deductible.375 
In Germany, foreign-based Stiftungen376 provide opportunities to distribute 
investment income among family members and to move the investment 
income source offshore.377  The investment income of Stiftungen based outside 
Germany generally is not taxable in Germany until the Stiftungen distribute the 
income to German taxpayers.  In this manner, the Stiftungen defer taxation in 
Germany. While high profile Germans have used Liechtenstein Stiftungen to 
evade tax in Germany,378 Stiftungen accomplish their deferral function in many 
instances as tax planning, not evasion vehicles. 
A Stiftung in the Liechtenstein context differs from the German entity of 
the same name.  The German term Stiftung is generally translated as 
“foundation.”379  Foundations are either 1) for the common good 
 
 371. Karlsson, supra note 8, at 25. 
 372. Id. at 24 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. at 24.  See also 24 c. Inkommstskattelag (Swed.) (providing rules for distributions 
from corporations). 
 375. Karlsson, supra note 8, at 24. 
 376. DAS GROSSE DEUTSCHES WÖRTERBUCH, supra note 38, at 3427, defines “Stiftung” as 
“zweckgebundenes, geschenktes Vermögen” [wealth donated for a specific purpose].  A 
“Stiftung” (plural “Stiftungen”) is similar to a charitable foundation in the United States, and 
most German-English dictionaries define “Stiftung” as a foundation or endowment.  Generally, 
philanthropic individuals form “Stiftungen” for eleemosynary purposes and contributions are 
deductible under EStG Section 10(b).  Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Law], Oct. 
16, 1934, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I], § 10(b) (recodified Oct. 8, 2009) (amended 
Dec. 22, 2009) (Ger.).  I use the German term in this paper in order to avoid any connotations that 
the English word carries with it.  Special thanks to Gregory Knott for the discussion of Stiftungen. 
 377. The English term “offshore” seems incorrect since Germans often move income to 
Switzerland with which German has an extended land border or to Liechtenstein adjacent to 
Switzerland. 
 378. See infra note 491 and accompanying text. 
 379. See Stefan Grundmann, Trust and Treuhand at the End of the 20th Century.  Key 
Problems and Shift of Interests, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 401, 423 (1999) (explaining the way a 
Stiftungen is structured as a base for family wealth). 
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(gemeinnützig) like the charitable VolkswagenStiftung [sic], 2) holding 
companies like the one that owns the grocery chain Lidl,380 or 3) family 
foundations (for the benefit of self (“eigennützig”) or others 
(“fremdnützig”)).381  The charitable Stiftung resembles the American 
foundation, but other Stiftungen have more trust-like characteristics.382 
Liechtenstein Stiftungen (and closely related entities known as 
Anstalten383) function similarly to Anglo-American trusts.384  The Anstalt may 
be “an autonomous fund with its own legal personality which exists to serve 
the interests of one or more beneficiaries named by the Establishment’s 
founder.”385  Planners frequently use Anstalten for family asset protection.386  
A Stiftung is “a legally recognized dedication of assets to a particular purpose,” 
such as providing for a particular family.387  Liechtenstein Stiftungen hold 
property and invest their assets to provide income to beneficiaries.  Like a 
trust, beneficiaries may include the settlors, families of settlors, third parties, 
and charities.388  Stiftungen invest for their own benefit and at their own risk 
subject to the terms of the Stiftung’s organizational documents.389  Stiftungen 
and Anstalten established in Liechtenstein by foreign non-resident persons pay 
a capital tax of 0.1% on assets and, to the extent they engage in investment 
 
 380. See, e.g., Shirley T. Cheng, Note, Recent Decision: Häupl v. Lidl Stiftung & Co. KG, 
N.Y. INT’L. L. REV., Winter 2008, at 143, 143. 
 381. Grundmann, supra note 379, at 419. 
 382. Id. at 423–25.  Stiftungen also differ from another similar entity, the 
Treuhandgesellschaft.  Treuhand is usually translated as “trust,” although the concept is not as 
flexible as trusts in the United States context.  Id. at 423.  Generally speaking, the grantor 
transfers ownership of property to another party to be used or held for a particular purpose, such 
as a security interest.  For more on Treuhand, see generally 1 HANS JOSEF WIELING, 
SACHENRECHT: SACHEN, BESITZ UND RECHTE AN BEWEGLICHEN SACHEN [PROPERTY, 
OWNERSHIP, AND LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY] 799–825 (1990).  Treuhandgesellschaften only 
hold or preserve property for inheritance of other administrative purposes, and Stiftungen hold 
and invest property under more involved, trust-like terms. 
 383. Although customarily translated as “institution,” “institute,” or “establishment” (as in 
research institute), in Liechtenstein an Anstalt may also serve a narrow non-public, often 
investment purpose. 
 384. Stiftungen based in Liechtenstein have even been treated as trusts in courts.  See, e.g., 
William H. Newton, Structuring Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate, 50 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 517, 529 (1996). 
 385. Duncan E. Osborne et al., Asset Protection Trust Planning, in 1 ALI-ABA COURSE OF 
STUDY MATERIALS: PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR LARGE ESTATE 543, 625 (2001). 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Ulrich L. Göres & Jens Kleinert, Die Liechtensteinische Finanzaffäre—Steuer- und 
steuerstrafrechtliche Konsequenzen [The Liechtenstein Financial Matter—Tax and Tax Crime 
Consequences], 19 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1353, 1355 (2008). 
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activity a VAT of 6.5% on their investment returns.390  Settlors may change the 
terms of the Stiftung or Anstalt as the entity’s organizational documents may 
permit.391 
A grantor may settle a Familienstiftung392 in Liechtenstein with assets of at 
least 30,000 Swiss Francs.393  Liechtenstein encourages the establishment of 
larger Stiftungen by halving the 0.1% capital tax for entities with assets of at 
least 10 million Swiss Francs.394  Bank secrecy laws in Liechtenstein protect 
the identities of the grantor and beneficiaries of a Stiftung as well as the 
amount of the Stiftung’s assets.395  Documentation requirements are minimal 
and the documents need not even name the beneficiaries.396  About 95% of 
Stiftungen registered in Liechtenstein do not disclose the names of their 
grantors.397 
Grantors of Liechtenstein Stiftungen who are subject to unlimited tax 
liability in Germany398 must include the Stiftung’s income in their German 
gross income if the grantors control the Stiftung assets (kontrollierte 
Stiftung).399  Fairly straightforward tax planning enables grantors to avoid 
becoming taxable on the Stiftung’s income.  Formalistic relinquishment of 
control to others makes the Stiftung sufficiently separate from the grantor to 
cause the Stiftung to become an independent entity for German tax purposes.  
The grantor may establish the Stiftung as an Ermessensstiftung,400 operating 
according to the grantor’s stated purposes.401  While neither the grantor nor the 
beneficiaries have access to Stiftung assets, a dual trustee-management 
 
 390. Osborne et al., supra note 385, at 624. 
 391. RAINER DEININGER & ANTON-RUDOLF GÖTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONALE 
VERMÖGENSNACHFOLGEPLANUNG MIT AUSLANDSSTIFTUNGEN UND TRUSTS [INTERNATIONAL 
WEALTH TRANSMISSION PLANNING WITH FOREIGN STIFTUNGEN AND TRUSTS] 106 (2006). 
 392. A family foundation.  PETER TERRELL ET AL., COLLINS GERMAN-ENGLISH ENGLISH-
GERMAN DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 236, 634 (2d ed. 1991). 
 393. DEININGER & GÖTZENBERGER, supra note 391, at 105.  Liechtenstein uses the Swiss 
franc as its national currency. 
 394. Arvid Kaiser, Alpen-Asyl für flüchtige Millionen [Asylum in the Alps for Millions Taking 
Flight], SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb. 14, 2008), http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,535409, 
00.html. 
 395. DEININGER & GÖTZENBERGER, supra note 391, at 106.  Note, however, that 
Liechtenstein has agreed in principle to exchange information with the United States in order to 
protect its qualified intermediary status.  Henry M. Ordower, United States of America 
Experience with and Administrative Practice Concerning Mutual Assistance in Tax Affairs 5 
(Saint Louis Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Ser. No. 2010-16, 2009). 
 396. Ordower, supra note 395, at 5. 
 397. Id. 
 398. That is, generally, residents of Germany.  See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
 399. DEININGER & GÖTZENBERGER, supra note 391, at 110–11.  The grantors are treated as 
the owners of the Stiftung’s assets in a manner similar to I.R.C. § 671 (2006). 
 400. A discretionary foundation.  TERRELL ET AL., supra note 392, at 223, 634. 
 401. DEININGER & GÖTZENBERGER, supra note 391, at 112–16. 
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structure for the Stiftung protects the interests of the grantor and the 
beneficiaries.402  Under this dualist system, the Stiftungsrat (board) presents 
spending and investment initiatives, and the Protektor (trustee) grants the 
necessary permission to act as long as the initiatives are consistent with the 
grantor’s intended purposes.403  The grantor and beneficiaries are only taxable 
to the extent of distributions they receive from the Stiftung.404 
While the transfer of the assets from the grantor to the Stiftung might be 
subject to a transfer tax in the form of a gift tax, grantors generally may avoid 
that tax as well by retaining the right to remove and replace the Stiftungsrat or 
alter the terms of the Stiftung.405  For German gift tax purposes that retained 
power renders the gift incomplete, but the gift is complete for income tax 
purposes.406 
A leading German tax treatise identifies other aggressive tax structures that 
taxpayers have defended successfully, including the warehousing of interest 
payments to defer tax between an entity and its owner; an interest in the Dublin 
Docks project; a payment to redeem a term interest in property that the 
redeeming party granted without consideration; and the payment of penalty 
interest on unnecessary third party financing. 407  The taxing authorities have 
challenged other structures successfully: For example, gifts from husband to 
wife followed by a gift from the wife to child in order to make use of multiple 
gift tax exemptions and the insertion of entities to intermediate and avoid a tax 
on an unincorporated business selling land.408 
In order to alleviate housing shortages, Germany provided significant tax 
benefits to homeowners who would outfit part of their house as an independent 
residence with a kitchen and bath.  Many homeowners made the conversion in 
order to capture the tax benefits, but far fewer actually made the residences 
available for rental.409  Homeowners tended to be reluctant to actually rent the 
available space because German landlord-tenant laws were favorable to tenants 
 
 402. Id. at 112. 
 403. Id. at 114. 
 404. See Osborne et al., supra note 385, at 625. 
 405. See, e.g., Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] [Federal Tax Court], June 28, 2007, SAMMLUNG DER 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN UND GUTACHTEN DES BUNDESFINANZHOFS [BFHE] 217, 254 (Ger.), 
available at JURIS (holding that the indirect continuing control through an Anstalt of the Stiftung 
distributions prevented completion of the gift for gift tax purposes). 
 406. Id. at 9. 
 407. KLAUS TIPKE & JOACHIM LANG, STEUERRECHT [TAX LAW] 164–65 (17th ed. 2002). 
 408. Id. 
 409. See generally FRANZ KONZ, KONZ: 1000 GANZ LEGALE STEUERTRICKS [KONZ: 1000 
COMPLETELY LEGAL TAX TRICKS] 492–546 (2008) (eBook) (discussing tax savings from home 
ownership and construction); id. at 496 (discussing deductions from buildings). 
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and made it extremely difficult to evict the tenant and recover the apartment 
once someone occupied it for six months or more.410 
V.  THE TAX AVOIDANCE CULTURE—LEGITIMIZING TAX EVASION 
When I presented an earlier draft of this paper at a workshop several years 
ago, the commentator for the paper411 recommended that I define “culture” 
with some care if I am going to argue that there is a tax avoidance culture.  
While I take that comment to heart, I find that current usage of the term has 
rendered a comprehensive definition of “culture” elusive.  Dictionary 
definitions disclose that historical usage of “culture” embraces various beliefs 
and practices that members of a society have in common and that help to 
distinguish that society from others.  For example, a dictionary I used when I 
was in college defines culture as “[t]he concepts, habits, skills, arts, 
instruments, institutions, etc. of a given people in a given period; 
civilization.”412  Similarly, the unabridged dictionary in the public area at Saint 
Louis University Law Library defines “culture” as: 
A particular state or stage of advancement in civilization or the characteristic 
features of such a stage or state; as, primitive Greek, Germanic culture. b. The 
complex of distinctive attainments, beliefs, traditions, etc., constituting the 
background of a racial, religious, or social group; as a nation with many 
cultures.413 
And a German language dictionary I have defines the comparable German 
term “Kultur” as: “Gesamtheit der geistigen u. künstler. Ausdrucksformen 
eines Volkes (Kunst, Wissenschaft, usw.).”414 
Those dictionary definitions are consistent with one another, but current 
usage of the term “culture” has become far less precise and somewhat 
hackneyed.  Any group of human activities may define a culture.  Both general 
and legal literature often refer to a narrow group of related human activities or 
beliefs as a “culture” consistent with my use of the concept in this paper.  
There are references to religious cultures, primitive cultures, corporate 
 
 410. BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, as amended, § 549 (special provisions governing residential 
leases), § 558 (limitations on rental increases to local index), § 573 (limitations on termination), § 
573a (special simplified termination where leased premises are in a residence the owner 
occupies), § 574 (lessee’s right to object to termination for hardship) (Ger.). 
 411. Sarah Lawsky, Comments at the Critical Tax Theory Workshop at Florida State 
University School of Law (Apr. 4–5, 2008) (schedule for critical tax conference available at 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/law_economics/criticaltaxconference.html). 
 412. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 358 (Coll. Ed. 
1960). 
 413. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 643 (2d ed. 1934) (defining “culture”). 
 414. DAS GROSSE DEUTSCHES WÖRTERBUCH, supra note 38, at 2187 [the totality of 
intellectual and artistic forms of expression of a people (art, knowledge, etc.)] (author’s trans.). 
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cultures, and tax cultures415 that simply describe a set of commonalities in a 
defined group that distinguish it from other groups.  Although historically 
“culture” was a conceptually neutral term, current usage frequently includes a 
value judgment that may be pejorative.  Negative usages include criminal 
cultures416 and cultures of corruption.417 
While “corporate culture” may simply serve as an identifier, the term also 
appears with negative connotations in specific contexts, as does the term tax 
culture when attached to specific tax cultures such as a culture of tax cheating.  
For example, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,418 the 
Delaware chancellor identified protection and preservation of corporate culture 
as a possible legitimate reason to resist a takeover, but in White v. Panic,419 the 
complaint alleges that there was a “corporate culture that turned a blind eye to 
violations of employee civil rights, even if it meant violating applicable federal 
and state laws, rules or regulations.”420  A front page story in a major United 
States newspaper reported on South Korea’s struggle with its “thoroughly 
male-centered corporate culture, starting with alcohol.”421 
A growing body of tax literature examines tax cultures separately from 
other cultural elements.  Victor Thuronyi sees a tax culture as something that 
grows out of the legal tradition of a country.422  Sharon C. Nantell reviews the 
history of taxation in the United States with a particular eye toward racial and 
sexual inequalities in the development of U.S. taxation.423  Ann Mumford 
compares the tax collection cultures of the United States and Great Britain.424  
Assaf Likhovski examines cultural issues in the tax law in British Palestine in 
 
 415. See infra notes 421–23 and accompanying text. 
 416. See, e.g., Criminal Culture Making Police Work Difficult, TULSA POLICE DEP’T BLOG 
(May 1, 2007), http://tpdblog.typepad.com/tpdblog/2007/05/criminal_cultur.html (discussing the 
effect of criminal culture on the use of informants). 
 417. The United States Democratic Party recently used this slogan in referring to the political 
scandals in the Republican Party during the presidency of George W. Bush presidency.  See, e.g., 
Scott Shepard, Dean Decries GOP’s “Culture of Corruption”, OXFORD PRESS (July 5, 2005), 
http://www.oxfordpress.com/news/content/shared/news/nation/stories/07/04_DEMS_LOBBY.ht
ml. 
 418. 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989). 
 419. 783 A.2d 543, 552 (Del. 2001) (affirming the lower court). 
 420. Id. at 552. 
 421. Norimitsu Onishi, As Women Rise, Corporate Korea Corks the Bottle, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2007, at A1. 
 422. VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAW 3 (2003). 
 423. Sharon C. Nantell, A Cultural Perspective on American Tax Policy, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 33, 
64–67 (1999). 
 424. ANN MUMFORD, TAXING CULTURE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TAX COLLECTION LAW 1 
(2002). 
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the 1940s.425  Michael A. Livingston briefly examines and contrasts what he 
refers to as the tax cultures in Israel, India and Italy.426  In his article, 
Livingston deals primarily with the issue of progressive taxation in those 
countries and then with both public attitudes about compliance and the 
structure of professional participation in the tax community.427  In an earlier 
article, Livingston suggests that tax culture: 
may be defined as the body of beliefs and practices that are shared by tax 
practitioners and policy-makers in a given society and that provide the 
background or context in which tax decisions are made, i.e., the noneconomic 
or at least nonquantifiable side of taxation, which varies between societies 
even though the underlying economic principles are largely the same.428 
And Livingston observes further that “[t]ax culture is thus distinct from the 
general culture or even the legal culture of a given society, although there is of 
course no clear line between them.”429 
It strikes me that tax avoidance in many developed economies is cultural.  
It embodies a free-standing set of beliefs, traditions, and practices that 
constitute a culture and, like any culture, includes a number of features that 
lack an underlying and compelling logic.  That tax avoidance culture may 
contrast starkly with other elements of the society and yet blend with those 
other elements as not to appear out of place.  Somewhat oddly, but reflecting a 
view of taxation as separate from the general and contrasting culture, 
Americans who pride themselves on being charitable, standing up for the 
oppressed and underprivileged elements of the society, and being meticulously 
fair in their business dealings might avoid taxes, even knowing that their 
avoidance must generate unfairness in the distribution of the tax burden. 
This paper has argued that tax avoidance through marketed shelter 
products and aggressive individualized planning has become commonplace.430  
 
 425. Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Income 
Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 725, 725–31 (2010). 
 426. Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel Aviv: Reflections on 
Progressive Taxation and “Progressive” Politics in a Globalized but Still Local World, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 555, 556 (2006). 
 427. Id. 
 428. Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of 
Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 119, 121 (2005) (arguing generally that cultural matters 
have an impact on harmonization across borders, so that tax scholarship may need to look beyond 
economics for development). 
 429. Id. 
 430. Compare the development of hedge funds in the United States.  Hedge funds began as 
investments for only the wealthiest investors.  As their mystique developed and rumors of their 
vast investment success spread, broader segments of the investing public wanted to get in on the 
opportunity.  Changes in law accompanied changes in investor attitudes and facilitated increased 
access to fund opportunities.  Most recently, a fund manager has had a public offering of its 
shares.  As the government tries to regulate hedge fund activities, demand for the products 
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Earlier in the paper, I traced the contribution of tax sheltering to this 
development.431  Although public opinion once regarded tax sheltering as a 
morally dubious practice,432 over a decade or two, that view changed 
radically.433  Neither change in the law nor successful tax litigation has made 
tax sheltering unacceptable conduct.434 
Similarly, in Europe, public opinion once would have frowned upon 
expatriation of labor or residence to avoid taxation.  While the recent 
Liechtenstein disclosures generated some public outcry against tax evasion by 
wealthy and prominent individuals,435 the public seems to accept and even 
embrace expatriation decisions.436  Technological advances facilitate business 
decisions to relocate to low tax, and often warm weather, jurisdictions.437  
 
nevertheless continues to grow.  See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design 
Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 323, 324 (2007); Ordower, supra note 254, at 295. 
 431. See supra Part I. 
 432. Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Raising the Ethical Bar for Tax Lawyers: Why We Need Circular 
230, 111 TAX NOTES 823, 825 (2006) (stating that the older generation of tax lawyers—defined 
as those between 45 and 65 years old—approach tax planning with an attitude that textualism is 
insufficient to glean the legislative intent of the tax code and thus the “right” result, while the 
younger generation of lawyers are more rule-bound and more willing to find a loophole in the text 
of the statute and to play the audit lottery). 
 433. See Lavoie, supra note 308, at 125–26 (stating adherence to morals is often determined 
by an individual’s perception of the consequences of non-compliance).  When people decide 
whether or not to pay their taxes, they consider the cost of compliance and the chance of getting 
caught; if the cost of compliance exceeds the expected punishment for noncompliance, the 
taxpayer will not pay his taxes.  Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax 
Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1783–84 (2000).  The audit rate is under two percent of 
returns, and only a small percent of those audited are penalized; civil penalties are generally 
around twenty percent for underpayment, and criminal penalties are rare.  Id. 
 434. Blank, supra note 8, at 539.  I suspect there is considerable schadenfreude (pleasure in 
the suffering of others) when someone who has sought to avoid taxes with clever schemes gets hit 
with a large tax liability or criminal prosecution.  Anecdotally, I know that many members of the 
tax professional community did gloat over the travails of Jenkens & Gilchrist, KPMG, and 
earlier, Kanter and Eisenberg without any sense of conviction that those professionals did 
anything reprehensible. 
 435. See infra note 492 and accompanying text. 
 436. Consider the Beatles and their 1966 song “Taxman” that alluded to the 95% maximum 
income tax rate in Great Britain to which each of them was subject.  There was publicity at the 
time concerning whether the Beatles might expatriate to avoid those confiscatory rates and 
speculation about whether taxes might have caused the band’s dissolution.  See Tim Andrews, 
How High Taxes Broke Up The Beatles, AMS. FOR TAX REFORM (Sept. 15, 2009, 12:52 PM), 
http://www.atr.org/index.php?content=091509_Beatles#; Andrew Leonard, Did the Taxman 
Break Up the Beatles?, SALON.COM (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:52 AM), http://mobile.salon.com/ 
technology/how_the_world_works/2009/09/15/the_taxman_and_the_beatles. 
 437. Many “tax havens” are Caribbean and Pacific islands, as well as the nations of 
Switzerland and Lichtenstein, although one probably would not view them as warm weather 
destinations.  Similarly, the state of Florida—where many Canadians and Europeans have first or 
second homes—has no personal income tax.  Richard K. Gordon, On The Use and Abuse of 
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Communication depends little upon one’s physical location.  Transmission of 
voice, image, and data is substantially instantaneous whether across the room 
or across the world.  Production in developed economies increasingly is 
service-based, and, at the upper income levels, independent of physical 
location.  Individuals in service industries often can provide their services 
without physical proximity to the service recipient.438  Much manufacturing 
has shifted to less developed economies because of lower production costs.  
Even in some service industries requiring physical proximity, service 
recipients have begun to follow the availability of service providers, especially 
where cost savings are possible.439 
If people once viewed taxes as “what we pay for civilized society”440 and 
as a collective obligation we accept and possibly even embrace, tax aversion 
has supplanted those views.  Despite decline in tax rates over the past fifty 
years,441 recent opinion surveys disclose that taxpayers in the United States 
think tax rates are too high.442  The “flat tax” movement has many adherents 
 
Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 
519 (2010). 
 438. This phenomenon has become problematic as outsourcing of product support to low 
wage jurisdictions has become common. 
 439. Joshua Kurlantzick, Sometimes, Sightseeing is Looking at Your X-Rays, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 20, 2007, at 10 (noting Thailand’s increasing medical tourism is due to high-quality care and 
low cost); M.P. McQueen, Paying Workers to Go Abroad for Health Care, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 
2008, at B9 (noting some insurers and employers are realizing the savings possible with medical 
tourism and are including the option in health care coverage). 
 440. Compania Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87, 
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (addressing the power to tax insurance non-uniformly). 
 441. With limited exceptions, both corporate and individual income tax rates in the United 
States have declined since 1965.  Compare I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (2006), with I.R.C. §§ 11, 2001 
(1982); see also Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 
259, 303 (2003).  The rate reductions have been more pronounced at the upper end than the lower 
end with a maximum rate reduction overall from 70% to 35% (with a short period of 28%).  
I.R.C. § 1 (2006); see also Alice Gresham Bullock, The Tax Code, the Tax Gap, and Income 
Inequality: The Middle Class Squeeze, 53 HOW. L.J. 249, 256–57 (2010).  The rate on net capital 
gain and many corporate dividends that low income individuals do not receive regularly, but high 
income individuals do, is even lower at a general maximum rate of 15%.  I.R.C. § 11 (2006).  At 
the same time, there has been a significant increase at the federal level in wage-based taxes that 
have a disparate negative impact on low and middle class taxpayers rather than high income tax 
from 10% to 15.6%.  Michael J. Graetz, Essay, Tax Policy at the Beginning of the Clinton 
Administration, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 561, 571–72 (1993).  Note, however, that new I.R.C. § 1411, 
as added by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, § 1402, 
124 Stat. 1029, 1060–63, imposes a 3.8% Medicare Tax on unearned income over a threshold 
amount and eliminates part of the regressivity in the employment-based taxes, Medicare and 
Social Security. 
 442. Andrew Chamberlain, Tax Found., What Does America Think about Taxes?  The 2007 
Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Taxes and Wealth, SPECIAL REP., Apr. 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.taxfoundation.org/news/show/22331.html) (finding that 58% of American adults 
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whose income tax rates already are low but may increase with a true flat rate 
tax if the tax is to raise the revenue necessary to fund the current level of 
government services.443 
Similarly, there has been serious discussion of replacing a progressive 
income tax with a consumption tax, including a national sales tax and a value 
added tax.  A sales tax would simplify collection by collecting only from 
vendors and service providers and limiting the opportunities for complex tax 
planning structures to diminish taxes.  A sales or value added tax would not 
eliminate tax evasion444 as these taxes substitute a regressive tax model for the 
progressive one that has dominated U.S. tax policy since World War II.  
Models of consumption taxes such as the value added taxes prevalent in 
Europe445 are regressive relative to income and wealth and, accordingly, 
 
consider income tax rates too high).  But see Karlyn Bowman, What Do Americans Think about 
Taxes?, 123 TAX NOTES 99, 99 (2009) (finding 60% of those surveyed thought the amount they 
would pay in taxes was “fair”); Karlyn Bowman, What Do Americans Think about Taxes?  An 
Update, 127 TAX NOTES 917, 917 (2010) (showing survey results demonstrating that Americans 
think taxes are high but fair, and have little understanding of progressivity). 
 443. “Flat tax” is a misnomer as a flat tax in fact would be a capitation tax.  Proponents of a 
flat tax refer to a single rate of tax on all taxpaying individuals without regard to their income.  
The flat rate income tax proposals recommend broadening the base and lowering the rate, but all 
include a zero rate for some taxpayers.  Some current low rate taxpayers probably would move 
from their current low rates under the United States’ mildly progressive rate structure either to the 
lower zero rate or the higher flat rate.  See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE 
MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 100 (2002); John F. Coverdale, Comment, The Flat 
Tax is Not a Fair Tax, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285 (1996). 
 444. For discussion on the vulnerability of the value added tax (VAT) to evasion and fraud, 
see Richard T. Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud in the EU: A Digital VAT Solution, 42 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 443, 445 (2006); Richard T. Ainsworth, CO2 MTIC Fraud—Technologically Exploiting the 
EU VAT (Again), 57 TAX NOTES INT’L 357, 357 (2010); Richard T. Ainsworth, Tackling VAT 
Fraud: 13 Ways Forward, 45 TAX NOTES INT’L 1205, 1207 (2007). 
 445. Throughout Europe the value added tax accounts for 40% to 60% of tax collections 
(other than social contributions).  Thus, the VAT accounts for approximately the same proportion 
of revenue as the income and wealth taxes combined, and diminishes the importance of income 
tax avoidance.  ALLESANDRO LUPI, EUROSTAT, TAX REVENUE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 
(2010), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-10-023/EN/KS-
SF-10-023-EN.pdf (noting taxes on production and imports made up 33% of tax revenue in the 
European Union in 2008); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., LUCERNE CONFERENCE: 
COMMUNIQUÉ 2 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/12/43669264.pdf (noting 
the VAT accounts for 18.6% of total tax revenue across European countries); Ordower, supra 
note 2, at 276 (noting Germany’s turnover tax, similar to a VAT, brings in about 50% of its tax 
revenue).  The membership of the European Union formally adopted a Value Added Tax 
convention to limit VAT competition so that each member state must maintain a VAT rate of at 
least 15%.  Council Directive 2006/112, art. 97, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006L0112:20100409 (outlining the 
common system of value added tax); see also Walter Hellerstein & Timothy H. Gillis, The VAT in 
the European Union, 127 TAX NOTES 461, 462 (2010). 
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contrary to the economic interests of the bulk of the taxpaying public.  Only 
relatively well-to-do individuals avoid broad-based consumption taxes by 
investing substantial portions of their income and wealth rather than 
consuming to acquire basic goods and services.  Consumption-type taxes such 
as add-on sales taxes, although regressive for the bulk of the consuming public 
in the United States, are easier to pass at the state level than are increases in the 
state’s progressive or proportional income tax or ad valorem property tax.  
Despite apparent preference for consumption taxes, the public avoids the sales 
tax.  Consumers prefer to purchase from out-of-state, internet-based businesses 
rather than in-state businesses in order to avoid sales tax.446  Generally, those 
consumers evade the state’s use tax that complements the sales tax.447  Most 
states do not enforce the use tax actively.  Smuggling of cigarettes across state 
lines to evade high consumption taxes on cigarettes also is fairly common.448 
Also expressing tax views contrary to their personal economic interests are 
taxpayers in the same survey who consider the steeply progressive estate tax to 
be the least fair tax.  They support estate tax repeal even though it impacts only 
a narrow band of the wealthiest Americans.449  While it is possible that the 
American public sincerely believes it is unfair to tax large estates at death, or 
that people believe that they will be part of that estate-taxable elite when they 
 
 446. A state may compel a vendor to collect a sales tax on sales to its residents if the vendor 
has a physical presence in the state.  If the vendor has no physical presence, the state may not 
compel it to collect the sales tax.  Some states, including New York and New Jersey, have begun 
to require internet vendors to collect the sales tax so long as they have an associated vendor in the 
state.  Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep’t. of Taxation & Fin., 887 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2009); Drugstore.com, Inc. v. Div. of Taxation, 23 N.J. Tax 624, 644–45 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
2008). 
 447. Purchasers resident in the state must pay, but infrequently do pay, a use tax equal to the 
sales tax. 
 448. Matthew McMahan, Note, The International Effects of Adoption of the Consumption Tax 
in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 519, 540 (2006) (stating that the consumption 
tax gives great incentive to smuggle cigarettes on the black market because state taxes vary up to 
sixty-three point five cents per pack among the states); see also Bruce Bartlett, Cigarette Taxes, 
Smuggling, and Revenues, 63 TAX NOTES 1493, 1496 (1994) (citing ADVISORY COMM’N ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CIGARETTE BOOTLEGGING: A STATE AND FEDERAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1977), a 1977 report from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations that concluded states were losing over $391 million per year in revenue due to cigarette 
smuggling). 
 449. Chamberlain, supra note 442, at 6 (finding that two-thirds of U.S. adults favor estate tax 
repeal and consider the estate tax to be the most unfair tax).  Even if Congress does not modify 
the estate tax, and its rates and exemptions revert automatically to their 2001 levels after 2010, 
most Americans’ estates never would become subject to the estate tax.  See I.R.C. § 2010 (2006).  
Tax legislation at the end of 2010 temporarily changed the maximum estate tax rate to 35% and 
exempted the first $5 million of estate value from the tax.  The change expires at the end of 2012.  
I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2006), amended by 2010 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization 
and Job Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 302, 304, 124 Stat. 3296, 3301–04 (2010). 
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die, a more likely explanation for opposition to the tax—now labeled 
rhetorically the “death tax”— is a concerted effort to sway public opinion to 
demonize the tax.450  That effort has been nearly evangelical.451 
Taxpayers who work in low-paying service positions such as domestic 
employment—also contrary to their economic interests—frequently forgo 
claiming the earned income tax credit452 and, in the longer term, social security 
benefits,453 in order to avoid having to report their wages and enter the system.  
While many low wage workers are undocumented workers who would not be 
able to claim the earned income tax credit454 or participate in Social Security, 
the urge to remain outside the tax system affects many United States citizens as 
well and reflects a deep-seated distrust of the tax administrator.  The 
preference not to report income also may arise from failed delivery of useful 
information concerning the earned income credit and Social Security.455  At 
least part of the information failure derives from passive and sometimes active 
dissemination of misleading information.  Employers of low wage employees 
may prefer to pay cash to evade the employer’s share and possibly the need to 
 
 450. Expenditures on lobbying efforts to repeal the estate tax were high; one group of 
eighteen super-wealthy families, having a collective net worth of at least $185.5 billion, spent 
almost a half-billion dollars of their own money between 1998 and 2006 to advocate for the 
repeal of the estate tax.  CONOR KENNY ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN & UNITED FOR A FAIR ECON., 
SPENDING MILLIONS TO SAVE BILLIONS: THE CAMPAIGN OF THE SUPER WEALTHY TO KILL THE 
ESTATE TAX 8–11 (2006) (also found at 2006 TAX NOTES TODAY 80-28). 
 451. See Steve Forbes, Perspectives on Taxes: Make Them Give Back Our Money, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at B9 (suggesting that the government “substantially cut or abolish 
inheritance or ‘death’ taxes. . . .  Death taxes undermine family businesses and farms and impede 
growth.”); George Lovejoy, On Taxes, the Choice is Clear Between Bush and Forbes, THE 
UNION LEADER (Manchester, NH), Dec. 29, 1999, at A14 (stating that Forbes’s proposed flat tax 
would “immediately abolish . . . the estate tax, which punishes parents trying to pass on their 
farms and small businesses to their children.”).  Lovejoy also uses Forbes’s famous line, “No 
taxation without respiration!”  Id. 
 452. I.R.C. § 32 (2006). 
 453. In order to claim Social Security retirement benefits, the claimant must have Social 
Security credits received when his or her wages became subject to the Social Security tax.  See 
Number of Credits to be Eligible for Social Security Retirement Benefits, SOC. SEC. ONLINE (Apr. 
29, 2011, 4:28 PM), http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/356. 
 454. I.R.C. § 32 (2006). 
 455. Low income tax clinics, many of which received funding from the IRS, have overcome 
many individuals’ reluctance to report their income and persuaded many low income individuals 
to file income tax returns and claim the credit.  See generally MARGUERITE CASEY FOUNDATION, 
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 1 (2005), available 
at http://www.caseygrants.org/documents/reports/MCF_EITC_Paper.pdf (also found at 109 TAX 
NOTES 1669 (2005)) (“There is widespread agreement that the EITC is important and effective. 
However, even among its supporters, there are three main concerns about its structure and 
operation.  The first concern is the lack of participation by some eligible taxpayers. As many as 
25 percent of the taxpayers eligible for the EITC fail to claim it.”). 
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pay higher wages to enable the employee to pay the employee’s share of the 
Social Security and Medicare taxes.456 
Aversion to both taxation and its administrative accoutrements seems to 
have grown relentlessly over the latter half of the twentieth century.  In the 
United States, demonization of the IRS has become a commonplace rhetorical 
device for members of Congress who are seemingly ignorant of their own role 
in creating the tax laws and the collection system.457  From time to time, 
Congress ties the hands of its tax collector.  For example, the IRS postponed a 
proposed round of Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) 
audits in the early 1990s following Congressional hearings.458  Historically, the 
audits were intrusive to the taxpayers that the IRS selected for the audits but 
provided critical information to facilitate the audit selection process.  
Congress’s unwillingness to continue to fund the program ultimately led to 
discontinuation of the program, and the IRS continues to work on other 
methods to gather essential data.459 
The IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (the “IRRA”)460 probably 
marks the nadir of respect for the IRS and the height of cynicism about the 
 
 456. I.R.C. § 3101 (2006) imposes a 6.2% Social Security tax and a 1.45% Medicare tax on 
the wages of each employee, and I.R.C. § 3111 (2006) imposes an identical tax on employers on 
the wages of their employees.  Only the first $106,800 of wages (or self-employment income 
under I.R.C. § 1401) is subject to the Social Security portion of the tax.  For household 
employees, the employer may pay the employee’s tax.  That payment is includable in the 
employee’s income (in many cases increasing the employee’s eligibility for the earned income 
credit) but is not subject to the Social Security or Medicare tax.  See I.R.S. Publ’n 926 (2011), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p926/ar02.html#en_US_publink100086732.  
Investment income was not subject to either the Social Security or the Medicare tax, so the tax 
was regressive relative to income and wealth.  However, Section 1402(a) of the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1060–63 (adding § 1411 
to the Code, effective for taxable years after 2012).  This new section imposes a 3.8% Medicare 
tax on the income from investments and other unearned income of individuals.  Id.  The statute 
imposes the new tax only on taxpayers whose income exceeds $200,000 ($250,000 for married 
filing jointly).  Id. 
 457. Members of Congress regularly refer to the Code as the IRS Code as if they were 
innocent of its origins.  See Steven J. Willis, Masks, Magic and Games: The Use of Tax Law as a 
Policy Tool, 4 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 41, 44 (1985). 
 458. TCMP is the program under which the IRS selected taxpayers for audits and required 
them to produce documentation for each entry on their returns.  The process was certainly time-
consuming for the taxpayers, and often costly, as taxpayers paid for the time their professional 
advisors devoted to the audits on the taxpayers’ behalf.  See Jonathan S. Feinstein, Approaches 
for Estimating Noncompliance: Examples from Federal Taxation in the United States, 109 ECON. 
J. F360, F361, F363 (1999). 
 459. GAO Reports on IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program, 69 TAX NOTES 332, 
332 (1995); George Guttman, Citing Budget, IRS Announces Indefinite Suspension of TCMP, 69 
TAX NOTES 521, 521 (1995). 
 460. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 
112 Stat. 685. 
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difficulty of the IRS’s job.  Congress adopted the IRRA following a period of 
heated anti-IRS rhetoric and hearings that highlighted purported abuses by IRS 
employees and featured the testimony of revenue agents who wore masks to 
hide their identities.  The IRRA made tax collection more difficult by adding 
increased due process rights to appeal the collection process461 and allowing 
taxpayers to shift the burden of proof to the government.462  More significant, 
however, was the IRRA’s “ten deadly sins”: a list of ten acts, each of which 
would result in the immediate separation of an IRS employee from IRS 
employment.463  Enactment of the “sins” certainly instilled fear in rank and file 
IRS employees who depended on the employment for their own livelihood and 
tended to make them less aggressive in collecting taxes often at the cost of 
much needed revenue.464  Unsurprisingly, enactment of the sins into law 
resulted in a rash of complaints, but internal investigations determined that few 
complaints had any merit.465  Numbers of complaints in more recent years have 
been few.466 
In both Europe and the United States, the tax avoidance culture has 
generated extensive tax evasion. 467  The underground economy468 grew 
rapidly, more than doubling relative to gross domestic product in the United 
States from 1970 to 2000,469  and carried the tax gap along470—as both 
 
 461. Id. § 3401, 112 Stat. at 746–49 (imposing notice and hearing rights by adding I.R.C. §§ 
6320, 6330). 
 462. Id. § 3001(a), 112 Stat. at 726–27 (adding I.R.C. § 7491, which enables taxpayers to 
shift the burden of proof in court proceedings to the government by producing “credible 
evidence”). 
 463. Id. § 1203(b), 112 Stat. at 720–22 (requiring the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to 
dismiss any employee violating any of ten provisions, including harassing a taxpayer). 
 464. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX 
SYSTEMS TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 151–52 (2003). 
 465. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: The Sixth Deadly Sin, 92 TAX NOTES 1018, 1018–19 
(2001). 
 466. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1039R, IRS’ EFFORTS TO EVALUATE 
THE SECTION 1203 PROCESS FOR EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT AND MEASURE ITS IMPACTS ON TAX 
ADMINISTRATION 19 (2004). 
 467. Of course, there is nothing new about tax evasion.  It has existed undoubtedly in almost 
all cultures that have imposed taxes and has taken many forms from hiding from the tax collector, 
to concealing property including the proverbial still in the Virginia mountains, to covering 
windows to evade the window tax in eighteenth century England and Scotland.  See Request for a 
Window Tax Exemption, 1765, THE NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
pathways/citizenship/rise_parliament/docs/window_tax.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2010); The Cat 
and the Mouse, MOONSHINE—BLUE RIDGE STYLE: THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF UNTAXED 
LIQUOR IN THE MOUNTAINS OF VIRGINIA, http://www.blueridgeinstitute.org/moonshine/the_cat_ 
and_the_mouse.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010). 
 468. SCHNEIDER & ENSTE, supra note 231, at 3–4 (describing the size and growth of 
transactions outside international banking systems in order to avoid taxation). 
 469. Id. 
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concepts became part of the American vocabulary.  As aggressive tax planning 
and avoidance became commonplace and neutral behavior, moral suasion to 
report income accurately carried little force.  It no longer was the least bit 
unseemly to evade taxes in various harmless ways: not paying employment 
taxes on household employees, not reporting barter transactions, buying goods 
for delivery from out-of-state to avoid sales tax, making cash payments as part 
of price negotiation, reporting charitable deductions for purchases at charity 
auctions, etc.471  It was not unusual to find designees to high public appointed 
office who did not pay Social Security taxes on their domestic employees or 
even on their own wages.472  Their tax lapses provided political fodder to delay 
or prevent their appointment, but the same behavior in ordinary citizens 
seemed far less objectionable. 
Recent surveys of attitudes toward tax evasion disclose that in the United 
States and most European countries, the majority of those surveyed consider 
tax evasion to be acceptable conduct under some circumstances.473  Estimates 
of the size of the underground economy474 and the tax gap475 suggest that tax 
cheating occurs on very large scale.  Cash payments and barter for goods and 
services enables individuals to receive but not report income that taxing 
authorities have very limited ability to detect.  Many factors may contribute to 
high rates of tax evasion on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, including high 
tax rates,476 complexity of the law, cost of compliance, perceptions that 
specific groups (especially very high income individuals and businesses) are 
avoiding or evading taxes, and the incidence of illegal immigration.477  
 
 470. According to the IRS, the tax gap refers to unreported and uncollected tax revenue 
attributable to taxpayers failing to report.  The IRS estimated a collection rate of approximately 
84% and a tax gap of $290 billion in 2005.  U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE 
FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf. 
 471. Robert W. McGee et al., The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Comparative Study of Germany 
and the United States (Oct. 2006) (unpublished working paper, Barry University), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=936743. 
 472. Sydney N. Schanberg, Contemplating Hypocrisy and Zoë Baird, NEWSDAY (Nassau, 
NY), Jan. 26, 1993, at 75 (discussing how Zoë Baird withdrew her nomination for Attorney 
General under President Clinton after admitting she had hired an illegal immigrant as a 
housekeeper and did not pay her Social Security taxes); Geithner’s Tax Code, WALL STREET J., 
Jan. 22, 2009, at A16 (noting Tim Geithner’s nomination as Secretary of the Treasury was 
delayed when he admitted he had not paid payroll taxes for several years). 
 473. McGee et al., supra note 471, at 25, 27. 
 474. SCHNEIDER & ENSTE, supra note 231, at 3. 
 475. U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, supra note 470, at 12. 
 476. Decreasing the rates of tax did not seem to dissuade aggressive tax planning and evasion 
following the TRA 86, discussion supra Part II.B, or avoidance of much lower rate state sales 
taxes, supra note 446 and accompanying text. 
 477. Since the end of the Bracero program in the mid-1960s, which permitted Mexican 
workers to do seasonal work in the United States, the number of unauthorized workers in the 
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Undocumented workers frequently are willing to work for lower wages than 
legal residents.478  Otherwise law-abiding individuals employ undocumented 
workers and pay them cash, both because documented workers are not 
available for certain types of work at reasonable cost and because the 
undocumented workers often fear that reporting income will expose their 
presence in the country, subjecting them to deportation.  That segment of the 
cash-based economy has become part of the local culture in both the United 
States and Europe. 
Efforts to limit the opportunities for taxpayers to underreport their income 
have motivated Congress to increase information reporting in the United 
States.  Information reporting helps to identify recipients of interest479 and 
dividends,480 but significant payment reporting from one’s trade or business 
has gained only limited traction.481  Despite statutory requirements, most 
 
United States has steadily climbed.  The U.S. Census estimated that in 1969 there were around 
540,000 undocumented aliens in the United States; that number climbed to 11.5 million in 2006, 
with nearly two-thirds of the 11.5 million arriving after 1995.  ÖRN B. BODVARSSON & HENDRIK 
VAN DEN BERG, THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION: THEORY AND POLICY 295, 305 (2009); 
Illegal Immigration: Population Estimates of Undocumented Immigrants in the US, 1969–2009, 
PROCON.ORG, http://immigration.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000844 (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2010). 
 478. See Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market: An 
Analysis of the Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrants in the United States, 12 J. 
POPULATION ECON. 91, 92 (1999) (offering anecdotal evidence of illegal immigrants accepting 
very low wages). 
 479. See I.R.C. § 6049 (2006) (requiring information reporting on payments of interest 
aggregating $10 or more). 
 480. See id. § 6042 (requiring information reporting on dividend distributions aggregating 
$10 or more). 
 481. See id. § 6041 (requiring information reporting on payments exceeding $600 or more in 
one’s trade or business).  While the IRS cannot determine how many reportable payments go 
unreported, the GAO determined that only some 8% of 50 million small businesses file Form 
1099MISC for payments of $600 or more, suggesting that small businesses do not report many or 
their trade or business payments as I.R.C. § 6041 requires.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-09-238, TAX GAP: IRS COULD DO MORE TO PROMOTE COMPLIANCE BY THIRD 
PARTIES WITH MISCELLANEOUS INCOME REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 17 (2009).  Congress 
extended this reporting requirement to additional transactions in 2010 with Section 210(a) of the 
Small Business Jobs Act.  Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-240, § 210(a), 124 Stat. 
2504, 2561.  The reporting requirement was projected to raise almost $22 billion in tax revenue.  
H.R. REP. NO. 112-15, at 7 (2011) (noting the Congressional Budget Office estimated repealing 
the provision would cost $21.9 billion in tax revenue over ten years).  Nevertheless, Congress 
quickly repealed the extended reporting requirement in response to lobbying against the 
provision.  Comprehensive 1099 Taxpayer Protection and Repayment of Exchange Subsidy 
Overpayments Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-9, 125 Stat. 36 (codified in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.).  See also H.R. REP. NO. 112-15, at 2 (2011) (noting that “it is now widely 
acknowledged” that the burdens of reporting outweigh the potential benefits of improved tax 
compliance); NFIB Leads Successful Grassroots Effort to Repeal1099 Reporting Requirements, 
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individuals employing household workers like nannies, cleaners, and 
gardeners, to whom wages payments are not deductible, have an extremely low 
compliance record for reporting those payments 482 despite high visibility 
incidents of non-reporting costing the responsible individual a government 
appointment.483  Off-economy barter arrangements became significant enough 
to warrant issuance of guidance from the IRS484 and a statutory information 
reporting requirement.485  Yet, in some cases, Congress has stymied the IRS’s 
efforts to collect taxes, and the IRS was correctly identified as contributing to 
the underreporting of income.486 
If lower- and middle-income taxpayers are evading taxes, they have taken 
their cultural cue from the high net worth end of the population spectrum.  
Individuals with high income and wealth pay taxes at an increasingly lower 
rate in the United States.487  The low rates are partially a product of capital 
gain and dividend rate preferences,488 and partially a function of tax shelter 
investments and other forms of aggressive tax planning.489  Many wealthy 
Americans also evade taxes. 
Recent events in Europe and the United States concerning offshore 
accounts and hidden income have disclosed that high net worth individuals 
 
NFIB, http://www.nfib.com/issues-elections/issues-elections-item?cmsid=56314 (last visited Apr. 
15, 2011). 
 482. Ron Lieber, Doing the Right Thing by Paying the Nanny Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, 
at B1 (offering various estimates stating that 80% to 95% of those who employ household 
workers do not comply with required reporting of Social Security taxes for those employees). 
 483. Schanberg, supra note 472, at 75. 
 484. Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 CB 60–61 (1979) (holding a bartered services are taxable to all 
parties). 
 485. I.R.C. § 6045 (2006) (requiring information reporting by brokers including barter 
exchanges). 
 486. For example, in 1978, Congress placed a moratorium on fringe benefit regulations and 
collection of taxes on fringe benefits.  See Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  Ultimately, Congress enacted statutory fringe 
benefit exclusion provisions. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 
531(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 877–88 (adding I.R.C. § 132).  Fringe benefit exclusions remain 
problematic from the perspective of equality principles in that they permit some taxpayers to 
consume goods and services without paying for them, while taxpayers who pay for comparable 
goods and services may not deduct the cost in determining their taxable income because the 
expenditures are personal, living, or family expenses nondeductible under I.R.C. § 262. 
 487. David Cay Johnston, Tax Rates for Top 400 Earners Fall as Income Soars, 126 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 916, 916 (2010), available at 2010 TNT 32-C (LEXIS) (showing a steady 
reduction in effective tax rates and increase in income for the top 400 earners in the United States 
from 1992 to 2007); see PARISI & STRUDLER, supra note 39, at 7, 10. 
 488. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006) (providing a general maximum rate on net capital gain as 
defined in I.R.C. § 1222(11) and a general dividend rate of 15%, with the dividend rate maximum 
set to expire at the end of 2010). 
 489. See supra Part I. 
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have evaded taxes of massive proportions in both Germany and the United 
States.  For wealthy individuals, bank secrecy laws facilitate tax evasion.  
Those individuals frequently deposit large sums in financial institutions in 
countries that have strong bank secrecy protections.490  Despite taxation of 
residents on interest and dividends worldwide in Germany, for example,491 
taxpayers fail to report earnings from those secret deposits. 
Recently, the German taxing authorities purchased an electronic database 
from a Liechtenstein bank employee that disclosed the names of many well-
known and wealthy Germans who were evading German taxes with a scheme 
that involved the use of Stiftungen492 for private benefit.493  The Stiftungen 
deposited assets in Liechtenstein banks, and the accounts and their underlying 
ownership were invisible to German taxing authorities until German 
prosecutors purchased a CD-ROM from a former Liechtenstein bank employee 
containing the names of German residents with Stiftungen in Liechtenstein.494  
Liechtenstein permitted the individuals who established the Stiftungen to 
withdraw funds from the Stiftung’s accounts for the private expenses of the 
individual and his or her family while the individual and family members were 
outside Germany.495 
Financial institutions in Switzerland and Liechtenstein have actively 
facilitated tax evasion in both the United States and Germany by marketing 
 
 490. Historically, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the Channel Islands all 
protected the identities of their depositors, but the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development began a tax haven project in 1996 to combat unfair tax competition by blacklisting 
countries that facilitated home country tax avoidance through refusal to share information with 
home countries on income from and investment in the tax haven.  The project identified the 
countries listed above as tax havens because of their bank secrecy laws.  Luxembourg, the 
Channel Islands and Switzerland all have begun to cooperate with national taxing authorities to 
provide information to help the authorities identify tax evaders.  Liechtenstein has resisted 
cooperation.  See What is the U.S. Position on Offshore Tax Havens?: Hearing Before the 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 1–5 
(2001) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); Randall Jackson, OECD to Update Tax Haven Criteria, 50 
TAX NOTES INT’L 109, 109 (2008). 
 491. Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] [Income Tax Law], Oct. 16, 1934, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 3366, 3862, §§ 1(1), 2 (recodified Oct. 8, 2009) 
(amended Dec. 22, 2009) (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/estg/ 
gesamt.pdf. 
 492. DAS GROSSE DEUTSCHES WORTERBUCH [GERMAN DICTIONARY], supra note 38, at 
3427. 
 493. Kaiser, supra note 394. 
 494. Gerson Trüg & Jörg Habetha, Die Liechtensteiner Steueraffäre—Strafverfolgung durch 
Begehung von Straftaten? [The Liechtenstein Tax Matter—Criminal Pursuit through Commission 
of Criminal Offenses?], 13 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 887 (2008).  The 
purchase price was some 4.2 million Euros.  Id. 
 495. Carter Dougherty & Mark Landler, Tax Scandal in Germany Fans Complaints of 
Inequity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at C2. 
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accounts that conceal the identity of the account holder.  The financial 
institutions have accepted and encouraged the use of controlled foreign entities 
to evade any reporting the institutions might be obliged to make to United 
States and German tax authorities.496  Liechtenstein agreed in principle to share 
information with the United States in order to protect its qualified intermediary 
status.497  As the United States has sought to bring U.S. taxpayers into 
compliance with both foreign account reporting requirements498 and to collect 
underpayments of tax, the U.S. government prosecuted agents of a Swiss bank 
who had marketed secret Swiss accounts to American taxpayers.499  The 
United States entered into a deferred prosecution agreement against Swiss 
financial institutions in exchange for an agreement to provide the U.S. 
accountholder information.500  Swiss courts initially rejected all or part of those 
agreements as violative of Swiss bank secrecy laws, but more recently the 
Swiss Parliament approved the release of client information for thousands of 
American bank account holders.501 
 
 496. STAFF OF PERMANENT S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 111th CONG., TAX HAVEN 
BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 3 (Comm. Print. 2008). 
 497. See Ordower, supra note 395, at 5. 
 498. All United States persons who have a financial interest in a foreign account holding 
$10,000 or more must file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Account (FBAR) (Form TD F 
90-22.1) annually.  See generally Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), 
IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=148849,00.html (last visited June 1, 
2011) (providing questions and answers concerning the FBAR filing requirement). 
 499. The United States indicted UBS Bank executive, Raoul Weil, in 2008 for conspiracy to 
defraud the United States for his role in the cross-border business, and he is now considered a 
fugitive; former UBS private banker, Bradley Birkenfield, pleaded guilty in 2008 to conspiring to 
defraud the United States for similar conduct.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Enters 
into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/ 
txdv09136.htm. 
 500. Id. 
 501. UBS and the Swiss government have been adamant that Swiss bank privacy laws prevent 
UBS from revealing the names of some 52,000 Americans depositors.  While UBS did agree to 
hand over the banking information of 4,450 American depositors to the United States 
government, the Swiss government tried to block this release of information as contrary to Swiss 
bank secrecy laws.  The Swiss Federal Administrative Court ruled in January 2010 that for UBS 
to hand over customer banking information would be illegal.  All Things Considered: Banking 
Flap Strains U.S.-Switzerland Relations (NPR broadcast Aug. 1, 2009), transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111464413; 2nd Swiss Court Ruling 
Complicates Life for UBS & Swiss Government, BANKING NEWSLINK (Jan. 26, 2010), available 
at http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure=decisions-rulings/13786899-1.html.  On June 
17, 2010, though, the Swiss Parliament decided to forgo a national referendum on the matter of 
bank secrecy law violations and agreed to honor the deferred prosecution agreement, allowing for 
the disclosure of account information on 4,450 UBS accounts held by American clients.  See 
Lynnley Browning, Swiss Approve Deal for UBS to Reveal U.S. Clients Suspected of Tax 
Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at B3. 
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CONCLUSION: CHANGING THE CULTURE 
I do not believe that the current complexity of the tax law necessarily 
fortifies the disrespect for taxation so characteristic of the tax avoidance 
culture.  Rather, complexity is a by-product of using the tax system to drive 
social policy and deliver a wide range of economic incentives and 
disincentives.  Taxation law has moved so far from a public perception of 
fairness and necessity that radical changes are critical to overcoming years of 
anti-tax rhetoric and activity.  I see the following four steps—which require 
considerable and very unlikely legislative resolve to implement—as essential 
to promote cultural change:502 
1. Wean legislatures from using the taxation system to deliver incentives 
or subsidies. 
2. Fund a massive compliance effort. 
3. Adopt wide-scale withholding to complement information reporting, 
and broaden both. 
4. Advertise and educate, emphasizing the services that tax revenue 
provides. 
Disincentives are less troubling than incentives.  Several countries have 
used special punitive taxes to discourage certain socially undesirable behaviors 
including alcoholism, smoking and even unnecessary automobile use.503  Even 
in those instances, however, critics have argued that such behavior-based or 
“sin” taxes impact lower income individuals disproportionally504 and do not 
consistently modify behavior.505 
Delivery of incentives and subsidies through the tax system makes the tax 
laws complex.  Subsidies require complex and detailed rules so that the 
government does not deliver the subsidy to claimants who fail to engage in the 
activity that the legislature wishes to promote.  Nevertheless, experience with 
the tax shelter industry teaches that tax subsidies encourage aggressive tax 
planning to redirect the subsidies to taxpayers who engage in the subsidized 
activity inefficiently, or even not at all.  Tax subsidies enable taxpayers with 
comparable incomes to pay vastly different amounts of tax.  Whether the tax 
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incentives are desirable or their distribution, fair seems to be of little 
importance to the development of the culture.  If one perceives that others who 
have equal or greater incomes pay less tax, a conclusion that the tax system is 
not even-handed is self-evident.  Simplification of the tax laws by using them 
to collect revenue for governmental purposes only is critical to cultural change 
but especially hard to sell to legislatures that have habituated themselves to 
hiding subsidies in tax incentives. 
Tax administration requires funding in order to do its job completely.  
Statistics show that the average revenue agent collects many times his or her 
salary and benefits in tax revenue.506  I am not suggesting that revenue agents 
should work on commission with salaries being a function of the revenue they 
generate.507  Tax collection requires resources so that playing the audit lottery 
becomes a bad bet.  Increase in the audit rate would encourage compliance.  
Increasing identification of and attention to taxpayers who have the ability to 
underreport will narrow the tax gap.  The compliance effort must begin with 
high income or wealthy taxpayers to dispel the common perception, whether or 
not justified, that the wealthy can avoid tax with impunity. 
Information reporting is a wonderful idea that provides a wealth of 
information.508  Eventually, the IRS will be able to use all the information for 
matching efficiently and accurately.  As good as information reporting may be, 
withholding at the source would be better.509  Wage withholding initially was 
unpopular.  Yet, despite many employers’ ongoing efforts to define their 
employees as independent contractors to avoid withholding and the employer’s 
share of the Social Security tax, wage withholding has developed into a 
commonplace feature of employment payroll.  Wage withholding passes 
almost unnoticed in most cases.  Most information reporters equally could 
withhold taxes as report income.  For those who have information, but no 
control over the funds that change hands, a requirement of advanced and 
detailed reporting as a condition to accepting appointment is critical to replace 
withholding where withholding is not practical.  Withholding compels 
compliance. 
Done correctly and carefully, massive education and advertising 
complementing tax simplification and enhanced compliance resources might 
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change attitudes and the culture. 510  In the United States, the IRS has 
publicized some successes well and with effect.  Failure of Jenkens & Gilchrist 
and the prosecutions, albeit unsuccessful overall, of KPMG parties were 
discomforting to the tax professional community and may have caused some 
professionals to rethink the advice they were giving clients.  The recent “son of 
boss,” SILO/LILO, and foreign account initiatives met meaningful, but 
incomplete, success in moving taxpayers away from those behaviors.  While a 
well-funded counter-campaign is likely to emerge, publicity of collection from 
highly visible, high income and wealthy tax avoiders demonstrates to a wide 
range of taxpayers at varying levels of income and wealth that the tax system 
seeks to collect fairly from all.  At the same time, I envision an advertising 
campaign of public service-type announcements reminiscent of the anti-drug 
advertising.  The campaign should balance the positive and negative, 
emphasizing the great benefits that tax collections fund—education, police, fire 
and military protection—and the negative of the relative-certainty of negative 
consequences from failing to report and pay. 
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